Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

231. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, May 6, 1966, 1135Z.

1652. NATUS Info.

1. I invited PriMin Stephanopoulos to lunch at residence May 4 to meet AsstSec Hare.

2. Regarding Cyprus, PriMin said GOG sincerely desired to resume friendly relations with Turkey and to find solution to Cyprus question. He said that in his meeting with Turkish Amb Tuluy he had emphasized this point, and in addition assured GOT that (1) GOG would not accept coup d’etat by Makarios on island and (2) GOG renounced use of force as means of settling dispute. PriMin added that he hoped GOT would also declare itself along same lines.

3. Initial question, PriMin continued, was how to begin talks. One major problem was Makarios: if talks were held in secret and he learned of them—which he probably would—then he would denounce them as “betrayal” of Cyprus cause; whereas if Makarios were informed in advance of them, he would undoubtedly “torpedo” them. King, he said, had suggested that talks be undertaken without knowledge of Makarios, but PriMin commented that he doubted that this would be possible, particularly in view of many connections Makarios has here. PriMin observed that Makarios could count on support of opposition (Papandreou) and Communists in Greece, as well as certain elements of right-wing press whom he has “bought.” PriMin then posed question, asking what we thought would be best approach. AsstSec Hare replied that he agreed it would be extremely difficult to keep such talks secret.

4. Another problem, Stephanopoulos continued, was “level” on which talks should be held i.e., whether at Ambassadorial, Ministerial, or even “higher” level. Should talks be held at higher level and not succeed, it could be disastrous. AsstSec Hare asked if PriMin had confidence that both GOG Amb Delivanis in Ankara and GOT Amb Tuluy in Athens had “necessary contacts” to carry out this task. PriMin replied that as far as Delivanis is concerned, he has complete confidence that Amb shares fully views of GOG on Cyprus problem: as to his abilities, only time would tell. Tuluy seems genuinely to want to find solution to Cyprus crisis, Stephanopoulos said.

5. PriMin then talked of possible final solution. Enosis, he pointed out, would be best for all concerned, since an independent Makarios could be dangerous element in area, due to his connections with the non-aligned nations. However, if GOT insisted, perhaps question could be put off for “three to five years,” at end of which time plebiscite could be held to determine will of Cypriot people. Possible solution, he continued, would be changing of one of British bases into NATO base, in which GOT could participate: GOT could even represent this base as their own to Turkish public. British, he continued, have indicated they would be willing to discuss giving up one of their bases if by such means solution could be found to Cyprus problem.

6. PriMin then asked for U.S. views on problem. AsstSec Hare said he had found during his recent visit to Ankara² that GOT is most anxious to settle Cypriot problem as quickly as possible so that it can face up to economic problems confronting country. However, opposition would not let govt alone on Cyprus question, thus forcing it to devote considerable time and effort to this problem. However, AsstSec Hare said his visits to both Athens and Ankara had indicated there was sincere desire on both sides to find early solution to Cyprus question. Perhaps for first time, AsstSec Hare said, psychological climate in both countries is similar, and this should facilitate moving ahead on problem. When Stephanopoulos complained about Turkish “threats” to invade Cyprus, which he said made his own position more difficult with Makarios and Greek opposition, Sec noted that Demirel also had problem with his own opposition, and that “threats” should be seen in this light.

7. Comment: As in our previous talk (Embtel 1589)³ PriMin impressed me with his sincere desire to restore good relations with Turks and get discussions underway, although Greeks still preoccupied with mechanics of initiating talks. Further, there appears to be growing inclination to accept idea of putting issue “on ice” for period of up to five years, although in Greek view such a delay in settlement would need to be coupled with some provision that at end of period would enable Cypriots to opt for enosis. Despite his good intentions, however, it is apparent that PriMin is hesitant to move forcefully lest he give opposition and Makarios opportunity to attack him.

Talbot

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, Paris for Crawford and James, USUN, and USDOCO South for Freshman.
2. As part of the U.S. Delegation to the CENTO Ministerial Council Meeting April 19–22.
3. Telegram 1589, April 26, reported Stephanopoulos’ assessment of the prospects for his government and his views on the Cyprus situation. (Department of State, Central Files, POL GREECE–US)