227. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State1
1203. Embtel 1121.2 NATUS. Cyprus. At luncheon which I gave for FonMin Caglayangil April 5, Political Counselor summarized impressions of four day trip to Cyprus and subsequent conversations in Athens. This provided opportunity for us to explore Foreign Minister’s views on Cyprus situation and Turk attitude toward possible solution.
Political Counselor summarized impressions of Cyprus as follows:
- A.
- Apparent that Turk Cypriot leaders both in Nicosia and other parts of Cyprus were determined to do utmost to protect Turk Cypriot population and defend its rights.
- B.
- Greek Cypriot area of control seemed to be developing normally in economic terms, in contrast to evidence of restrictions and limitation on Turk Cypriot construction, travel, economic development, etc.
- C.
- Over long run, Makarios has interest in at least maintaining status quo because he will thereby strengthen his position and contribute to continuing erosion Turk Cypriot position on island.
- D.
- Turk Cypriots hold limited cards on Cyprus. They do not have enough bargaining power to offset Makarios’ efforts to whittle away their rights and position.
In informal personal discussion in Athens among Embassy representatives from Nicosia, Athens, and Ankara, three possible approaches to Cyprus problem were aired.
- 1.
- Continuation of existing situation. While this seemed in line with Makarios’ wishes and might be acceptable to Greeks, continuation of existing situation could not be regarded as satisfactory by Turk Cypriots or by GOT.
- 2.
- Reconsideration of Acheson plans which might still contain some useful elements which were worthy of negotiation among parties concerned.
- 3.
- Modus vivendi with provision for deferred settlement, in ten years time, for example. Language would have to finesse ultimate settlement of issues of enosis and partition, and stress would be on protection of Turk Cypriot physical security in intervening period. Variable elements would include future of Greek troops on Cyprus, status of Greek and Turkish contingents, role of UNFICYP, various types of administrative, judicial and police arrangements for Turk Cypriots, and possibility of UN or other international organ to guarantee security Turk Cypriot community.
FonMin replied in several installments as follows:
- 1.
- Prior to becoming FonMin, he had reached conclusion that because two communities could not live together, only solution was partition or federation. However, seems unlikely such solution could be attained at present time.
- 2.
- In GOT view, it was also apparent Greek Govt was weak and not in position to make decisive commitment re future of Cyprus. For this reason GOT agreed that modus vivendi, if it could be achieved, followed by interim period leading to final settlement might be possible way of approaching Cyprus problem.
- 3.
- Continuation of status quo was out of question since GOT had made it clear that this, in itself, was form of fait accompli. Lack of settlement might provoke some Greek Cypriot elements to take action against Turk Cypriots which would compel intervention of Turk armed forces. On other hand, Turk Cypriots, beleaguered and frustrated by status quo, [Page 480] might themselves instigate incident which would incite Greek Cypriot reaction and thereby trigger Turk intervention.
- 4.
- Neither Turks nor Turk Cypriots had any faith in Makarios’ interest in security of Turk Cypriots. GOT would therefore find it impossible to agree to withdraw Turk military contingent prior to final solution.
- 5.
- FonMin stressed instability in Eastern Mediterranean which would continue to exist, in absence of progress toward settlement, with all that this instability means to NATO. Suggested that NATO had important stake in guarantees for Turk Cypriot security and noted sadly that lip service which NATO paid to London-Zurich agreements was of little use to Turk Cypriots.
- 6.
- Turks considered that basic principles of London-Zurich agreements were still valid and must be incorporated in any new agreements although they were willing to accept modifications and adjustments in LZ to reflect current situation. Any settlement, even of interim nature, must be in accord with honor and dignity of Turkey.
In reply to FonMin’s question re contact with Greek FonOff, POL Counselor mentioned talk with Theodoropoulos April 2. In general terms latter had personally expressed positive interest in approach toward modus vivendi now with provision for deferred settlement.