Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

225. Field Information Report¹

[document number not declassified]

Athens, March 7, 1966.

COUNTRY

• Greece

SUBJECT

• Rightist Greek Military Conspiratorial Group

DATE OF INFO

• August 1965–23 February 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ

• [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] (24 February 1966)

SOURCE

• [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] information has been fairly reliable

1. In late 1963 and early 1964 a group of rightist Greek Army colonels (reported at that time as the military conspiratorial group) organized to stage a military coup if Georgios Papandreou accepted support from the United Democratic Left (EDA). After Papandreou’s election, the group was dispersed by transfers to Cyprus and northern Greece. Those officers have now completed their tours in these areas and are gradually returning to key command positions in Athens through the help of Lt. Colonel Georgios Vagenas, Director of the Greek Army General Staff (GAGS) office dealing with assignments.

2. Although Vagenas is not a member of the military conspiratorial group, he is friendly with many of its members and is influenced by Lt. Col. Georgios Papadopoulos, who is now with the First Army in Larissa, and Lt. Col. Dimitrios Stamatelopoulos, both of whom are competing for the leadership of the group now being revived. Col. Ioannis Lazaris, Director of the Chief of GAGS office and reportedly well thought of by the Palace, is also influenced by Stamatelopoulos. Lazaris is also a key man in the placement of officers.

3. The following members of the military conspiratorial group have recently returned to key positions in the Athens area:

a. Lt. Col. Kostas Papadopoulos, brother of Georgios, has been assigned as commander of the Dionysios Battalion since early February 1966;

b. Lt. Col. Dimitrios Stamatelopoulos, commander of the Agia Paraskevi Battalion since mid-October 1965;

c. Lt. Col. Antonios Mexis, expected soon to take a battalion command in the Athens area;

d. Lt. Col. Ioannis Ledis, Director of Military Police with headquarters in GAGS;

e. Lt. Col. Dimitrios Ioannides, expected soon to take a battalion command in the Athens area;

f. Lt. Col. Theodoros Patsouros, expected soon to take a communications command function in Athens;

g. Lt. Col. Michail Roufogalis, temporarily assigned on 23 February 66 to head the Security Office of the Greek Central Intelligence Serv-ice (KYP), is expected to move to “A” Branch of KYP.²

h. Lt. Col. Antonios Lekkas, expected soon to take a key command in the Athens area.

Ladas, Ioannides, Patsouros, Lekas, and even Kostas Papadopoulos, who is at odds with his brother, are supporters of Stamatelopoulos. Roufogalis is close to Papadopoulos, but Stamatelopoulos is trying to win his confidence.

4. Just before the Center Union (EK) 16 February 1966 rally in Athens, Lt. Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos came to Athens to contact military colonels in the event a coup was deemed necessary to thwart mob violence instigated by EDA or by Georgios Papandreou at the rally. Papadopoulos told his military contacts that Lt. General Grigorios Spandidakis, Chief of GAGS, had summoned him to Athens.³,⁴

5. The aims of this rightist group are to counter or avert leftist infiltration of the government and the military. Its fears that an uprising similar to that which occurred in the Greek Forces in the Middle East during World War II were increased with the discovery of another military conspiratorial group, Aspida, which the rightist group believes was inspired by the neutralist trend oriented by Center Union (EK) Deputy Andreas Papandreou. As a result of the strenuous efforts by former Chief of KYP, Lt. General (retired) Alexandros Natsinas to have a Reader’s Digest article on Brazil, “The Country that Saved Itself”, translated and widely distributed in Greece, the group saw a parallel between the situation in Greece under the Papandreous and the situation created in Brazil by the Joao Belchior Marques Goulart regime. It identifies itself with the thinking and policy of the Brazilian military junta.

6. The group has been divided since 1963, when Stamatelopoulos felt that Papadopoulos was willing to sacrifice competence and integrity for political expediency by his aid to certain officers to obtain key KYP positions and other command positions. Papadopoulos’ actions were in response to political pressures and his desire to placate General Natsinas, then his superior, who was too closely identified with the National Radical Union (ERE). Stamatelopoulos’ faction preferred not to align itself with any political party. Papadopoulos has used Natsinas and Nikolaos Farmakis, a former ERE deputy noted for his extreme rightist convictions, as contacts to rightist politicians. The key factor now joining the Papadopoulos and Stamatelopoulos factions is their common desire to neutralize the power of any officers who have any connections with ASPIDA. Emphasis is now being placed on identifying these officers who continue to occupy secondary posts within the military commands of Athens and who are in a position to learn of the group’s activities. The tempo of replacement of these officers is expected to increase during March 1966. As a figurehead, the Stamatelopoulos group tends to favor Major General (retired) Georgios Ballas.

7. Stamatelopoulos’ faction has contact with the Palace through one of the King’s aides, Lt. Colonel Dimitrios Zagorianakos. The King’s personal secretary Major Michail Armaoutis does not have Stamatelopoulos’ confidence. Stamatelopoulos feels that if the King opts for extra-constitutional military activity, the King would prefer martial law with rule by decree—a situation which Papadopoulos and the higher military commanders (particularly Spandidakis, Lt. General Christos Papedatos, and other generals hand-picked by Lt. General (retired) Konstantinos Dovas, former Chief of the King’s Military Household) would be inclined to accept. Stamatelopoulos’ faction prefers a military junta which would allow the King very few prerogatives; this faction blames the Palace for the political instability, starting with the fall of former Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis in 1963.

1. Source: Department of State, Athens Post Files: Lot 71 A 2420, POL 15 GVT. Secret; Noforn; Controlled Dissem.
2. Field Comment: A Greek security official reported in late February that Roufogalis will act in Papadopoulos’ stead while the latter is in Larissa. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Source Comment: Spandidakis is generally aware of the rightist military conspiratorial group but believes that it is more in line with his thinking relative to military intervention if necessary; i.e., that the King would rule through martial law. He therefore condones many of the transfers taking place now. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. Field Comment: [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Papadopoulos [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that he had come to Athens to determine what type of support the army could expect from the police in the event there was trouble during the 16 February rally. If the crowds decided to march against the Palace or Parliament, Papadopoulos [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that the army would take over. Papadopoulos also [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that there were only “precautionary plans” [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. [Footnote in the source text.]