222. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State1
Ankara, February 3, 1966,
1440Z.
885. NATUS. USUN’s 3340 to Dept, Deptel 629.2 Embassy shares Department’s views contained Deptel 629, especially paragraph 4. Nevertheless [Page 470] Department may find Embassy’s estimate of Turk views useful supplement. We believe four-power guarantee of Cyprus independence (and against enosis and partition) would not be feasible or desirable from Turkish point of view. Principal reasons are:
- 1.
- GOT still not inclined to place great trust in USSR. Despite past disappointment in US and UK and recent efforts toward Turk-USSR normalization of relations, GOT continues regard USSR as more friendly to Greece and Cyprus than to Turkey;
- 2.
- Turkey is committed to position against unilateral enosis but not necessarily against partition or double enosis (Embtel 858);3
- 3.
- Turkey is concerned about its strategic position vis-à-vis Greeks and Greek Cypriots whom Turks tend regard as one enemy, not two. Therefore, in event Cyprus is annexed to Greece, or if Turks lost foothold in Cyprus represented by their 650 men contingent and Makarios becomes undisputed lord of island, resulting Greek strategic envelopment of Turkey (as Turks prone to see it) constitutes situation which FonMin said was unacceptable.
- 4.
- Nature of guarantee and rights of Turk Cypriot community within independent Cyprus more important in Turk view than guarantee of independence for Cyprus. SYG and Rolz-Bennett arguments do not seem take account of future role of Turk Cypriot community in independent Cyprus.
Hart
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, London, Paris, USUN, Izmir, Istanbul, and Adana.↩
- Telegram 3340 from USUN reported that the Secretary-General had been apprised of preliminary negative U.S. response to his four-power guarantee proposal. (Ibid.) Telegram 629 to Ankara was sent for action to USUN as telegram 1813, Document 220.↩
- Document 221.↩