Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

218. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, January 11, 1966, 1731Z.

1054. Ref: Deptel 744.²

1. We believe Tsirimokos had two main objectives in mind when he proposed mediation proceed under SYG aegis. Maintenance of UN cover for any talks on Cyprus is important for Stephanopoulos govt, just as it was for Papandreou, who had systematically drummed into mind of Greek public that UN path was only traversible course towards just solution of Cyprus problem. Will be recalled that GOG last May felt compelled to justify its agreement to begin its dialogue with GOT with argument that it was simply following suggestion of Plaza who had recommended talks among parties to dispute.

2. Second, Tsirimokos probably concluded that one sensible way out of cul-de-sac created by Plaza’s resignation³ would be for SYG himself to assume Mediator’s mantle. To find someone else would be difficult and could lead to repetition of situation which has culminated in Plaza resignation. We doubt Tsirimokos expects that SYG would take up active role as Mediator, at least not initially. Rather, Thant could simply state that under mandate of March ’64 SC resolution, he was placing himself and Secretariat at disposal of parties concerned for whatever ways they considered appropriate for assisting them in finding early solution to problem. Tsirimokos would not object to participation member SYG in mediation (Embtel 1055).⁴

3. Re para two Nicosia’s 342,⁵ we see merit in parcelling out Cyprus problem into [garble] elements in order to discover where points of flexibility may exist. But it may be difficult to mount the scheme organizationally, particularly considering sensitivities of participants to each separate negotiation. We believe it might be preferable first to await results of GOG soundings in Ankara regarding resumption of dialogue. Tsirimokos is aware, as we all are, that Makarios cannot be ignored, but he is rightfully fearful that Makarios and Cyprus press will seek to torpedo talks before they have any chance of success. It seems to us that we should concentrate our efforts now in stressing to GOG importance of avoiding imposition of preconditions to future dialogue with GOT (Embtel 1055). We might also suggest to GOT that it accept UNSYG cover for talks and that it be as forthcoming as possible with Greeks on resumption of dialogue.⁶

Talbot

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, and USUN.
2. Telegram 744 to Athens, January 10, requested an analysis of Tsirimokos’ proposal for the resumption of U.N. mediation. (Ibid.)
3. Galo Plaza resigned on December 22, 1965.
4. Dated January 11. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
5. Dated January 8. (Ibid.)
6. In telegram 576 to Ankara, the Department of State reported that Menemencioglu had stated that the Turkish Government strongly opposed the idea of resumed U.N. mediation. (Ibid.)