Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

94. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 9, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Message from Chancellor Erhard to the President

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Heinrich Knappstein, German Ambassador
• Berndt von Staden, German Counselor
• William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary

After mutual introductory compliments, the Ambassador referred to the Chancellor’s most recent letter to the President.² The Ambassador said that the letter was in a sense in response to the President’s oral message conveyed through the Ambassador some weeks ago at the time when certain other Ambassadors were presenting their credentials (see attachment).³

The Ambassador said that he was under instructions to amplify the Chancellor’s letter in the following respects:

(1) de Gaulle’s statements on international monetary affairs in his February 4 press conference⁴ had been made without prior consultation with or the knowledge of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Ambassador said that his government felt strongly that the United States and the United Kingdom must participate in any discussions on international monetary matters.

(2) The Ambassador said that he was under instructions to bring to the President’s attention a certain growing concern in Germany with regard to increasing United States capital investments. The German government was not at all opposed to US investments in Germany which were beneficial to the industrial and economic health of the country. However if investments increased beyond a certain point, a situation could arise in which German offset military purchases became in fact a form of partial financing the deficit caused by massive exports of capital into Germany by the United States. For this reason, the German government hopes that further measures could now be taken to reduce the volume of US private capital exports. The Ambassador then cited the figures of $4.3 billion in 1963 and $3.9 billion in 1964 for US export of capital. He also mentioned the sum of $1 billion as the price paid by the US Ford Company when it bought up the UK Ford Company.

(3) With regard to German reunification the Ambassador said that his government was most grateful for the President’s Georgetown speech in December and for his State of the Union message as well as for subsequent statements by the State Department in support of reunification. It was gratified that de Gaulle had “at last” come around to supporting discussions on ways of moving toward an initiative in reunification. At this point the President asked whether de Gaulle really wanted to go it alone as seemed to be the case from what he had said on February 4. The Ambassador stated with emphasis that Germany considered reunification to be a Four Power question, at least at this stage and for the foreseeable future, and felt strongly that a US role was indispensable. The President said that if Germany and other Europeans want to discuss reunification by themselves, this was something that he would not have difficulty with. He said he had a close feeling for Chancellor Erhard and valued the US-German relationship, but he didn’t want this to stand in the way of progress toward reunification if Germany thought it could be better discussed independently of the United States. The Ambassador referred to a statement issued by the French government after de Gaulle’s press conference clarifying what de Gaulle had said so as not to exclude a role by the United States. He said that this French statement had been made as a result of the strong German feeling on the subject which had been conveyed to the French government. He said that de Gaulle is now willing to participate in Four Power talks and that this was a success for Erhard.

(4) The Ambassador summarized certain aspects of the talks at Rambouillet between de Gaulle and the Chancellor on the nuclear question. He said that de Gaulle envisaged Germany’s role as being limited to participating in planning of strategic nuclear targeting. The Ambassador stated emphatically that his government considered an Atlantic nuclear force to be necessary in order to prevent the gap between nuclear and non-nuclear powers from increasing to the point where it would create grave psychological and political difficulties. He said he wished to tell the President frankly that some people in Germany had felt last December that the United States Government had gone too far in apparently dissociating itself from a commitment to move forward toward an Atlantic nuclear organization. Even if the United States Government felt that it had been exerting too much pressure before this, the fact remained that the impression now was in Germany that the United States had moved too far in the opposite direction.

The President said that when Prime Minister Wilson and he had talked,⁵ the Prime Minister had questioned just how strongly any European government was in favor of moving toward an Atlantic nuclear force. The Prime Minister seemed to feel that such favorable views as had been expressed in Europe had been colored by US insistence. The President said that we didn’t agree with the British assessment on this, and suggested that they take the matter up themselves and talk with the Germans and Italians and other countries, and that they would find that those countries would say the same things to the British as they had said to us. Then the British could come back to us after they had concluded their discussions and we could all move forward together again. The President said that we had told the British that an Atlantic nuclear force was the best means we knew to relieve the British of their national nuclear burden. It was likely that with a small majority and certain other pressing problems, the British Government might be glad to find a solution to their nuclear difficulties. We had suggested that they undertake these talks and then we could discuss the whole thing further. The President said that our position represented no advancement and no retreat from the position we had previously taken.

The Ambassador said that nevertheless the December memorandum⁶ had been widely misinterpreted as reflecting far-reaching disaffection by the United States.

The President said the important thing was for the British, the Germans and the Italians to get together, rather than that we should appear to be telling our European friends what they should be thinking. The quicker they brought their positions closer to each other the easier it would be for us to move ahead with them.

In conclusion the Secretary asked the Embassy to tell the Chancellor that he appreciated the Chancellor’s letter. He said he was happy with the relationship which existed between them. He wanted the Chancellor to feel that he had the support of the United States government for efforts to make progress toward reunification. He said we were ready to participate in discussions whenever our responsible allies were. The President said he was pleased that de Gaulle and Erhard were in agreement on further moves in the field of European unity. He said that he looked forward to full exchange of views with the Chancellor when he goes over to Europe.

Finally the President and the Ambassador agreed on what the Ambassador should tell the press about their conversation. Subsequently the following statement on the visit by the Ambassador was issued by the White House:

“Ambassador Knappstein and I have had a good talk this morning. He delivered a message from Chancellor Erhard which reaffirmed the deep community of interest between the Federal Republic and the United States. I told the Ambassador of the full and continuing support of the United States for serious progress toward the reunification of Germany, and I expressed my clear agreement with Chancellor Erhard that the struggle for the reunification of Germany requires the interest and active participation of all of the responsible powers.”

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 7. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved in the White House on February 15.
2. Document 93.
3. Not printed. According to the memorandum of conversation of this discussion, the President told Ambassador Knappstein that he would keep Erhard fully informed of any conversations he had regarding Germany and stressed the need for the two nations to work in concert.
4. For text, see Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, vol. 4, pp. 325–342.
5. Records of these discussions, held in December 1964, are in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, Documents 58–61.
6. Reference is to NSAM No. 322, December 17, 1964, Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, Document 65.