Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

81. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, January 7, 1965.

SUBJECT

• German Unity

1. This memorandum suggests a US course of action regarding German unity, for the period immediately ahead:

(a) The Four Western Foreign Ministers would declare (perhaps when meeting at the GA in New York) that they favor, in principle, an initiative, such as the FedRep has in mind, for a Four Power Commission on Germany, which would provide an umbrella for mixed German commissions. The FonMin’s would declare that they have directed a quadripartite working group in Bonn to staff out the proposal in greater detail.

(b) The Bonn Working Group would then be activated. Its labors could be made the subject of considerable public and press comment by the German government between now and the election. These labors would include consideration not only of procedures for the Four Power Commission and the inter-German committees but also of the substance of matters to be considered in that Council, e.g., German frontiers and other security aspects of German unity. (Prior to the German elections, it is obviously an open question as to how deeply the Germans in the Working Group would consider it feasible to delve into such matters of substance, since any leaks on these questions could and would be exploited by Strauss and Co. to the disadvantage of Schroeder and Erhard. Only time and experience can answer this question.)

(c) When the FonMin’s met for the spring NATO meeting in London, they could review the Working Group’s efforts and give it further guidance. This would be the occasion for another highly publicized communiqué stressing their intent to proceed re German unity.

(d) If the three Western FonMin’s should then meet Gromyko in Vienna, to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty, they could discuss with him, in very general terms, the importance of progress toward German unity. They would not unveil the specific Four Power Council proposal. Ambassador Kohler’s judgment, expressed on his recent trip, was that the Soviets would not accept any proposal on German unity before the German election, for fear of strengthening the CDU. But even very general exhortations by the Western FonMin’s, in their discussions with Gromyko, could be made known to the press, with happy results in Germany.

(e) The specific Four Power proposal could then be put to the Soviets at such time, after the German election, as it had been staffed out in sufficient detail to be plausibly presented—and to be effectively executed if the Soviets should agree to set up the Council.

2. This proposal is designed to meet two needs:

(a) to generate further quadripartite Western staff work in spelling out the specific substance of a German unity proposal;

(b) to provide evidence of tangible progress which the CDU moderates could put to good use in repelling attacks by the German Gaullists.

The second of these needs is of crucial importance. The nationalists are clearly out to get, first, Schroeder (whose position is highly vulnerable) and then Von Hassel. They would expect Erhard, if success crowns their efforts, to accommodate to the changed center of gravity in his party. If the CDU thus comes under increasing nationalist influence the SPD might be compelled to follow suit, in the degree that this commodity proved popular; the lesson of Weimar is that no major German political party can allow nationalism to be the monopoly of the opposition. Thus, the basic object of our postwar European policy—the maintenance of German moderate leadership—would be placed in some jeopardy.

3. The basic assumptions underlying this proposal are that:

(a) The German proposal for a Four Power Council and inter-German committees is the most promising basis on which to proceed with further staff work. No one can predict in advance whether substantive discussions in the Four Power Council would prove fruitful; this Council might turn out to be no more than a forum for rehashing past Western and Soviet positions. In this case, the Council (meeting, perhaps, rather infrequently) might prove important chiefly in providing cover for the inter-German committees, where useful work might well be done.

(b) Quadripartite staff discussion of the German proposal for a Four Power Council will only be useful, in the long run, if it gets into the subjects covered in your recent backgrounder, in its consideration of proposals to be advanced in the Four Power Council. We would have to make this clear to the Germans from the start (although, as suggested above, it may well be that the most serious staff work in this respect will only be undertaken after the German elections).

4. The French will have little incentive to go along with the course of action proposed in this memo. The main purpose of that course—the strengthening of German moderate leadership—is one that they do not share. They want to see Schroeder weakened, so that he can be replaced by a German Gaullist.

The French might be moved, however, if it were evident that the US, UK, and FRG were prepared to proceed with the public declaration and the necessary staff work, without the French, if need be. There may be inoffensive ways of intimating this to Couve in New York, before France’s position is fixed. The French might well fear that continuing French isolation on this issue would place a heavy strain upon their allies in Germany: Refusing, day in and day out, to join in allied consideration of the issue which, more than any other, interests German public opinion is not the way to make the flowers of Gaullism bloom across the Rhine.

5. It may be useful to make our willingness to proceed along the lines described in this memorandum known to Erhard, before he visits de Gaulle. He will feel better able to stand up to Gaullist pressures and blandishments, in the course of that meeting, if he knows that the US is ready to back him strongly on the unity issue. It would probably not be useful for him to do more than stress the importance of the German unity issue and the need for further discussion of specific tactics among FonMin’s in his talk with de Gaulle. If he unveils the details of the course of action proposed above, this might only trigger a premature French rejection—since he could hardly lay out what may be the most convincing pro argument: The fact that a possible Western willingness to proceed with further staff work without France, if necessary, cannot be wholly precluded. Furthermore, our suggesting to Erhard at this point that he propose this course to de Gaulle might tend to confirm German suspicions that the US intends to withdraw from a role of active leadership and leave the Germans to bear the main burden from here on out.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 6. Secret.