Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

79. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, January 5, 1965, 7 p.m.

2484. Pass to the White House for the President. Subject: Meeting with Chancellor Erhard.

1. Message from the President.

I saw Chancellor Erhard this morning at 9, just before he went into a Cabinet meeting scheduled for 9:30. I advised Erhard that I had just returned from the US where I had seen President Johnson at his Ranch.² The President had asked me to extend his warm greetings to the Chancellor. He had recalled his very satisfactory meeting with the Chancellor at the Ranch and had asked me to tell the Chancellor that he looked forward to a return visit with him in Bonn. The President had also reaffirmed his continued interest in German reunification, and had asked me to point out to the Chancellor the reference he proposed to make to this in his State of the Union Message.³

The Chancellor expressed appreciation for the President’s greetings and statements. The President’s presence in Europe was badly needed. There had been many bilateral visits in Europe, i.e., he was visiting both de Gaulle and Wilson soon.⁴ However, only a visit by the President could serve to ease the “tensions and difficulties” that now exist in Europe. He welcomed the President’s statement on a European visit as contained in his State of the Union Message.

2. Reunification.

Since today’s Cabinet meeting had been called mainly to discuss the alleged change in US policy regarding an initiative toward reunification arising out of the “backgrounder” held in Washington on December 30,⁵ I dealt next with this subject. I explained that there was no change in US policy or tactics towards an initiative on reunification. What had been stated in the backgrounder conformed to what the Secretary of State had told FonMin Schroeder during his recent visit to Washington⁶—indeed, what he had been saying in all discussions on this subject for many months. It is not a question of our desire to seek reunification by all feasible means, but what could be expected to be accomplished by a particular initiative at this time.

I referred to the references to reunification in the President’s Georgetown speech and in his State of the Union message. I gave orally from the verbatim text of the backgrounder the statements made as to the importance of a solution of the German problem. In the light of his experience, however, the Secretary was convinced [that]before a serious initiative could be undertaken, answers on an agreed Four-Power basis must be found to certain questions which the Soviets might raise. This did not mean answers to all questions at the outset, but at least enough so as not to be caught off balance by the Soviets. I pointed out that the US, through a series of discussions by President Kennedy, President Johnson, and Secretary Rusk with Soviet FonMin Gromyko, as well as by our Ambassadors in Moscow, had been pushing for an opening for an initiative almost continuously since 1961.

The most recent discussions in this series had been held as recently as early December, between the Secretary and the President, and Gromyko.⁷ Both had probed deeply with Gromyko, however, Gromyko had made it clear that he had no desire to talk about reunification—only subjects such as Western troops in West Berlin, security of the Soviet bloc, borders, non-aggression pact, thin-out, denuclearization of Germany, and sovereignty of the GDR—subjects which the Germans and we had no desire to speak about. I was sure that the Germans did not have in mind a mere propaganda effort, i.e. the floating of a proposal which would immediately be shot down in front of the German people. Such a maneuver would be so patently transparent that it would unquestionably create an adverse popular reaction.

The Chancellor confirmed that this was not what the German Government had in mind. He referred to reports that we had, in the backgrounder, inferred that we did not wish to support the present CDU government politically through the making of an initiative. I said that no such inference had been given. I recalled to the Chancellor the fact that in the Four-Power discussions preceding the recent NAC meeting,⁸ the US and Britain had agreed to the strongest statement on a reunification initiative that had yet been considered by the Four, only to have it turned down by the French. The Chancellor asked why in our judgment the French had turned it down. I replied that it appeared to have been the result of a momentary reaction by the French FonMin to the position the Germans had taken in the NAC on the MLF.⁹

As evidence of the sincerity of our desire to see reunification pushed ahead, the Secretary had authorized me to propose to the FonMin, which I had already done in a preliminary way last evening:

1) that Four-Power discussions as envisaged in the agreement which was under discussion in Paris be resumed, if acceptable to the other three, in Bonn by the Bonn Group.

2) that Schroeder himself join the Secretary, the French FonMin, and the British FonSec when they gather in New York for the UN meeting, for further discussions on the initiative.

I emphasized that nothing should be said publicly about those proposals since agreement had not been obtained from the British and French. However, if the Germans agreed we would undertake to obtain their approval.

3. MLF.

The Chancellor asked the significance of the announced abandonment of the MLF organization within the State Department.¹⁰ What was the American attitude toward the MLF? Do we think there is any chance of getting the French to participate? Will we proceed without the French? Using guidance contained in NSAM nr 322, Dept Circular 1158,¹¹ I advised the Chancellor that we have not lost interest in the MLF. We, the Germans, and certain others had developed a position on the MLF, concerning which the British and others had raised certain questions. Since we seek a solution to the question of nuclear responsibility within the Alliance on as broad a basis as possible, we are willing to abandon our initial position in moving toward a broader consensus, which we hope will come out of the meeting planned this month between the interested nations. In arriving at this consensus we do not wish to assert pressures or create deadlines. We insist that any arrangement take care of the legitimate interests of Germany, as well as those of the other European states involved. Our position toward the French, I continued, was that we did not wish to do anything directed against them and wished to advise them fully of what we proposed to do. If they are not willing to participate now, we wished to leave the door open for them in the future. Although we do not expect them to join, we have some basis to hope that they will in the end acquiesce in whatever arrangement is made. When the force de frappe is operational the French have indicated that they will be willing to coordinate in some way its planning and targeting.

4. Bloc credits.

The Chancellor said with some feeling that he had once had hopes that the Germans could make a contribution to their relations with the Soviets and to reunification by offering large-scale assistance to the Soviets in return for political concessions. This was now no longer “politically realistic,” since Germany’s allies were offering credits to the Soviets.

I replied that I assumed he did not include the US Government, which has not offered such credits. Minister Westrick indicated, however, that there was a possibility that the American firms supplying East Germany with a synthetic fiber plant might offer credits on a private basis. I said that I had seen no evidence to this effect, however, I would look into the matter and advise them. I pointed out that US law, as well as government policy, prevented the granting of such credits.

5. Review of policy.

The Chancellor said that he wished to discuss with me further, when there was more time, what he termed as a “balance sheet,” which he could use in his forthcoming discussions with de Gaulle and Wilson. He would, for example, like to discuss further the question of the MLF. He thought it significant that de Gaulle had now postponed his press conference until after the Chancellor’s visit. His implication was that de Gaulle was thereby putting pressure on him to be more accommodating during his visit.

Comment: I saw the Chancellor immediately upon his return from a vacation at Tegern See, to which he will return for three more days on Thursday. He had had only a few moments to be briefed by Westrick, however, he appeared quite relaxed about the reunification initiative issue which has been boiling in the German press. I believe that what I told him will enable him to cope with the questions raised in his Cabinet meeting. I also believe that the government will now feel itself in a position to take action to dampen down press discussion of alleged changes in US policy on reunification. Federal press spokesman Von Hase will be holding a press conference later today. I will myself hold separate backgrounders with both the German and American press.

What is not yet clear is how Erhard and Schroeder will themselves come through this latest flurry. Apart from some SPD murmurings about the lack of an imaginative government approach, the Chancellor and his FonMin have so far escaped much direct criticism because of concentration on US policy. The next phase might, however, bring some shift of emphasis to the inadequacies of Bonn policy which have brought about the present situation.

In connection with the Chancellor’s suggestion for a discussion leading to the creation of a “balance sheet” for his forthcoming meetings, the Embassy will put forward to the Department suggestions as to the positions we should take on the various outstanding issues. The Chancellor was particularly heartened by the indication given in the President’s State of the Union Message that he would be visiting Europe soon.

McGhee

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 6. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
2. According to President Johnson’s Daily Diary, he met with McGhee at the LBJ Ranch from 10:45 a.m. to 11:15 a.m. on December 30, 1964. The two men also talked by long distance telephone on January 3 when McGhee called from Middleburg, Virginia. (Ibid.) No record of either conversation was found.
3. For text of the State of the Union address, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 1–9.
4. January 19–20.
5. The text of the Secretary’s comments was transmitted to the Embassy in telegram 1876 to Bonn, December 31, 1964. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–4 GER)
6. See Document 73.
7. See Document 74 and footnote 1 thereto.
8. See Documents 75 and 77.
9. McGhee’s response appears to have been based on the summary report in circular telegram 1152, December 20; see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, Document 66.
10. Reference is to a James Reston article in The New York Times, December 21, 1964.
11. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, Document 65.