Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

71. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, October 15, 1964, 3 p.m.

1481. Ref: Moscow’s 980 to Dept.²

1. In Moscow’s 980 to the Dept Amb Kohler has raised important questions concerning relations between Moscow, Bonn and Washington as they revolve around Berlin and the German question. In Embtel 1340,³ which pouched to Moscow unfortunately crossed Moscow’s reftel, we also alluded to the FRG’s policy with regard to Berlin. Although we raise virtually the same issue as Amb Kohler, our tentative conclusions are somewhat different. We will therefore, in the present message, comment further in order to respond to Amb Kohler and to cover the problem in fuller scope.

2. Neither the FRG nor any one of the three major political parties in West Germany regards acceptance or solidification of the present status quo in Central Europe as desirable. They do not, however, wish to bring about a change by force, indeed, they are so committed. We have, for example, seen in time of crisis in Berlin that they are prepared to move in the direction of accepting the status quo if under serious pressure from the Soviets. When, however, this pressure is no longer present or the Soviet threat less credible—a condition which they now consider to exist and estimate as likely to prevail for at least several years—the Germans revert to their underlying desire for progress on the German question. As noted in Embtel 1340, it is this desire which motivates the FRG in seeking a greater show of unity with Berlin through Cabinet meetings and the like.

3. It is significant that the steps which the FRG has taken or contemplates taking are not new. The recent Bundesversammlung meeting in Berlin should in fairness be accepted entirely as indicative of a trend, since it has never met anyplace except Berlin and its timing is determined by the Constitution. Certain other possible steps, moreover, e.g. Bundestag meetings, automatic application of Federal legislation, direct election of Bundestag representatives, were either in practice or had been sought before the Berlin crisis began in 1958. The Allies, under certain conditions, had actually approved the enactment of a “Globalgesetz” providing for the general application of Federal legislation. What we are now witnessing is, in our judgment, merely a resurfacing on the German side of a strong current temporarily forced underground by the prolonged Berlin crisis.

4. We believe that the desire for progress toward reunification will be a continuing and basic motivation of German foreign policy regardless of which party is in power. This is another way of saying that the FRG will not under foreseeable circumstances be prepared to cooperate in accepting or solidifying the status quo in Berlin or East Germany. Whether the United States or all three of the Western Occupying Powers are satisfied with the present state of affairs is therefore in the long run not likely to be the determining factor. We will, of course, continue to seek specifically U.S. objectives, and for various reasons we shall not always be able to support the Germans. But we must recognize that, given the overall position of the FRG in the Western Alliance, there are very definite practical limits to the possibility of our forcing or persuading the Germans to accept a policy which is repugnant to them.

5. A factor which we need always to keep in mind is the complexity and delicacy of the problem which the FRG faces in seeking to bring East and West Germans closer together in the interest of preserving the concept of their nationhood. There have been a whole series of examples recently: the pass agreement, the Hof Bridge settlement, rail path negotiations, etc. In each case the East German objective quite clearly has been to achieve either increased recognition or at least a public indication that the FRG is prepared to come to terms with the GDR as a lasting if unattractive reality. The West Germans must in each case decide to what extent they should accept East German terms in pursuing precisely the contrary objective of bringing German reunification closer. While recognizing that the FRG has frequently been inept in dealing with the East Germans, we should nevertheless not forget the difficulty of the problem they face. No one at the present time can be absolutely sure whether the pass agreement, for example, is a step more toward reunification or toward recognition of the GDR. Given this situation, it would hardly be surprising if the FRG should seek some extra insurance on at least part of its position by forward steps in its relations with West Berlin, where it is dealing with friends rather than foes.

6. The Germans are looking for such insurance elsewhere as well. The Berlin clause is a major attraction of the trade agreements with Eastern European countries and which the GDR may eventually seek with Communist China. The Chancellor will certainly seek some recognition of the special ties between Berlin and the FRG during Khrushchev’s visit. This is the most they hope for, and I have found no real optimism among those who determine German policy on the prospects of achieving even this limited aim. State Secretary Carstens has told me that he does not expect a Soviet concession on the Berlin clause question.

7. Contrary to the impression conveyed by Ambassador Groepper in Moscow, Erhard has consistently cautioned in both public and private statements against any great expectations from the talks with Khrushchev. There is, it is true, among the business community and some politicians a tendency to think that it will be a salutary and revealing experience for Khrushchev to see at first hand the economic strength and political stability of the FedRep. To this extent there is perhaps wishful thinking in the FRG. But even among these circles we have seen no recent signs of a belief that reunification can be bought through economic concessions. I am convinced that those Germans who will be planning the Khrushchev visit—Schroeder, Westrick, Carstens, and Krapf—have no illusions about a changed Soviet attitude on the German question as a result of the Khrushchev visit. The FonOff is closely following statements emanating from Moscow such as the Pravda editorial cited in the reftel. The Chief of the FonOff Soviet section (Kutscher) quoted to us the Suslov GDR anniversary speech as an indication of how little could be expected from Khrushchev’s journey to Bonn. The Schwirkmann case has also hardly contributed to an optimistic atmosphere in the FRG.

8. With specific relation to Berlin, although I have not always found the FRG’s timing or method of presentation of proposed actions as adroit as it could be, I believe we would encounter serious problems if we failed to understand the strong current of German thinking which their Berlin policy represents. Equally serious problems would of course be encountered on the side of the Allies if the Germans should ever come to underestimate the importance of maintaining the Allied position in Berlin inviolable. I am optimistic that the present satisfactory understanding on this question can be maintained, however it may require some re-thinking—and some yielding on less important issues—on the part of the Allies. It was the objective of Embtel 1340 to analyze where it might be possible for the Allies to “give.” We may have to restrain the FRG at times, but we cannot on the other hand allow the Soviets or the East Germans the right of defining what is or is not provocative. It is often the East Germans or the Soviets themselves (as in their military parade in East Berlin on the 15th anniversary of the GDR) who commit the most flagrant provocations.

9. I would like particularly to emphasize that if we give the impression of pushing the Germans to accept the status quo in Germany—whether this be related to Berlin or to broader aspects of the question, we shall be in for trouble. The Germans do not have any real hope at the present of achieving a satisfactory solution of the German problem within the foreseeable future. They do, however, hope and expect that their Western Allies, particularly the United States, will stand with them in keeping the issue alive and probing for modest progress, even though the effort may be futile. In some respects, and this involves both the personal practice of FonMin Schroeder and the general posture of the Erhard govt, the appearance of effort may be more important than the substance of real progress. But the appearance of effort there must be, especially in an election year, if the govt is to preserve the allegiance of its supporters. For this reason, we could not expect that they could accept the Soviet-GDR Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance of June 12, 1964 without a strong reaction.

10. I have not detected any significant “Rapallo” thinking in the Fed-Rep. This includes the Ruhr industrialists with whom I maintain fairly close contact. The alternative to the Atlantic partnership usually cited by those in Germany who are looking for an alternative is not an arrangement with Moscow but closer cooperation with France. Any suspicion that the US is not prepared to support German reunification encourages, illogical though it seems, Gaullist thinking in the FedRep. In the future this could transform itself into a nationalist approach conducive to Rapallo thinking. This is only likely to arise, however, if we fail to take fully into account the depth of German feeling against acceptance or solidification of the status quo.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 32–1 GER. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow, Paris, London, and Berlin.
2. Dated October 5. (Ibid., POL 38–6)
3. Document 70.