66. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State1
590. Subj: The Oder-Neisse Line. Ref: Embtel 2432, Deptel 2026.2 The following represents our current thinking on the general question of Germany’s eastern boundary. We have benefited from a discussion on this subject during the past few days with Ambassador Kohler. The Dept’s study (Research Project No. 677 of April 1964)3 on the US position on the Oder-Neisse line is also most useful. We have read it closely and think it will be of continuing value. As a matter of historical interest, it might also be noted that President Kennedy, in his press conference of April 12, 1961,4 reaffirmed the view that fixing of the German eastern border would have to await a peace treaty.
In reviewing German developments on this matter since Embtel 2432 and Deptel 2026 in January, I think that events have supported the main conclusions of those messages, i.e. that Schroeder is trying to underplay the issue, that the German Govt will adhere to its position of not making unilateral concessions prior to a peace treaty (although there is no realistic expectation of Germany being able to negotiate more than marginal border adjustments and concessions), and that our best policy is to avoid public statements about the subject. At the same time, some political movements have occurred in this field, not all of it unfavorable. The past six months have in fact brought about two distinct but connected developments.
The favorable development has been the increased recognition and public discussion, primarily in intellectual and student circles, of the probability that Germany will not regain her former eastern territories. We should not, however, overestimate the impact of this trend in terms of a change in the German position. In the absence of reunification, a real change might well take close to a generation to evolve. In addition, the govt has clarified (as much as it is apt to) its position on the 1938 Munich agreement by acknowledging its abrogation by Hitler, and by disclaiming any territorial designs on Czechoslovakia.
[Page 149]The foregoing has not been an unmixed improvement, as it has set off a counteraction of expellee backlash. The extent of the latter is hard to judge, but its expression is harsh and loud. Minister Seebohm’s statements in Nuernberg were a good example. The Embassy has also reported such recent moves as the proposal for a Sudeten “march on Bonn,” warnings that the league of expellees is turning “soft,” and disgruntlement with de Gaulle’s position on the eastern frontier (Embassy’s A–292).5 Despite this reaction, however, the current attention to the eastern border problem is not in my judgment, a major or growing factor in German national life.
With a close election in the offing, however, it could become, at least temporarily, a field of political rivalry which could adversely affect the growing German potential to influence the future course of events in Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, the problem posed by expellee unrest is most difficult for those German moderates who are our natural allies in trying to “defuse” it. Much of the animus of the current upswing, for instance, is directed against FonMin Schroeder, who has been suspect in expellee circles ever since June 28, 1963, when he delimited restoration of the right of self-determination “to our countrymen in the Soviet Zone.” Expellee activity cuts across all three parties; the expellee leaders (Rehs and Jaksch) of the SPD are as impervious to party discipline on this score as are intransigents (Neuwir) in the CSU.
As for American policy, we can of course, hardly change our formal position on the Oder-Neisse line. It is now too deeply embedded, although the original ethnic and economic (foods and jobs) justification for our 1945 reserve6 about the line itself no longer obtains, there is in any event, little need for such a change, since our position is only procedural and does not bind us as to specific lines on a map. Although we might review the situation after the 1965 elections, there appears to be no room at the present for maneuver in this area. We can however, as we have since Secretary Marshall, give no new public impression that we envisage any specific territorial adjustments (nor should we deny this possibility).
What I would propose to undertake, with suitable caution, is to spread the idea in responsive govt and party circles that a moratorium on discussion of this issue would be desirable in the 12-month period before the elections. Although expellee agitation could not be totally silenced, it would still be worthwhile to stimulate govt spokesmen and major party [Page 150] leaders to soft pedal, or so far as possible to bury it, the issue during the forthcoming campaign. The election atmosphere could easily exacerbate the issue. Although it is a matter of primarily minority interest, this minority could potentially supply the 5–10 percent vote shift that the SPD or CDU are competing for.
Our line in achieving this might be as follows:
- 1)
- In explicit US statements, we would discuss reunification only in the context of the Zone. We would avoid any reference to or acceptance of the concepts of East and middle Germany.
- 2)
- We would avoid volunteering any public restatements of our formal position on the Oder-Neisse line. When queried we would express adherence to the Potsdam Agreement but in minimum terms and low key.
- 3)
- In private discussions:
- (A)
- We would note that the formal US position on the line is procedural (i.e. negotiating it finally in a peace settlement) rather than substantive, and that in fact we are committed to support some “accession (to Poland) of territory in the north and west.”
- (B)
- Try to create a general atmosphere of discouragement that the Germans can realistically gain territory. We would emphasize the improbability of any substantial German recouping in the area beyond present borders, since force is ruled out and it is unlikely to be achieved through a voluntary Polish surrender. Emphasize that neither we nor anyone else would ever be willing to fight for return of this territory.
- 4)
- In private conversations, we should urge on the Germans a moratorium on domestic discussion of the issue.
- 5)
- Finally, we should emphasize privately that continued agitation on this question is a drag on German reunification policy. In view of the continued close Soviet/GDR connections, the best possibilities now are in the direction of expanding German influence in East Europe, and isolating Ulbricht in his own camp. Implications that Germany aims at crippling Poland or Czechoslovakia can only tighten Soviet ties with these two nations, which together with Pankow bond, would thus continue to provide an extensive framework for continued Soviet predominance over East Europe. It is, however the retirement of frustration of this hegemony by gradual and natural processes, which can provide the only conceivable basis for eventual reunification.
In advancing the foregoing, I would naturally be highly selective in conversation partners. There would be no suggestion of an official campaign, any press leaks of which could seriously backfire. In general we should try to be casual and conversational, and to the greatest degree possible endeavor to implant the idea in the other person in such way as to suggest that it accords with, or originated in, his own thinking. In spite of the sensitivity of the problem, it should be noted that there already exists [Page 151] a rudimentary awareness of the desirability of keeping the issue out of domestic politics, as evidenced by Brandt’s proposal, which was accepted by the other two parties, that a three-party position should be taken with this aim on the Munich Agreement. There are thus good chances that some responsible political figures would be receptive, and I recommend that we try the approach since any gains in this sense would be positive in terms of our overall German and European objectives.
During his visit Ambassador Kohler inquired whether the Germans might be persuaded to offer the pledge that if they obtained reunification any future all-German govt would acquiesce in the present Eastern border in peace settlement. He pointed out such a move would permit a new relationship with Poland, and would focus energies and attention on reunification rather than the frontier question. I certainly agree that this would be the best interim solution, and it is furthermore likely, if any future German policy change occurs, that it would take just this form. There is, however no present party or governmental enthusiasm for the idea (which was first broached prominently in 1963) and it is too early to estimate the possibilities for such a step in 1966. Here again it becomes a question of quid-pro-quo. The Germans are reluctant to yield any bar-gaining power no matter how fractional, which conceivably could be of cumulative significance at a peace conference.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 32–3 GER-POL. Confidential. Repeated to Prague, Moscow, Warsaw, Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich, Stuttgart, Dusseldorf, and Bremen.↩
- Telegram 2432 from Bonn, January 11, summarized German positions on the Polish and Czech border issues. (Ibid.) In telegram 2026 to Bonn, January 20, the Department of State commented on the German positions. (Ibid.)↩
- See footnote 6, Document 28.↩
- For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 258–264.↩
- Airgram A–292 from Bonn, August 6, reported on resentment against Erhard on the part of Sudeten Germans. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 13 GER W)↩
- Documentation regarding the U.S. reserve is in Foreign Relations, 1945, The Conference at Potsdam, vol. I, pp. 744–745, and vol. II, pp. 208–215, 1491–1492. See also President Truman’s August 9 statement in Department of State Bulletin, August 12, 1945, pp. 210–211.↩