Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

58. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, June 17, 1964, 8 p.m.

3801. Department telegrams 3650 and 3651.² Emb had hoped that public knowledge of tripartite démarche in Moscow in advance of announcement of Soviet-GDR treaty as well as President’s letter to Erhard endorsing reunification³ as major Western policy objective would have satisfied FedRep need. Obviously latest FedRep initiative in Ambassadorial Group indicates Bonn believes further action required to cope with internal FedRep political pressures.

We would hope that in deciding form and content of response due consideration would be given to elements in Moscow picture which account in large measure for Soviet handling of Ulbricht visit, including particularly unorthodox private “reassurances” to Western Three as to significance of Sov-GDR treaty. At risk of seeming to plead Moscow’s case, we would point out that Sov behavior could be rationalized as calculated effort to reconcile internal pressures within own camp with desire to maintain impetus for improving relations with West, including FRG. Specifically, Moscow may have regarded treaty of friendship as relatively safe maneuver which would in part satisfy East German pressure for cashing in on Khrushchev’s 1958 ultimatum⁴ (confirming GDR frontiers, restating refusal countenance FRG proprietary interests in West Berlin) and at same time, by its confirmation Quadripartite responsibilities, avoid triggering Allied reaction resulting in crisis situation which Moscow obviously wished avoid. Moscow would undoubtedly find it difficult to maintain this posture of “restraint” if further Allied moves effected in such way as to compel vigorous rejoinder. In context struggle with Peiping, Sovs cannot afford to appear soft toward West and FRG and weak in defense of a socialist ally. ChiComs apparently have already started flogging Moscow on issue and Soviet concern is reflected by Izvestiya June 16 attempted rebuttal of ChiCom charge that treaty did not change “one iota situation of GDR.” We not in position judge East German reaction to visit but entirely possible that ChiCom attack based on evidence unhappiness of Ulbricht and others with results of visit.

In circumstances if action required to reassure West German public, we would share British preference (Deptel 3663)⁵ for some form public declaration, which reaffirms our understanding of situation in unprovocative terms requiring minimum response from this government. Time for protest, it seems to us, will come if Soviets choose draw some legal consequences from paragraph in treaty about West Berlin being separate entity.

Stoessel

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Berlin, vol. 1. Secret; Limdis.
2. Telegram 3650 to Moscow, April 9, reported on discussions with British and German officials regarding the Kennedy Round. (Department of State, Central Files, FT 13–2 US) Telegram 3651 was not found.
3. For text of the démarche, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 869–872. For President Johnson’s letter, see Document 56.
4. Reference is to Khrushchev’s November 10, 1958, address. For extracts, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 542–546.
5. Not found.