Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

40. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 18, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Mayor Brandt’s Call on Secretary Rusk

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The Secretary
  • GER—Mr. Creel
  • BTF—Mr. Ausland
• FRG
  • Mayor Brandt
  • Ambassador Knappstein
  • Minister Von Lilienfeld
  • Senator Schuetz
  • Mr. Egon Bahr

The Secretary opened the discussion by noting that it was important, as we deal with Berlin and German questions in the next few years, not to allow them to become a partisan issue either in the U.S. or in Germany. If they become partisan issues in Germany there will be an attempt to draw the U.S. in. The result would only help the Soviets. The Secretary asked Mayor Brandt what the prospects on this were in Germany. Mayor Brandt replied that he was not sure how the situation would develop. At present the coalition in Bonn on foreign policy is different than that on domestic questions. He pointed out that he had no influence on developments within the CDU or the CSU. There were some difficulties there, but he didn’t know how far they would go. The Secretary recalled that at a dinner several years ago in Bonn he had referred to bipartisanship. This had produced amused reactions on the part of some of the Germans present and he was not quite sure what this meant. Mayor Brandt said he thought it was important to link the question of German unification to decisions on other long-run problems. It would be undesirable if the impression were created that they were not linked. He noted that the Test Ban Treaty had not yet been approved by the Bundestag. Mayor Brandt added that he had spoken to Schroeder just before he went to The Hague. He thought they had an understanding that there must be a common front.

The Secretary said he was very interested in the change taking place in relations between the Federal Republic and Eastern Europe. The effect was to isolate Ulbricht. He heard from time to time talk from Germany that any move toward a détente would be bad unless it were linked with the German problem. He wondered if there were an effort to apply a double standard. For example, some Germans had objected to the U.S. selling wheat to the Soviet Union when the U.S. trade with the Soviets is only a fraction of European trade. Mayor Brandt said he thought those who follow such things closely understand that the German question cannot be inserted at every point. In his travels around Germany he had found considerable support, particularly among young people, for Atlantic unity, peace between Germany and its neighbors to the East, and partial solutions along the lines of the Christmas pass agreement.

The Secretary said he would like to say directly to Mayor Brandt that the U.S. is not negotiating with the Soviets on European problems behind the back of the Germans. His last talk with the Soviets on Germany had been in Moscow at the time of the signature of the Test Ban Agreement.² He had emphasized the importance of allowing the Germans the right of self-determination. However, he got nowhere. Khrushchev seemed preoccupied with other problems and maintained that no one in the West was really interested in German reunification. Mayor Brandt commented that if we should move from peripheral questions we should consult the German Government.

The Secretary said he got the impression that the Soviets were preoccupied with the Chinese and internal problems and were not interested at the present time in serious discussions with the West. This does not mean we may not want to take some initiative because we can never tell when this might be desirable. Khrushchev was blaming the British and American elections for our inability to get ahead but this may be an excuse.

Ambassador Knappstein said he would like to comment on the question of linkage between unification and relaxation of tensions. The Federal Republic was not opposed to measures which were world-wide in nature, such as the Test Ban Agreement, or bilateral agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. It did, however, feel that it had a direct interest in such measures as the Rapacki and Gomulka plans.³

The Secretary said he was sure the Soviets would be happy if we pursued their idea of agreement by mutual example. For example, if we were to withdraw troops from Germany, Khrushchev would probably follow suit. We can’t do this, however, until the German problem is settled. The Secretary added that he didn’t believe relaxation of tension harmed the prospects for unification. After all, tension had not moved us toward German unity. (At this point both Schutz and Bahr murmured agreement.) On the other hand, the Secretary added, we can’t assume that relaxation will lead to German reunification.

Mayor Brandt said he thought it might be desirable to concentrate on steps within Germany. He referred in this regard to statements in the Adenauer policy statement of 1963⁴ and the Erhard policy statement regarding the desirability of improving the situation in East Germany.⁵ The Secretary commented that this was an interesting line of thought. Adenauer had mentioned to him the desirability of the situation in the Soviet Zone being improved. The Secretary said he thought it would be desirable to do things which remind the Germans that they belong together. The Federal Republic should also assure the Eastern European countries that they have nothing to fear from Germany.

Mayor Brandt then turned to the problem of the border with Poland. He noted that the Poles were in the incongruous situation of wanting to recognize two German states, but asking the one with which they did not have a common border to guarantee the border with the other state. It might, however, be desirable to think in terms of some kind of qualified nonaggression arrangement which gave the Poles some assurance that the Federal Republic was not thinking in terms of a violent solution. The Secretary commented that this was an interesting idea. He was not sure of the Soviet reaction, since it presumes a common frontier between the Federal Republic and Poland. He then asked Mayor Brandt what he thought would happen after Ulbricht disappeared from the scene. Mayor Brandt replied that he didn’t know. There were more differences within the leading group in the GDR than there were a year ago.

The Secretary commented that Khrushchev has serious problems. He was not sympathizing with Khrushchev’s problems but merely noting them. From the Communist point of view Peking was probably right in saying militancy is necessary to maintain Communism. The East Germans may appear to the Soviets like the boy with his hand in the Dutch dike. If the Soviets pull their divisions out of East Germany they may lose all of Eastern Europe. The Secretary added that he thought, however, that the more isolated Ulbricht is, the better. Mayor Brandt agreed.

The Secretary asked if Mayor Brandt had any idea why the East Europeans are not jamming our radio as much. Brandt replied he thought this was because they needed the equipment to use against the Chinese. The Secretary expressed surprise at this and asked Mr. Creel to get him a report on this.⁶

Ambassador Knappstein said he thought it would be good if we could convince Khrushchev that the disappearance of the GDR would not destroy their position in Eastern Europe. The Secretary asked if the Ambassador could say this with conviction. Ambassador Knappstein said he thought there was a difference since the other Eastern European countries were national states, whereas the GDR was not.

The Secretary said that in view of Khrushchev’s remark to the Danish Prime Minister about responding to an American move against Cuba in Berlin, he thought he should say frankly to Mayor Brandt that the situation in Cuba was very explosive at present. We are continuing our overflights. The Soviets are training the Cubans to handle surface-to-air missiles and turning them over to the Cubans. The Cubans may be more nervous than the Soviets. This could lead to an explosive situation. He did not think it was an immediate matter but it could take a turn for the worse sometime in the future. We may be able to replace our overflights with other methods in time, but for now we must be sure there are no missiles in Cuba. The Secretary added that the situation in South Viet Nam is also very dangerous.

Ambassador Knappstein asked if it would be possible to replace U–2s with satellites. The Secretary replied, not for several months. There was the problem of orbiting and satellites were much more expensive than U-2s. Ambassador Knappstein asked if it were possible for U-2s to fly off the mainland. The Secretary replied that in this case they could only make adequate photographs 5–6 miles inland. There may be alternative means available some months ahead.

The Secretary noted that Mayor Brandt in his speech to the Foreign Policy Association⁷ spoke of joint projects with the East. Mayor Brandt said that he did think it would be useful for us to make proposals to the East, such as to build highways across Europe. The Secretary said he was interested in this because we have discussed within the U.S. Government the possibility of technical cooperation with the Soviets. We might locate, for example, some technical institute on the autobahn. He added that moving the UN to Berlin would be difficult, but that the location of some UN agency there would be acceptable to us.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–4 GER. Secret. Drafted by Ausland on May 20 and approved in S on June 3.
2. See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XV, Document 204.
3. For the portions of Rapacki’s October 2, 1957, address calling for creating a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 512–513. For text of his March 28, 1962, proposals on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 201–205. For text of Gomulka’s 1964 proposals, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 1086–1087.
4. Apparently a reference to Adenauer’s April 25, 1963, statement to the Bundestag. For text, see Adenauer, Bundestag Reden (Bonn, 1967), pp. 336–340.
5. June 11. For text, see Europa Archiv, 1964, vol. 2, pp. 318–323.
6. No report was found.
7. For a summary, see The New York Times, May 14, 1964.