Office of the Historian

4. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State1

Bonn, January 18, 1964, 3 p.m.

2532. Subject: Significance of Berlin pass arrangements.

1.
Embassy is pouching to addressees on January 20 an airgram analyzing political significance of Berlin pass arrangement in West Germany.2 Assessments of local reactions provided by Consulates have been taken into account. Following are main conclusions reached:
A.
Public reaction—while West German press has tended to highlight dangers involved in Christmas pass protocol, public generally has been favorably impressed by humanitarian achievement and considers that pass arrangement was a gain for the Western side. There is awareness that caution is required in dealing with East Germans but idea of contacts with them is not rejected per se. Public identifies Brandt with pass arrangement and he appears to have gained somewhat in popularity as result.
B.
Position of political parties—The FDP is the most enthusiastic and unequivocal of three parties in its support for pass agreement and for continuation of such contacts. In spite of doubts in the party executive, the SPD has also endorsed the arrangement and will support further efforts to reach agreement with the GDR along lines of Dec. 17 protocol. The CDU/CSU is in basically defensive position since most of its leaders have serious reservations about pass negotiations and are fearful that FRG’s German policy has already been jeopardized. They are prevented from attacking agreement and present efforts to extend it because Erhard has concurred in them and public opinion favors them. CDU/CSU can therefore be expected to go along with continuation Korber-Wendt talks but to oppose any elevation of level of contact or the establishment of further channels of negotiations with GDR, except under quadripartite auspices.
C.
Government’s policy—The immediate FRG objective is to maintain and extend such gains as the Western side achieved in the pass arrangement while minimizing the price paid. It will make every effort to counter any impression that FRG policy has changed and can be expected to reinforce the competence of the IZT Treuhandstelle and to oppose higher level contacts with the GDR. FRG will cooperate with the Allies in maintaining a fairly stable situation in which both can handle [Page 8] Berlin matters in accordance with their varying interpretations of the city’s status. The FRG does not view Berlin pass arrangement as bringing reunification any closer but it does not rule out the possibility that an amelioration of conditions in Berlin and the Soviet Zone might at some point be achieved by dealings with East German representatives and the extension of West German credits. It will move extremely cautiously to avoid unwarranted jeopardy to its present German policy, but it will do what it can to encourage a political relaxation in East Germany.
2.
Subsequent messages will be submitted on the implications of the pass issue for US policy and the motivation and tactics of the GDR. The latter will first be coordinated with USBER.3
McGhee
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 23–10 GER B. Confidential. Repeated to Berlin, Paris, Moscow, London, Rome, Bremen, Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich, Stuttgart, USAREUR,CINCEUR, and USELMLO.↩
  2. Airgram A–1185 from Bonn, January 20. (Ibid., POL 23–10 GER)↩
  3. Not further identified.↩