Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

285. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, September 5, 1968, 1500Z.

16455. Subject: Ambassador’s talk with Chancellor on Czechoslovakia.

1. Summary: The Chancellor made the following principal points: the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia is not an isolated matter but represents a basic change in Soviet policy toward all of Eastern Europe. “Wise and firm” US leadership is essential in the new situation. The US can stop Soviet action against Yugoslavia, and hopefully, Romania. The heightened Soviet emphasis on all Eastern European states being their private preserve puts the FRG in a special and vulnerable position because “half our country is one of the states in the Soviet preserve.” Hence FRG efforts toward German unity will be sharply attacked. A NATO summit would be the best means of demonstrating the strength and unity of the West, and there are signs that other countries are coming to this view. A meeting between the President and Kosygin is, of course, the President’s own decision, but if such a meeting takes place it must take on a new and different cast, with the President making clear to Kosygin the gravity and consequences of the new situation created by Czechoslovakia. The Chancellor is not optimistic over his chances of persuading de Gaulle of the need to stand with the West on Czechoslovakia. The Chancellor is sending Birrenbach to the US on September 7 as his “special envoy” to represent German views and to learn US view on the response to Czechoslovakia. End summary.

2. The conversation took place in a relaxed atmosphere during the evening of September 4 at the Chancellor’s bungalow. Present were the Chancellor, Carstens, Guttenberg and Osterheld, as well as the Ambassador and the DCM. The Chancellor began by saying he attached importance to the conversation with the American Amb on the eve of his trip to the Near East. He had debated some as to whether he should go in view of the Czech situation but decided that he should do so. Comment: It was clear that the Chancellor attached public political importance to this talk before going on his trip. He also clearly felt he ought to speak to the American Ambassador after his interview with Tsarapkin.

3. The Chancellor said that there are signs that Soviet policy has undergone a basic change. The threat to Romania remains very real and Yugoslavia is also menaced. Tito is deeply worried and feels “anything is possible” from the Soviets now. Tito also is disappointed in the Western reaction to date, including the US reaction and, on a quite different scale, the de Gaulle reaction. The Chancellor said he had always been deeply impressed by a remark which Secretary once made to him to the effect that European Communism, because it does not meet the realities of the world today, simply will not be able to hold out under “co-existence” and that only in China is Communism likely to survive in the longer term. What surprised the Chancellor was that the Soviets struck out so soon and so sharply in an effort to stop this inevitable internal erosion of European Communism. It was in reality an act of desperation and weakness. The Chancellor said he had done everything possible to avoid any provocation for Soviet action in the Czech case, including efforts to keep important official Germans from even going to Czechoslovakia.

4. Throughout the conversation, the Chancellor kept returning to the theme that wise and firm US leadership is essential in meeting the situation. The US as the leading power in the West must assume the lead. The Chancellor said he recognized our difficulties on the eve of an election, but there was really no alternative. He felt that by taking a firm line and rallying Western unity, it would be possible for the US to deter the Soviet Union perhaps from moving against Romania and especially against Yugoslavia. A Soviet move against Yugoslavia would be a most grave event for all our security interests.

5. Although it is not necessarily a new policy, the categorical emphasis which the Soviets now put on all of the “socialist” states being their private preserve poses a very special problem for Germany because one part of Germany, the GDR, is regarded by the Soviets as a part of the Soviet bloc. This would seem to mean that all efforts by the FRG to bring [about] the German reunification or even contacts with the GDR will be regarded by the Soviet Union as a hostile act. With their new emphasis on UN Articles 53 and 107,² the Soviets are likely to use this as a pretext for intervening more directly against the FRG. Not only in the propaganda sense but also politically, the Soviets are likely to be aggressive against the FRG.

6. This may well, among other things, take the form of moves against Berlin. The Chancellor said that the FRG was determined to meet this expected, new aggressiveness from the Soviets with calmness but also with firmness. He expected also greatly heightened propaganda attacks against the FRG. (We took this occasion to tell the Chancellor of the helpful instructions regarding US willingness to assist in countering Soviet propaganda attacks against the FRG around the world.)

7. The Chancellor said that he stuck by his proposal on the value of a NATO summit meeting as an effective means for demonstrating the unity of the West. He mentioned that he was encouraged by signs that some countries, like the Netherlands and Luxembourg, were showing signs of being favorable to the idea. He mentioned also New York Times sponsorship. He said that there is now a great opportunity for NATO and the West.

8. The Chancellor referred to rumors of a meeting between the President and Kosygin. The Chancellor said he would not of course presume to advise for or against such a meeting; it was up to the President to decide if such a meeting is held. Its main purpose however, must be to bring home to the Soviets fully the gravity and consequences of their action in Czechoslovakia and to deter them from similar action against other countries. The Chancellor said he realized this would change the character of a President-Kosygin meeting but he felt obligated to say that the Czech invasion created an entirely new situation.

9. On de Gaulle, the Chancellor said he will be meeting him at the end of the month and will of course encourage him to stand more closely with the West in reacting to Czechoslovakia. The Chancellor said he did not know how de Gaulle would respond, although he feared he would probably still hope to play an independent arbiter role between East and West.

10. The Chancellor said he felt it was essential that the German Government have close contact now with the US because Ambassador Knappstein is unfortunately ill and Minister Lilienfeld has recently left. He is sending Birrenbach as one whom he fully trusts as his personal envoy³ to talk with key people in the US. The Chancellor said that he understood important decisions were being made in Washington at this moment and that he would very much appreciate being informed on them.

11. In the course of the conversation, the Ambassador made number of points. He said that he fully agreed on the great gravity of the situation and knew that it weighed very heavily on the President’s mind. He also said that he felt it was an hour of real opportunity for NATO which had not existed before. The Amb also said that the Soviets are paying dearly for their action in Czechoslovakia. Their efforts forcibly to put down the spirit of freedom and the desire to share in the benefits of modern technology might erode the foundation of Communism in the long run. But military success had a certain devastating effectiveness all its own. The Ambassador promised to keep in closest contact with the Chancellor on the latest US thinking regarding steps to be taken.

Lodge

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 16. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow, Prague, Bucharest, Belgrade, Paris, London, Rome, The Hague, and USNATO. Brandt discussed West German reaction to the Czech crisis in My Life in Politics, pp. 166–168.
2. For text of the U.N. Charter, signed at San Francisco on June 26, 1945, see 59 Stat. 1031.
3. Lodge reported on his discussions with Birrenbach in telegram 16454 from Bonn, September 5. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W)