Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

28. Memorandum for the Files¹

Washington, April 21, 1964.

SUBJECT

• German Initiative

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Undersecretary Ball
• Ambassador Thompson
• Mr. Tyler
• Mr. Davis
• Mr. Creel
• Mr. Penberthy

Ambassador Thompson handed the Secretary a report of a conversation between Foreign Secretary Butler and Foreign Minister Schroeder on the above subject.² After reading the report the Secretary asked whether Ambassador Thompson’s memorandum of April 21 on this same subject2 would need any revision. Ambassador Thompson thought not and said that, as he had pointed out in his memo, there are two conflicting objectives in the present circumstances. One of these is to attempt to bring about bona fide negotiations on the Berlin and German problems through use of the German paper. He said he thought it absurd to think we could surface the German paper as a negotiating proposal without blowing the Soviets out of the water. To do so would raise holy hell in East Germany for the Soviets would have to come back with an East German paper at the least, and might even feel forced to take some action, perhaps even to sign a separate peace treaty. It is a question of either wanting negotiations, in which case the way to get them would be not to surface the paper, or of not wanting negotiations, in which case you could go ahead with the initiative in as innocuous a way as possible. But you couldn’t have it both ways.

The Secretary said that, in other words, we might get back to where we were in the summer of 1961 without there being any point to it. He wondered if it were really true that there is an erosion of the position on reunification by not doing anything about it. Mr. Tyler thought that it is true that, as Schroeder had said in his talk with Butler, if we don’t talk about reunification it would just melt away like ice.

Ambassador Thompson said that the status in the Ambassadorial Group of the German initiative is that we have asked the Germans to list in the European security section elements from the 1959 plan rather than just mention that plan. He said he took it from the Schroeder/Butler conversation that the answer was going to be that the Germans would not do so. Minister Lilienfeld had said only a week ago that the FRG prefers a German paper, but, again, from the Schroeder/Butler conversation, it seems that Schroeder wants an Allied paper. Ambassador Thompson expressed his apprehension that we should get tied to an Allied paper at the present time through the current exercise. He said he had agreed that at the working level we would consider a UK draft for an Allied paper based on an amalgam of the German paper and the Principles Paper.³ But he had made it clear that there could be no US/UK paper.

The Secretary asked what is next. Ambassador Thompson replied that Lord Harlech was scheduled to see the Secretary tomorrow, April 22, and that Butler was coming in on Monday, April 27. Ambassador Thompson said that if the Germans press for action now, we could have an Ambassadorial Group meeting in order to hear the German answers to the questions we had put to them at the last meeting.

Referring again to the Schroeder/Butler conversation, the Secretary noted that Schroeder had pooh-poohed the idea that the 1965 elections had anything to do with the German initiative and asked whether Schroeder had been dissimulating with Butler on the amount of pressure in Germany for an initiative. He noted that we had been led to believe for the past several months that there was considerable pressure, particularly among the youth. Mr. Tyler thought that Schroeder had not been utterly candid with Butler, for all the indications are that there is a considerable amount of pressure for some movement on reunification. The Secretary then asked whether there wasn’t more to an Erhard visit with Khrushchev than Schroeder had indicated there might be to Butler. Mr. Ball thought that there was, because the FRG seems to be very concerned about the possibility that Brandt might get to see Khrushchev first. Mr. Ball thought that if Erhard could get Khrushchev to come to West Germany it would be a big plus for Erhard. Mr. Creel added that the FRG thinks Brandt got a leg up from his invitation to visit Khrushchev in East Berlin even though the visit had not come off. Mr. Ball thought it would be very difficult for Khrushchev to go to the FRG in light of his constant reference to revanchists, etc., there.

Ambassador Thompson then asked whether the Secretary had seen the FRG response to the Soviet TASS statement,⁴ pointing out that the FRG statement was very strong and well written. Mr. Creel noted that the Soviets had followed the TASS statement up in a relatively mild manner and in fact had, through Smirnov in Bonn, hinted at the possibility of bilateral talks.

Mr. Tyler said that he was bothered by the fact that Schroeder was not bothered by putting forward proposals to the Soviets that could not possibly be accepted as a basis for negotiations. Mr. Creel observed that Schroeder recognizes that the present paper is no basis for negotiation but nevertheless feels he must take a step that would be viewed as progress or at least motion on the subject of reunification.

Ambassador Thompson wondered whether we couldn’t help the Germans out by having NATO make a statement on reunification which nevertheless could be attributed to the Germans. He pointed out that the FRG paper does include the idea of a Four-Power Council and feared that if the Soviets rejected the German paper, or any initiative based on it, then the Four-Power Council idea would be virtually killed, since it would be much harder for the Soviets to accept it once they had rejected it in a paper in which it is the principal point of substance.

The Secretary asked whether the FRG is really determined to keep open the question of the Oder-Neisse territories. Mr. Ball noted that certain Germans, for example, Carlo Schmid,⁵ as late as four or five years ago, had talked about recovering the Oder-Neisse territories but that they do not do so any longer. Mr. Creel pointed out that, regardless of what individual politicians think, this subject will not be frankly discussed before the 1965 elections. The Secretary said that the more the Germans talked about the Oder-Neisse line in the context of reunification, the more they push into the open the question of reunification of what. Mr. Tyler agreed that the way the Oder-Neisse territory was dealt with in the German initiative was one of its major defects and said that this point plus a lack of forthcomingness on European security were really the points that made the German paper not a proper basis for negotiation.

Mr. Tyler then elaborated his idea that perhaps the German paper could be turned into a unilateral German manifesto. It would be a solemn governmental statement drafted so as not to require the Soviets to respond as to an invitation to negotiation. The Three Powers could then associate themselves with this German statement. When he had floated this idea informally with Ambassador Knappstein, the latter had said he thought the manifesto idea offered the best solution. Mr. Tyler thought that Knappstein probably had been reprimanded in Bonn for voicing such an heretical idea. Mr. Creel pointed out that, even if the German initiative were converted into a manifesto, we would nevertheless probably have to indicate our willingness to participate in the Four-Power Council.

Ambassador Thompson suggested that in the Secretary’s conversations with Harlech and Butler he should say that we do not see that we will be able to bring about negotiations with the Soviets by means of pursuing the initiative suggested by the Germans. Proposals for negotiations are just not appropriate now. The Secretary said he assumed that the French would be of like mind, and Ambassador Thompson replied that the French would probably object to things in the paper on European security and nondissemination. The Secretary remarked that Couve continues to be receptive to the nondissemination but does not think the Soviets will be receptive because of the MLF.

The Secretary said that, if the problem is really one internal to the Federal Republic, the solution to our problem may be a speech by Schroeder or Erhard. Mr. Tyler pointed out that Schroeder had already made such a speech at Munich. Schroeder had gone deeply into the question of reunification and its meaning for Germans. The Secretary asked whether we were supposed to react to that speech, and Mr. Creel pointed out that in the letter from him to Schroeder on FRG-Yugoslav relations we had added a sentence commenting favorably about the speech.

Ambassador Thompson asked if it was true that Schroeder seemed to be backing away from the initiative idea. He thought he had seen an intelligence report to the effect that the Germans don’t think an initiative is such a good wicket to be on now. Mr. Tyler thought he had seen such a report. Mr. Creel pointed out that something on this point might emerge from the German Chiefs of Missions meeting now going on in the Bonn Foreign Office. The Secretary said that it seems to him that the Federal Republic wants us not to have any truck with the Soviets except on reunification, even though they, the Germans, might have any connections with the Soviets they want. Ambassador Thompson said that so far as the initiative is concerned the FRG wants to develop a package from which no part can be removed by the Soviets and pocketed. They are particularly sensitive to the inclusion of anything on access for this reason. Mr. Tyler recalled that Schroeder had, however, said to Butler that difficulties about the International Access Authority are not insurmountable. Ambassador Thompson pointed out that certain portions of the German paper, that is those on Heimatrecht, had been removed at our request.

Mr. Tyler suggested that perhaps the Secretary could see Schroeder in Miami. He thought that while Schroeder had not been willing to see Ambassador Thompson or himself, Schroeder might be willing to see the Secretary. The Secretary said that he gathered that Schroeder does not expect anything to happen on this subject before The Hague meeting. Ambassador Thompson pointed out, however, that Schroeder, according to Butler’s report of their conversation, was giving a slightly different impression. He thought we should see Knappstein as soon as he gets back this weekend. Mr. Tyler added that he thought it would be desirable for us to see Knappstein before the Secretary sees Mr. Butler and thought we should see Knappstein Saturday morning. The Secretary wondered whether we shouldn’t have a tripartite talk with the French and British before leveling with the Germans.

Ambassador Thompson thought that Schroeder had missed the point in saying that we cannot do anything because it is quiet now in Berlin. The reasons why we are not now in a position to make progress on reunification by a diplomatic proposal are that the Soviets are having troubles on the one hand and the US and UK are having elections on the other. The Secretary asked whether there is any reason why the Federal Republic cannot wait until after the elections to launch their initiative. Mr. Tyler in response expressed the view that the Germans are very sensitive to this action now. They feel they have lost ground in their stance on relations with East Germany both in the case of Ceylon and Zanzibar. They continue to feel that Yugoslavia is moving with the nonaligned countries to get them to recognize East Germany. They feel that there is a political deterioration in the FRG in relation to its GDR policy that can only be stopped by a move on reunification.

The Secretary asked Mr. Tyler to elaborate on what he had in mind by a manifesto. Mr. Tyler said that the principal thing was that it would be a statement by the Federal German Government in which it would be clear that no action is being taken, so that the Soviets would not feel compelled to take counteraction.

The Secretary asked that he be provided with a full text of Schroeder’s speech.

Ambassador Thompson reverted to the NATO declaration suggestion he had made earlier. Mr. Creel pointed out that for the Germans this would probably not be acceptable, since a NATO declaration would presumably not mention a Four-Power Council, which is the key provision of the German paper.

Ambassador Thompson said that the thing to say to the British, as he had done himself already to Mr. Greenhill, is that if you want a Four-Power Council you should do something to get it in a separate, unpublished approach to the Soviets. You should not try to get it by using a paper that the Soviets would feel compelled to shoot down. The Secretary said that that was what the French had been saying for some time. He said he would see what Harlech has to say and indicated that he thought that this German initiative question would be the main basis at The Hague Quadripartite meeting. He wondered whether we should draft and put forward some language for the European security section. Ambassador Thompson advised against doing so, since the Germans would only be frightened and only harm could come from it.

The Secretary noted with some resignation that he had been trying to get Berlin and Germany off the front pages for over three years and now that we had succeeded the Germans seem to want to put it back. Mr. Tyler said that that was the position in a nutshell. He said he was worried that a serious negotiation proposal at a time when we know the Soviets are not receptive to one can only be dangerous. For this reason he thought that the Germans should confine their initiative to the level of a manifesto, as he had outlined.

Mr. Tyler continued, saying that he does not like drifting toward being associated with unworthy proposals for fear of saying no to the Germans. Ambassador Thompson thought that what the Germans are really doing was gauging our intentions with respect to reunification. He noted that the French and British have made it clear that they do not want it. Mr. Ball said that he felt that unless something really useful could come from the present exercise we should not be afraid to say “no” to the Germans. We should stick to what we think is the right course. He thought there was no reason for us, with such serious consequences possible, to help the Germans in domestic matters.

The Secretary asked whether we had ever said anything concrete about what we wanted by way of disposition of the Oder-Neisse Territories. Mr. Tyler felt that our position was more implicit in what we had said than by precise statements. Mr. Creel said it was much clearer, in statements made by our government at Potsdam, that we would recognize the Soviet and Polish claims to the former East Prussian territory than what we had in mind for the territory immediately east of the Oder-Neisse rivers. He undertook to report further on what is a matter of record reflecting the American viewpoint of the disposition of this territory.⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B. Secret. Drafted by Penberthy.
2. Not found.
3. For text of this U.S. paper, which was prepared in March 1962 and handed to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at Geneva, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XV, Document 20.
4. For text of the TASS statement, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1964, vol. 16, No 10, pp. 37–38. For text of the Federal Republic’s reply, see Europa Archiv, 1964, vol. 2, pp. 251–258.
5. SPD Vice President of the Bundestag.
6. An unsigned April 23 memorandum attached to the source text reads: “RHD sent the Schroeder text to the Secretary, and Franklin in the Historical Office is taking care of the action assignment in the last paragraph.” The Historical Office prepared a research memorandum, No. 677, April 1964, entitled “The United States Position on the Former German Territory East of the Oder-Neisse Line.” (Department of State, Office of the Historian, Research Memoranda)