Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

269. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas¹

Washington, June 13, 1968, 2133Z.

CAP 81278. You will wish, I believe, to get the flavor of Kiesinger on the meaning of the East German visa move. Countermeasures not yet decided.

Bonn 13232.

Subj: Meeting with the Chancellor on Berlin access.

1. Summary: During a meeting with the three Allied Ambassadors this afternoon, Chancellor Kiesinger termed the East German measures on passports and visas a step in a long-prepared plan aimed at a gradual weakening of the status of Berlin and at the FRG. The Soviet Union clearly stands behind the measures and is seeking to isolate the FRG and to divide it from its allies. The new East German measures are not aimed only at Berlin and the FRG however but also at the Three Powers. The Chancellor felt that the assessment of the seriousness of this development provided in BQD-CC–28² was correct. As suggested in that document countermeasures are required and not just protests. The Chancellor urged as a first step that the Tripartite public statement be issued by the three governments as quickly as possible. The German Government had not reached decisions on specific countermeasures which the German and Allied sides should undertake. This should be the subject of close Quadripartite consultation. He would welcome démarches by the three Foreign Mins with the respective Sov Ambassadors. The three Ambassadors expressed on a personal basis general agreement with the Chancellor’s assessment of the situation and said that their governments would wish to consult closely in order to find the right response to the East German steps. End summary.

1. Chancellor Kiesinger met with the three Western Ambassadors for an hour this afternoon to discuss the East German passport and visa requirements. Also present on the German side were State Secs Carstens, Guttenberg and Duckwitz. The Chancellor first said that he would go to Berlin tomorrow to meet with Governing Mayor Schuetz for a discussion of the situation. He will not follow Schuetz’s suggestion that he take part in a Senat meeting since he does not wish to provide the East Germans with any pretext for claiming that the FRG is seeking to intervene in the government of West Berlin. He thought that under the present circumstances the population of West Germany and of Berlin considers his visit necessary.

2. The Chancellor said that in his government’s view the East German move is a step in a long-prepared plan that is aimed at a gradual weakening of the status of Berlin and at the FRG. The Soviets do not wish a real Berlin crisis and actual travel to Berlin will probably not immediately be affected. The dangerous thing however, is that the East Germans have created an instrument which can be used at any time in the future to interfere with access.

3. The Chancellor referred to the Quadripartite document BQD-CC–28 and said that the assessment contained therein of the seriousness of the introduction of a visa requirement was correct. The FRG believes that the East German measures are aimed not only at the FRG but also at the Three Powers. He felt that “not just protests but countermeasures are needed,” if possible as contemplated in the BQD.

4. What makes the present East German moves more serious, Kies-inger stated, is that they mark a clear escalation. There is no doubt that the USSR stands behind the East German regime. It is trying more and more to isolate the FRG and divide it from its allies. The Sovs are seeking “permanent right of intervention in the FRG,” they will not accept the very sincere FRG policy of seeking a relaxation of tension. Instead, they intend “to force us to our knees” and they naturally seek to use Berlin for this purpose as the most exposed point. The Sov approach to the FRG is so blunt as to be actually disarming as when, for example, they insist publicly that the FRG must sign the NPT and that the FRG signature is the only one of interest to them.

5. The time has come to make the Sovs realize, Kiesinger said, that they cannot through an indefinite continuation of salami tactics force the FRG to accept Sov positions. “My request,” the Chancellor said,”is that the Allies, as foreseen in the BQD, take a very clear position against the East German moves.” This is necessary to maintain the confidence of the German population in Germany’s allies. The German people will expect a very clear position both from the FRG and the Three Powers “in the framework of the overall political situation.” The Chancellor realized how difficult problems connected with Berlin were and how necessary it is to proceed with caution and realism. A balance is required in finding the right response but the basic elements of BQD-CC–28 are right.

6. The Chancellor said that this was a preliminary presentation of the German views which would be followed by written papers spelling out the German position in greater detail. He urged that in the meantime the three governments issue as quickly as possible the proposed Tripartite statement. The German Government had not yet issued a formal statement and would do so only after consultation with the Allies. The statements made by the FRG press spokesman yesterday and today were “impromptu.”

7. The three Ambassadors expressed, on a personal basis, general agreement with the Chancellor’s assessment and indicated that their governments would wish to work in close consultation, as the Chancellor had suggested, in finding the right response to the East German move. The French Ambassador said that he personally was of the opinion that the passport and visa requirement could not be left unanswered. Ambassador Lodge said that the United States considered the East German move a matter of the highest importance. He had been particularly interested in the Chancellor’s mention of counter measures and asked if the German Government had any specific ideas. The Chancellor replied that they have not yet considered what measures can appropriately be taken by the FRG and the Allies.

8. Ambassador Lodge also noted that BQD-CC–28 foresees the possibility of the three Foreign Ministers and the German Government making appropriate démarches to Soviet Ambassadors or in the German case to East German trade reps. The Chancellor said that he would welcome an initiative by the three FonMins with the respective Soviet Ambassadors in order to express serious concern over developments. The Chancellor was not yet sure that he would call in Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin right now since he considered it in the first instance better for the three Allies to approach the Sovs given the fact that it was a Four-Power agreement which has been violated. At an appropriate time he would, of course, make the FRG’s views known to Tsarapkin.

9. Our comments follow by septel.³

Lodge

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 15. Confidential. Received at the Communications Center at the LBJ Ranch at 6:10 p.m.
2. Not found.
3. Telegram 13246 from Bonn. June 13. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 38)