Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

267. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (McGhee) to President Johnson¹

Washington, May 31, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Final Report on Germany

1. Kiesinger. In my last meeting with Chancellor Kiesinger, he asked me to convey to you his warm greetings and to assure you that he still felt as he had expressed himself to you in Washington last August. As he wrote you,² he considers your decision not to seek a new term as an unselfish act of the highest order of statesmanship. In my conversation with him, it developed that his immediate concerns are with the current situation in France, both from the standpoint of its effect on France as a member of the European Community and insofar as it may induce unfavorable reactions in Germany. He is also concerned about the increase of the NPD vote to ten per cent in the recent Baden Wurtenburg elections, and the adverse effect on the stability of the SPD as a coalition partner resulting from its corresponding eight per cent loss.

2. Present Internal Situation. Despite the NPD increase and continued student unrest the internal situation in Germany remains relatively stable, particularly in comparison with that in France and even England. The political storm over the Emergency Law should recede once the law is passed. The Grand Coalition, although squeaky, is understood by all to be the only viable government available and will continue at least until 1969. Student unrest, although troublesome, has not resulted—and should not—in a threat to the government as in France. The greatest threat is that it may produce a right wing reaction. Most important, the workers have refused a linkage of their objectives with those of the students, and the labor unions remain conservative and stable and do not threaten strikes. The German economy is moving forward satisfactorily at a rate of five per cent annual increase in GNP, and unemployment has been reduced to manageable proportions. Germany has found itself, increasingly, as a pivotal country in European and world decisions—such as monetary reform, KR acceleration, and British entry. There is, however, an underlying apprehension largely arising from uncertainties in the general world situation.

3. U.S./German Relations. U.S./German relations are on the whole quite satisfactory. Although there is a strong anti-Viet-Nam sentiment among the youth, this has not resulted in any appreciable overall anti-Americanism. We still have a reservoir of good will among the German people and strong support among government and party leaders. Germany, being a country in unstable international equilibrium, must “lean” on other countries. With increasing evidence of French internal weakness, there should be a tendency to shift toward greater dependence on the U.S.—particularly the American security guarantee and the continued high level of U.S. forces in Germany. The creation of a Popular Front Government in France would produce a feeling of “encirclement” in Germany, which would require special reassurances from us. At the same time Kiesinger will continue to show that he is capable of pursuing an independent policy, which first takes into account German interests. He will continue to seek greater freedom for maneuver in the face of rapidly changing circumstances. He will continue, in a pragmatic way but with little hope of a real breakthrough, to press for progress in German Eastern Policy.

4. Current Problems. (a) NPT. The Germans are reluctantly drawn along by the course of events toward the signing of the NPT. I am convinced, particularly as a result of my last discussion with the CDU leader, Kurt Birrenbach,³ that they will sign—if a large majority of the other important nations of the world do. They will, however, wish to wait until after the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings and will be influenced by the firmness of U.S. interpretations of ambiguities in the treaty and Soviet reactions.

(b) Offset. We are in the final stage in the negotiations for an Offset Agreement for the next fiscal year. In my judgment, the 250 million dollar difference remaining between us can only be settled by a “splitting of the difference” approach—involving concessions by both sides. In my last meeting with him, I urged Kiesinger that the Germans better their current offer.

(c) Troop Levels. The Germans remain sensitive to possible further decreases in U.S. troop levels. Reductions beyond the limited deployment now under way should be avoided if at all possible—and assurances to this effect given—although this need not preclude savings in “non-combat” activities.

5. Future U.S. Approach. We should continue to maintain and strengthen our ties with Germany as perhaps the most stable and potentially influential free world country, through full and early consultation—as an equal. We should be alert to and reassuring in regard to well-known German sensitivities.

George C. McGhee

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 15. Confidential. A notation on the source text reads: “For the President From Walt Rostow: Herewith George McGhee’s [Final Report on Germany].” The report was transmitted to the President at the LBJ Ranch in telegram CAP 81232, June 3. (Ibid.)
2. A copy of the Kiesinger letter is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 71 D 370, Germany.
3. No record of the meeting was found.