Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

265. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, May 16, 1968, 1745Z.

12181. Subject: Berlin access. Ref: (A) Bonn 12007; (B) State 164087; (C) Bonn 11526.²

1. The Embassy’s view is that it would be unwise for Brandt to get into the specifics of Berlin access with Tsarapkin, even German access. The Germans’ right of access is inextricably if implicitly bound up with the Allies’ rights and with the responsibilities of the Four Powers. It is because this is true that the Allies are in a position to direct their approaches to the Soviets when there is interference with German travel to and from Berlin. A German-Soviet dialogue on access, outside the traditional Quadripartite framework which the Soviets continue to accept, might render it more difficult for us to approach the Soviets in future cases of interference with German access. It was this reasoning which led us in reftel (C) to suggest that it would not be appropriate to have Brandt’s discussion with Tsarapkin extend into matters which are an Allied responsibility.

2. The Germans do not seem inclined at the moment to have Brandt pursue the matter with Tsarapkin. They have not informed us that a meeting between the two has been scheduled. They have not indicated that they contemplate any further responses of their own in the access field soon.

3. However, the British Embassy (Gladstone) told us today that London felt a contingency plan should be developed, which would permit a swift Allied response in the event the GDR published a new travel decree or again interfered with German access to Berlin in the next few weeks. Gladstone said the British Minister in Washington had discussed this idea with the Department last week. Essentially what London had in mind was agreeing in advance that at a specified time after some new GDR access interference, the three Allies would proceed to deliver an oral démarche in Moscow. The three governments might also agree in advance to signal their displeasure directly to the GDR, perhaps in the form of a warning to the East German travel bureau about a possible slow down in TTD issuances. The British had no fixed ideas as to the details of this contingency plan but felt something along these lines would help us avoid having to go through the usual cycle of a press statement and protest to Abrasimov. We indicated that this idea had merit and that we would be willing, subject to any Departmental comments, to work out the details of such a plan at our next Tripartite meeting in Bonn on May 21.³

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 28 GER B. Confidential. Repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, Berlin, and USNATO. Brandt discussed his meetings with Tsarapkin in My Life in Politics, pp. 161–163.
2. Telegram 12007 from Bonn, May 13, was a situation report on East German activities. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B) In telegram 164087, May 14, the Department of State instructed the Embassy that if the issue of Brandt-Tsarapkin talks was raised by the Germans it should state that the United States had no objection to the discussions. (Ibid.) In telegram 11526 from Bonn, May 1, the Embassy reported on discussions with German officials regarding Berlin access. (Ibid., POL 38–6)
3. In telegram 166762, May 16, the Department of State replied that it saw merit in the idea of having Brandt warn the Soviets that “further GDR trouble making around Berlin would jeopardize a fruitful German-Soviet dialogue on matters of broader interest.” (Ibid., POL 28 GER B)