Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

263. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, May 8, 1968, 1858Z.

11795. Subj: Conversation with Wehner—Berlin access. The main topic discussed during my farewell call² on All-German Affairs Min Wehner on May 7 was Berlin access and related questions.

1. I gave Wehner a brief review of my conversation with Sov Amb to the GDR Abrasimov on May 3.³ I had pointed out to Abrasimov that recent GDR actions restricting access injected new tensions into a situation which had remained calm for the past three years. It represented an attempt to upset the status quo. I said that Abrasimov had taken the position that the USSR had always protested meetings of Bundestag committees in Berlin and other actions on the part of the FedRep tending to create the impression that Berlin was being treated as a Land of the FedRep. Therefore this could not be considered as part of the status quo. Abrasimov had hinted that if the Fed Govt were to publicly announce their curtailment of these activities, the Sovs would prevail upon the GDR to rescind access restrictions. I had told Abrasimov that I did not see any basis in his proposal for a bargain.

2. Wehner expressed appreciation for the position which I had taken. He agreed with my contention that Allied protests are not mere paper measures, but undoubtedly had some effect on the Soviet Union. As evidence he cited two recent lengthy articles in Pravda and Izvestia which took unusual and elaborate pains to relate access restrictions to the Potsdam Agreement. Wehner suggested that these articles should be closely studied. He was inclined to think that the Sovs, as a result of Allied protests, now felt it necessary to justify their position on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement.

3. Wehner said that Brandt had reported that the possibility of protest in Moscow was also under study. I confirmed this. I also told Wehner that countermeasures were being studied quadripartitely. If any were instituted, it would have to be by Quadripartite agreement and all, including the FedRep, would have to participate. Wehner agreed with this position.

4. I asked whether he had any suggestions as to what should be done next. Was he in favor of probes to determine the extent of the GDR measures? Wehner said that he was. He said that German civil servants had instructions to proceed as usual in traveling to Berlin. This involved of course the risk and inconvenience of being turned back at the checkpoint and having to continue by air. It was felt, however, that probes of this nature are necessary.

5. The Arndt-Behrendt exchange. Wehner then read from a memcon prepared by Parliamentary State Sec Arndt on his conversation with Behrendt (GDR Deputy Foreign Trade Min) at the Hannoverfair on May 1. He promised to make a copy of this memo available to us.⁴ From this conversation it appeared that the GDR was sensitive to hints that access restrictions might affect interzonal trade. Behrendt took pains in pointing out that none of the GDR measures affected interzonal trade and that Pollak (the FRG interzonal trade negotiator) would be free to travel to Berlin by surface means.

6. Tsarapkin’s Trier visit. Wehner said that the govt was paying close attention to two instances which constituted interference in West German internal affairs. One was Amb Tsarapkin’s visit to Trier where, instead of attending the official Karl Marx celebrations, he visited the meeting organized by the leftist opposition. The Chancellor had instructed FonMin Brandt to make a suitable protest to Tsarapkin about this visit.

7. Special train carrying demonstrators. The other question concerned the special Reichsbahn train which would carry demonstrators to the May 11 protest meeting in Bonn from Berlin. This problem was still occupying the Cabinet and a final decision has not as yet been taken. Wehner said that he had taken the position that the govt should refuse permission for the train, at the risk of interference with the gymnastic festival in West Berlin which Wehner considered an ill-chosen occasion for a major exertion on the part of the FRG. It was however a difficult question to decide. The Min of Transport had taken the position that refusal to let the train go through might lead to further restrictive measures with regard to Berlin access. It was a question of judgment.

9. [sic] I agree that it was a difficult question. Permitting this train to go through however could set a precedent for similar demands in the future which would amount to permanent interference in internal German affairs. There was here a parallel to the offer by East German authorities to permit the SDS to demonstrate on the Autobahn. Wehner agreed.

10. Possible visit to the US. In conclusion, I told Wehner that I had greatly valued my association with him. I had admired the energy with which he had attempted to bring motion into the German problem. Wehner responded warmly. When I expressed the hope that he would undertake a visit to the US, Wehner smiled and said that the chances for such a trip decreased as election results became worse (this was the only reference during the conversation to the defeat suffered by the SPD in Baden-Wuerttemberg). He added that he had talked to Amb Knappstein at the foreign policy conclave chaired by Chancellor Kiesinger last weekend, and that Knappstein had urged him also to visit the US. I gained the impression that Wehner might, after all, undertake such a visit if a suitable occasion were found. I would consider this highly desirable and hope it will be followed up.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 28 GER B. Confidential. Repeated to Berlin, London, Moscow, Paris, and USNATO.
2. President Johnson appointed Henry Cabot Lodge Ambassador to Germany and George McGhee Ambassador at Large on April 22. McGhee left post on May 21 and entered on his new duties on May 24. Lodge presented his credentials on May 27.
3. Reported in telegram 1396 from Berlin, May 3. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 USSR-GER E) McGhee commented on the meeting in telegram 1399 from Berlin, May 4. (Ibid.)
4. The memorandum of conversation was forwarded in telegram 11795 from Bonn, May 9. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B)