251. Memorandum From Nathaniel Davis of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)1
SUBJECT
- Eastern European Support for Berlin Crisis
You asked whether it might now be harder for the Soviets to start something in Berlin than in 1961. Would there be less support from Warsaw Pact allies? Would this effectively slow down the Soviets?
There are three obvious ways a Berlin crisis could come: (1) as a clear decision, after consultation with Warsaw Pact allies; (2) as a Soviet decision with little consultation (perhaps only with the East Germans and the Poles); or (3) as an East German initiative (taking advantage of an ambiguous Soviet attitude). In any case, the crisis might well start with harassments, East or West German police shot, or other incidents where the fault and the initiative were not clear. Probably the West Germans would initially be the ones involved—not the occupying powers.
If there were prior Warsaw Pact consultation, there would be strong voices opposing a Berlin move. All the allies except the East Germans and Poles would be unhappy. The Czechs realize that their economic troubles are partly the result of the military readiness they had to maintain during the recurring Berlin crises of 1959–1961. Their imports from West Germany have doubled in the past half dozen years (I am sending you a separate paper on this) and they have a strong interest in trade with the West. The Romanians would almost surely dissociate themselves from a Berlin initiative, and oppose it furiously. The Hungarians and Bulgarians would be most reluctant.
It is more likely the Soviets would engineer it without giving their allies a chance to object. It is only too easy for a crisis to grow of itself in Berlin, and no Warsaw Pact ally would be in a position to withhold public support. This would be all that would be required (except from the East Germans and the Poles) in the initial stages. The southern tier allies might later be asked to mobilize, curtail trade with Bonn, and close down diplomatic and trade missions. By that time, however, the Berlin crisis might really have taken on a momentum and life of its own.
There is a real possibility that Ulbricht might sense an ambiguity in Soviet attitudes and start slicing salami slices off the Berlin status quo. Polycentrism in Eastern Europe has not left Pankow untouched, and it [Page 644] gives Ulbricht a weight and maneuverability which he once did not have.
There is an idea floating around the Intelligence Community that the Soviets might initiate a Berlin crisis in order to weld together the Warsaw Bloc. This is a minority view. Most analysts believe the Soviets are essentially cautious—particularly the current collective leadership—and not anxious to sacrifice their gains in Western Europe, their developing relationship with DeGaulle and the exploitable fissures in the West German coalition. While a Berlin crisis might force a degree of Eastern European solidarity, it would be bitterly resented.
Conclusion: Moscow’s Eastern European allies south of Poland and East Germany would no doubt try to restrain the Soviets from initiating a Berlin crisis. However, if a crisis of ambiguous origin comes along, they are not in a good position to influence its development. With the possible exception of the Romanians, they would not be able to put themselves in the position of saying, “we won’t support you.” A crisis might, in fact, force the Czechs and others to pull in their horns. It would also produce deep resentments at being manipulated once again by Moscow.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 15. Secret. Also sent to General Robert Ginsburgh.↩