Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

25. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, April 11, 1964, 3 p.m.

3692. I met last evening (April 10) with Chancellor Erhard for an hour and a half at my request. It was the first opportunity for a meeting since my return from the States and his return from an 18 day vacation at the Tegernsee.

I told the Chancellor of my meeting with President Johnson² and conveyed to him the warm greetings the President had sent. I told him the President looked forward very much to receiving the Chancellor on June 12 following his acceptance of a degree at Harvard. I expressed to him the President’s appreciation for having sent on to him from time to time, through me, his confidential views on the international situation as it had developed. He hoped that the Chancellor would continue to keep him advised. He would in turn communicate periodically with him.

I expressed the President’s particular appreciation for the solid German support of the MLF, and hoped he had noted in this connection the Sec of State’s strong reference to the MLF in his speech of April 7.³ The President also appreciated the Chancellor’s support on the Kennedy Round and looked forward to discussing the prospects for success with him in his meeting on June 12, when the negotiations in Geneva will have revealed more clearly what some of the obstacles might be.

The Chancellor expressed appreciation for the message I conveyed and said he looked forward very much to seeing the President in Washington. He thereupon raised several questions on a very confidential basis.

1. Possible Erhard visit to Russia.

The Chancellor asked whether or not the possibility of his visiting Russia had been in the press prior to my meeting with the President and whether or not this had been discussed. I said that it had not, however, the German Government had before that time advised us of the suggestion made in the note conveyed to the Chancellor by Ambassador Smirnow on March 11 for bilateral German-Soviet discussions.

The Chancellor said that he would consider a visit to Russia only if there was a good chance that something useful could be achieved. The fact that Mr. Adzhubei, Khrushchev’s son-law, had during his recent visit to Paris⁴ made a favorable comment with respect to the Chancellor indicated to him that the question of his visit was being discussed in Soviet circles. Alternatively, the Chancellor suggested that he was considering the possibility of inviting Khrushchev to visit Germany.

2. Possible invitation to Nasser to visit Germany.

The Chancellor said he would like to float, in utmost confidence, another idea that he had had, namely, of inviting Nasser to visit Germany. He commented on the forthcoming non-aligned conference⁵ (at which it is anticipated that a determined attempt will be made by the Bloc to get various neutral nations to recognize the GDR). He confirmed that his interest stemmed largely from Nasser’s strong position in this group as it might be related to the recognition issue. In discussing the possibility of Germany having a constructive influence on Nasser, the Chancellor commented that the Germans had never fought the Arabs and had, he believed, a considerable reservoir of good will in the Arab states.

The Chancellor said the Israeli Prime Minister, Mr. Eshkol, had also suggested the possibility of a visit to Germany, however, this was not possible since Germany and Israel do not recognize each other. He had, however, met with Mr. Eshkol privately and secretly at various times and Eshkol was pressing for a meeting during his visit to the States, which it might be difficult for him to avoid. If he decided to invite Nasser, he would therefore like to get his invitation off before his visit to the States. The Chancellor said he thought he could, in the light of what the German Government had done for Israel, get by with the Nasser visit without too much strain on German-Israeli relations. He commented that if Nasser visited here it would probably be expensive for the Germans, however, this did not seem to trouble him. I suggested that he should consider the attitudes of the other Arab states who might be at odds with Nasser. He said all of this was being given careful study by the Foreign Office, however, he would welcome our own reaction.

3. Economic aid to the Soviets.

The Chancellor raised again, on his own initiative, the question of possible large scale economic aid to the Soviets. He said that he hoped we would continue to follow the scene closely and would tell him if and when we saw some opportunity for Germany to achieve important political gains on the all-German problem in return for economic aid. When I queried him as to whether the recent German commitment to provide an additional 400,000 tons of fertilizer to the GDR under interzonal trade represented a beginning of what he had in mind, he shrugged this off as being more or less inconsequential. I advised him that up until now we had not been able, after careful analysis, to discern in the present situation an opportunity for such a move. However, we would continue to follow it closely.

Comment: We will in a separate following telegram⁶ analyze the question of a visit by the Chancellor to Moscow or by Khrushchev to Bonn. There is no evidence, of course, of a firm Soviet invitation, however, Erhard appears to believe one would be available. We have in our recent Embtel 3619⁷ analyzed Soviet-German relations in general and possibilities for their improvement. We would appreciate any advice Dept is willing to have us transmit to the Chancellor.⁸

We are unable to assess here the full consequences of an invitation to Nasser. Obviously, the Chancellor conceives of it largely as a continuation of the Hallstein Doctrine. It is possible, however, that he may see it as an opportunity to provide an additional source of assistance and a new Western anchor to Nasser, which might help overcome some of the limitations imposed on us by our relations with Israel, and on the British and French by Suez, in establishing effective contacts with Nasser. We are not repeating this message to Cairo, however, the Dept may wish to in formulating its own evaluation, which I hope we will be able to provide the Chancellor.⁹

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Secret; Exdis. Passed to the White House.
2. See Document 22.
3. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 27, 1964, pp. 650–655.
4. Adzhubei visited France for 2 weeks beginning on March 25.
5. The conference was held in Cairo November 28–December 5.
6. Telegram 3694 from Bonn, April 11. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W)
7. Telegram 3619 from Bonn, April 6, reported on the current status and prospects for Soviet-West German relations. (Ibid., POL GER W–USSR)
8. In telegram 2908, April 17, the Department of State instructed McGhee that, if asked, he should inform Erhard that his judgment on the advisability of a meeting with Khrushchev would enjoy the full confidence of the United States. The telegram also noted that, in view of the number of issues likely to involve Allied rights, the Department would suggest quadripartite discussions prior to any initiative. (Ibid., POL 7 GER) In telegram 3322 from Bonn, April 22, McGhee reported he had passed this message to Erhard. (Ibid.)
9. No reply was found. Telegram 3805 from Bonn, April 23, reiterated the request. (Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W–US)