Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

239. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, November 15, 1967, 1900Z.

5213. Subj: Meeting with Chancellor Kiesinger, East-West relations.

1. The present telegram summarizes the discussion of Germany’s relations with the East which took place during the call I paid on Chancellor Kiesinger today at my request. Other subjects discussed are reported in septels.²

2. I queried the Chancellor on his press statement made on Nov 3³ when he had, after repeating the standard German line that there can be no final agreement on the Oder-Neisse border except through a peace treaty, said: “That does not exclude, for example, that joint discussions of such a solution acceptable to both peoples could be arranged before such a peace treaty.” The Chancellor replied that there was in his view nothing to prevent such discussions, the purpose of which would be “just to build up a little more trust.” He is aware that the Poles do not, at the present time, consider the question a subject for discussion. The Poles are not willing even to accept the German offer for mutual declarations against the use of force. Apparently they feel that this would weaken their case in building Germany up as a threat. In response to my question, he elaborated on what he had in mind in making his statement—that he might tell the Poles that, although a final decision could only be made by a united Germany, “We could imagine, however, a solution along the lines of (blank).” Kiesinger did not appear to be fully informed as to Polish FonMin Rapacki’s reported statement in Luxembourg on Nov 4⁴ to the effect that Poland would be willing to normalize relations with Germany if the Oder-Neisse issue could be settled. After discussion with his aides he did not believe, however, that too much credence could be attached to this report. The fact is, he said, that the Poles do not believe the Germans when they offer assurances. He knows the Poles very well. They are suspicious by nature as a result of their unhappy contacts with the Prussians over the years (which was not the case in their contacts with southern Germans). The Poles tend to react in the light of what they would do if they were in the German position.

3. According to Kiesinger, German East-West efforts must be directed not just to the Communist countries. They must seek to convince the whole world that although they will exercise their rights, they are seeking solutions in a responsible way on the basis of justice for all. In doing so they recognize fully that the first step must be the creation of a détente. Unification cannot be expected to precede détente. In his judgement, they should have moved more quickly in the beginning of his administration to establish relations with Hungary and perhaps other countries before Ulbricht made his counter-attack. In response to my query about the rumors that they might move toward establishing diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, he replied that the majority of the CDU/CSU is not yet prepared for such a step. He, himself, is not so worried at such an apparent breach of the Hallstein Doctrine, although he admitted that it would be a great defeat if India—for example—should as a result establish relations with East Germany.

4. Kiesinger was pessimistic as to overall prospects for improvement of East-West relations. However, he thought the Germans must continue to try. Many changes will take place within the next 5–10 years which might be favorable to their cause. The Chancellor spoke of his conversation of the evening before with the Hannover industrialist Philipp von Bismarck, himself a refugee from East Germany. Bismarck had advised him that for the first time the refugee groups in Germany are taking Eastern policy seriously—and on a realistic basis. There are those who argue that the govt’s Eastern policy involves risk, Kiesinger continued—that there will be no immediate success and that in the end the people will accuse the govt of having raised “illusions” and having ended up in a “dead end.” He fully supported the policy which he and FonMin Brandt had developed, which was based on the desire to move forward but without expectation of immediate success. This policy, which had the official backing of the CDU/CSU, was not seriously contested within the party (this was confirmed by a group of CDU Parliamentarians at lunch-eon today, as is being reported separately).

5. I advised the Chancellor that we had followed the efforts of his govt in East-West relations closely, and that we had found nothing to take exception to. His policy was consistent with that of our own in attempting to build bridges to the East, although we were in the present circumstances handicapped in our own efforts. The Chancellor commented that he did not think there was much we could do under the circumstances. The Chancellor assured me that Germany would of course not undertake any action with the Sovs which affected the US without first consulting fully with us. I said that we appreciated this and that this was particularly important where US forces were involved such as proposals for mutual force reductions.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL EUR E–GER. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, USNATO, Belgrade, and Warsaw.
2. McGhee reported on their discussion of NPT in telegram 5211 from Bonn, November 15. (Ibid., DEF 18–6)
3. For text, see Meissner, Die deutsche Ostpolitik, pp. 230–231.
4. Not found.