Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

237. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, November 7, 1967, 1355Z.

65712. From Secretary for Ambassador McGhee. Ref: Your Airgram A–459.² Subj: German Relations with Eastern Europe.

1. I have read with great interest your airgram and accompanying letter. Senior officers of the Dept have studied both papers and agree with me that they are excellent and timely. We feel that with a few relatively minor changes the airgram would serve admirably as a basis on which you could recommend a plan of action as suggested in your letter.

2. Re question of FRG relations with GDR (Section 2A, A–459) not clear to me precisely what you mean by de facto recognition of GDR, or how this would differ from present situation in which FRG acknowledges existence of an authority in East Germany and has some quasi-official relations with it. Would de facto recognition as you visualize it affect Allied access to Berlin? Could we continue to exclude East German regime from any participation in these arrangements?

3. I agree entirely with your views on bilateral FRG-EE exchanges of declarations on non-use of force. However, our view as to utility of Soviet proposal for a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression treaty would be governed by many other factors in addition to the FRG view; e.g., wisdom of equating the two organizations, degree of progress toward European political integration, general state of East-West relations, our reading of trends in Soviet international policy.

4. Would be difficult to maintain U.S. troops in Germany if FRG should wish us to withdraw them. We would also, of course, want to avoid giving the Germans any justification for claiming we were responsible for lack of progress toward reunification. I hope we could at right time make point to FRG leaders that FRG cannot commit U.S. in advance to any bilateral FRG-Soviet understanding on withdrawal of foreign troops; but that such proposals, whatever their origin, would be appropriate subjects for close bilateral FRG-U.S. as well as NATO consultations. Subject of German neutralization is particularly difficult. I wonder whether we can assume its acceptability to us without knowing the situation in which it might arise as a serious proposal.

5. I share your view that we will have to move with considerable circumspection in discussing with the Germans the limitations we see in their freedom to enter into agreements with the Soviet Union; we would wish to avoid arousing resentment and suspicion. Your views on timing and techniques could of course be incorporated in your recommended plan of action.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Confidential. Drafted by Johnpoll; cleared by Katzenbach, Kohler, Leddy, and Stoessel; and approved by Rusk. Also sent to USNATO for Ambassador Cleveland and to Moscow for Ambassador Thompson.
2. See footnote 2, Document 232.