Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

229. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, September 9, 1967, 1303Z.

2654. Subject: The current calm in US-German relations.

1. Contrasted with the situation six months ago, German-American relations are presently characterized by a pervading calm—an absence of controversial issues. Offset and related troop rotation problems have, at least pending the German decision on reduction of forces, been resolved. The NPT—while still not a happy prospect for the FRG—has been recast to meet the most acute FRG objections and there are now others who are willing to take the lead in seeking further gains. The emotional resentment against us is substantially reduced. The Kennedy Round and the international liquidity problem have both been settled to our mutual satisfaction. There is no acute concern over US investment—a recent large US purchase of a German firm went unnoticed. The FRG appears satisfied that consultation between us is adequate. The initial delay in a meeting between the President and Chancellor was in itself a source of instability. One could now say that, with the completion of their recent highly successful meeting, a new period in German-American relations—one long in the making—began.

2. The principal characteristic of the present period is a clearer separation—but not necessarily divergence—of German policy from our own. The Federal Govt knows that the FRG remains dependent on the US for defense. There is, however, no present military pressure from the East, and the Germans are therefore in a position to concentrate more of their attention on problems where the US role is less important. For the German Govt and people, the overriding present concern is their economic recession and budgetary squeeze, a field outside the direct influence of the US. During the period of their postwar recovery the Germans made massive contributions to every sort of international endeavor and charity—in order to gain acceptance by the community of nations. Now, deeply alarmed by their first real post-war economic turndown, they are looking out for themselves.

3. In second place among their concerns stands the German problem—or more precisely stated, the development of a more hopeful relationship with the Communist countries and with East Germany. The critical importance of the US in an eventual European settlement is accepted by the Germans, and they wish to work with us toward this goal. In their present efforts in Eastern Europe, however, they appear to have concluded that too close an association with the US can be more of a handicap than a help. They look to the French—their closest European associate—as being a more natural and effective partner in this particular enterprise.

4. The problem of Western security, particularly the German contribution thereto, probably ranks third in the list of current German concerns; and here the position of the US remains of paramount importance. It is indicative that our closest bilateral consultation is presently in this area.

5. It has no doubt been the Chancellor’s objective to remove some of the emotion from German relations—both with France and the US. He has succeeded, in part at least, by insisting that German policy be friendly toward, but independent of, both. He does not hesitate to disassociate himself from French NATO policy—and US Viet Nam policy. As the Chancellor told the Press Club,² the German Govt will no longer look to the US to solve all of its problems. Indeed, it has come to realize that we cannot in all cases do so, even if we wanted to. The result, I believe, will be less closeness in our relations but also, in the long run, less potential tension and recriminations.

6. There are, nonetheless, possible areas of difficulty in the future. I would list the main ones as follows:

A. A new European order—We have in the past encouraged the FRG to seek better relations with the Soviets and Eastern Europe, and a more fruitful contact with East Germany. In doing so, we have defined no limits as to how far we think they could safely go without endangering Western security. We showed signs of unease when Kiesinger hinted that a reunited Germany might be neutral—and when Brandt suggested that NATO might disappear. But we have not—I think wisely—tried to say now what would or would not be acceptable to the US in the way of a European settlement. For their part the German leaders do not appear to have thought very clearly of the limits they would set for themselves. On the other hand, they show almost an eagerness for contacts—to wit, Brandt’s recent discussion with Soviet Amb Tsarapkin (Bonn 2555)³—and Kiesinger’s exchange of letters with East German Chairman Stoph. Should the East show some readiness for movement and the Germans respond, I believe misunderstanding might arise between us as to how far the FRG can and should go without doing harm to the interests of the US and of NATO. This is something we must discuss with the Germans.

B. Security—The planned rotation of some 35,000 US troops has caused no serious disquiet in Germany. A more extensive reduction in the US presence would still bring with it, however, a strain in our relations and a further decrease in US influence in Germany. On the German side, some troop reduction seems inevitable, although not more than 19,000 troops for the present, and this probably over three years. Even, this, however, can cause strain on our side—and release presures for further US rotations or withdrawals. We must work closely with the Germans to minimize both their reduction and its impact in the US. The development of an American ABM system could also cause severe problems in our relations, probably more intense than with other less exposed European countries—although the difference would be only one of degree. A potential danger also lies in the possibility of our not reaching the same conclusions with respect to the carrying into the production phase our joint V/STOL and main battle tank development projects.

C. The US-Soviet relationship—During the recent past, the main problem for them which the Germans have viewed as resulting from US-Soviet relations has been the NPT. As indicated earlier, this issue has now largely been relieved of its emotional content. This same reaction can occur again, however, if we are able to reach further agreements with the USSR affecting Germany or Europe—without some progress, or visible effort on our part to achieve progress, on the German question. We should, therefore, clearly indicate to the Germans our willingness to consider any reasonable step they can propose which might result in some movement of the German question.

D. American investment—Further concentration of US investment in German industry, particularly in petroleum, will entail problems which could eventually reach serious proportions. We must consult closely with our companies on this possibility, pointing out the likely consequences of their actions.

7. Conclusion. It seems to me that we should also take advantage of the present absence of divisive issues in our relations with Germans in the following general ways:

A. We should seek to expand the constructive initiatives which have been taken to enlarge cooperation in mutually beneficial projects between our countries. For example, exchanges in the social environmental field initiated by Secretary Udall’s visit—and more recently in transportation—should be pursued. Cooperation in research and co-production in advanced fields such as space technology should be expanded.

B. Consultation at all levels should be frequent and comprehensive, concentrating in particular on the fields of most likely future difficulties—in an effort to avoid troubles before they arise. Direct exchanges between the President and Chancellor, with emphasis on the broad world outlook, should be encouraged.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, Berlin, Moscow, EUCOM for General Burchinal, USAREUR for General Polk, USAFE for General Preston, and USCOB for General Fergusson.
2. August 16. For extracts of the significant portions, see Meissner, Die deutsche Ostpolitik, pp. 225–227.
3. Dated September 7. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 38–6)