Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

184. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, November 2, 1966, 1803Z.

5393. Subject: Implications of a new German Govt² for US policy.

1. While the Embassy will continue to report significant day to day developments affecting the current German governmental crisis, it may be useful at this point to attempt some assessment of the overall implications insofar as US interests are concerned. The still fluid situation in Bonn as to the precise contours of the next govt brings with it both opportunities and dangers in our relations with Germany. At this juncture, the latter will probably predominate.

2. There is reason to think that Germany has reached a watershed in its postwar political development. In retrospect, it may well appear that the Erhard govt was the last govt of the postwar era. There are, of course, objective limits within which German policy must develop. However, the postwar era was also marked by many self-imposed limits. Some of these will now disappear, regardless of the composition of the next govt. This will become especially notable if CSU leader Strauss, as appears likely, should occupy an important position in a new govt; however, it is basically not a matter of personalities. A trend toward greater self-assertion and closer attention to specific German interests has, of course, been evident for some time. It has not yet markedly affected German foreign policy, mainly because the Erhard govt tended to respond more to the traditional postwar influences than to the new demands for greater German assertiveness. The next govt will, we believe, cease to operate in this postwar framework, which was characterized inter alia by a disposition on the part of the German Govt to look to us for guidance on almost any given issue.

3. There is a natural German tendency for French influence to fill any vaccum left by a diminution of Germany’s ties with the US. The momentum toward closer relations with France will probably continue for some time. Although it is unlikely to result in basic policy changes, since the French have in the final analysis little to offer the Germans, the new govt will doubtless try to give the public impression of a better “balance” in its relations with the US and France.

4. On the other hand, the impending change in govt will also bring opportunities for us as well as Germany. While the new govt which finally emerges from the transitional period will almost certainly be more difficult to deal with than its predecessor, it will also be a more strongly led govt, more willing to play an active role. It will be better able to fulfill its undertakings. Although the new govt will not proceed from the assumption that there is a virtual identity of US and German interests, it can be expected to recognize that there will remain a large area where our mutual interests are sufficiently close to permit fruitful cooperation. After all, Germany must continue to rely on us for its basic security.

5. During this transitional period, we shall obviously have to proceed with great caution. There is a tendency, although fortunately not expressed widely or forcefully, to put some of the blame on us for the demise of the Erhard govt. President de Gaulle’s press conference statement of Oct. 28³ was undoubtedly meant, with deliberate intent, to be the coup de grace for Erhard as the man who had spurned cooperation with France in favor of a close tie to the US. Fortunately for us, however, there are so many obvious reasons why Erhard must be replaced, and the view that he must is so universally held here, that we may get off lightly.

6. What should we do in the meantime? Some of the immediate consequences are obvious, and we do not wish to belabor them. We must lean over backward in order to avoid the impression that we are in any way interfering in the present crisis. We can probably live with any govt that emerges—no matter who is Chancellor or what form the coalition takes. There will be a tendency here to look closely for indications of US intervention, and every statement we make will be combed over with this in mind. During the period in which we must wait for the formation of the new govt we should, through our normal foreign policy pronouncements do what we can to create an atmosphere which will work in our favor in its selection and orientation. The following issues appear to be relevant.

A. The offset.

Any concessions made now to Erhard under the current offset would appear to be an intervention in his behalf. The best we can do is to maintain a neutral stance, and stand ready to enter into discussions with any government that emerges on how the current German undertakings will be fulfilled. It will continue to be difficult for us to grant concessions at this stage, even if we so desired, since it would be hard to explain why we offer to a new Chancellor what we withheld from Erhard. A forum now exists in the Trilateral Committee for discussion of future offset agreements, which obviates the need, for the time being, for us to make any new statements on this issue.

When the new government is ready to deal with this problem, it is conceivable that we may be confronted with a firm German proposal, with Parliamentary backing. We do not, at this juncture, believe that such a proposal would seek to renege on the current commitment to pay DM 3.8 billion—or necessarily to seek a moratorium; however, it may affect the mode of payment. Any proposal on a longer range offset in the Trilateral Committee will probably correspond closely to that made by Erhard in Washington.

B. Trilateral talks.

Little progress can be expected on the broad policy aspects of the Trilateral talks until a new German Govt has had time to determine its policy toward the issues involved. Earlier actions to induce the Germans to accept decisions—especially on troop withdrawals which they will probably oppose strongly—should be avoided. If the Germans get the impression that vital security objectives are being sacrificed because of US–UK financial requirements, they may seek an alternative—such as a closer bilateral understanding with the French—which would be damaging to the Western Alliance.

C. Détente.

During the last year German opinion on Eastern policy and reunification has been developing quite favorably from our point of view. However, the process has been slow and uneven and these issues remain among the most contentious in German politics. During this transitional period we will, therefore, want to exercise great care in interpreting our own policy on these issues. The central theme of such interpretations should be to emphasize that we have no intention of jettisoning our fundamental postwar policy in Central Europe. Our basic position on Germany’s Eastern frontiers, and of active support of German reunification by whatever peaceful means are available, remain unchanged. On the other hand we would not wish to negate the basic Eastward-looking impact of the President’s speech of Oct 7.

D. Presidential visit.

Until Erhard’s fate is determined, it would of course be inappropriate to say anything about a possible Presidential visit to Germany, resulting from the invitation Erhard recently extended in Washington. Soon after a new Chancellor takes office, we will undoubtedly wish to invite him to Washington. If on this occasion the new Chancellor should issue a new invitation and if the European situation as a whole is appropriate, I would hope that the President could respond favorably.

E. Non-proliferation.

We should not, during this period, take any decision to make important substantive changes in our draft non-proliferation treaty, especially if they effect options on a NATO or European nuclear arrangement. After a new government is formed, careful consideration should be given as to how consultations on this issue should be handled. Since there is much apprehension here that we will present the Germans with a fait accompli on this issue, we should take every opportunity to reassure them that they will be fully consulted.

8. The foregoing views must necessarily be only tentative and subject to revision in the light of what is a rapidly changing situation. We should, however, be fully aware that an important turning point has now been reached in Germany, and be ready to take advantage of any opportunities favorably to affect the attitude of a new government. Forbearance may, however, at a given point be just as important in this connection as speedy action.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 15 GER W. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Brussels, London, Moscow, Paris, Rome, The Hague, and USUN, and passed to the White House.
2. On October 27 the FDP members of the Erhard Cabinet resigned. The CDU/CSU agreed on Kurt Georg Kiesinger as their candidate for Chancellor on November 10. Following an accord between the CDU/CSU and SPD on a “grand” coalition on November 27, Erhard handed in his resignation on November 30.
3. For text, see Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, vol. 5, pp. 96–117.