Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

166. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, September 1, 1966, 1754Z.

2698. Subj: Conversation with Adenauer.

1. I had a meeting with Chancellor Adenauer today which he expressed at length his views on world affairs along familiar lines. I raised certain points which emerged in some of his recent interviews and invited his comments on the domestic situation.

2. Adenauer immediately launched into an exposition of the Soviet threat and what the West should do about it. His starting point was the proposed Senate resolution of the Democratic Policy Committee. I drew his attention to the comments by the White House spokesman on this resolution and assured him that we had no intention to withdraw major combat units.² The substance of Adenauer’s exposition was that the Soviet military threat toward West Europe had not diminished. It was imperative for the West to maintain an effective military posture in Western Europe. Although he felt that de Gaulle was generally correct in his criticism of the NATO organization, he regretted that de Gaulle had taken France out of that organization. The Soviets were confronted with three major tasks: to build up their military forces in competition with the US, to tackle major problems of domestic economic development, and to ready themselves for the Chinese threat. The Soviets could not accomplish all these tasks simultaneously, but would have to choose. It was in the interest of the West to steer the Soviets in a direction whereby they would concentrate on domestic development and the Chinese threat in order to do so, the West must not lower its guard in Europe. A major US troop withdrawal would lead the Soviets to believe that Western defenses are crumbling and encourage them to adopt an offensive posture in Europe. The West, on the other hand, should not itself adopt a threatening posture vis-à-vis the Soviets as this, in turn, would lead the Soviets to concentrate their efforts in Europe. The proper Western posture in Europe was one of patient waiting while maintaining current defense levels. This would offer the best chance that the Soviets would divert their attention from Europe to their own domestic problems and to the threat posed by Communist China and the Far East. They would realize that Europe offered no threat to them but that Communist China did.

3. I pointed out that our govt fully shared the view that a Soviet threat remained serious. It seemed, however, that de Gaulle held a different view. Adenauer said that he would gladly talk to de Gaulle about this. He was confident that de Gaulle would be in basic agreement with his analysis. He said de Gaulle shared his belief that the fates of Germany and France were closely interwoven. If Germany fell prey to the Soviets, France would be next. French interest rather than a desire to be kind to Germany was the reason for de Gaulle’s defense of the German case during his recent Moscow visit. Adenauer recalled a meeting with Eisenhower, Macmillan and de Gaulle during which there had been a frank discussion of the German problem. While Eisenhower and Macmillan had been somewhat cautious, de Gaulle had taken the position that he desired reunification because he did not wish to see Soviet troops on the Rhine.

4. I mentioned the interview which Adenauer had given to Sulzberger on August 10 in which he had said that we should withdraw from Viet Nam.³ I pointed out that in our opinion such a withdrawal under present conditions would have extremely dangerous consequences and that it might also be interpreted by the Soviets as softness and in Europe and elsewhere as unwillingness on our part to adhere to our commitments. I also said that we appreciated his views on this as well as on any other problem but that we hoped he would give them to us directly rather than through the press. Adenauer said he wanted to explain his position to me very frankly. He had not asked for the interview but he had welcomed it as an opportunity to draw attention to a situation which he felt was very serious. What he really feared was that the question of US obligations and commitments might become a serious issue in the US Presidential campaign. He had given the interview in the hope of provoking a statement from us reiterating the firmness of our commitment in Europe.

5. Commenting on the current crisis in the Defense Ministry Adenauer said that in his opinion Von Hassel must go. He thought this would happen fairly soon. A structural reform of the Defense Ministry was also necessary—the tasks were too vast for one man to handle. He said no decision had as yet been reached whether to appoint an additional Minister or Political State Secretary to the Defense Ministry, or whether to transfer some of the Defense Ministry’s responsibilities to another Ministry.

6. I asked Adenauer for his views on the current prospects of the CDU. He said the situation was very bad. The voters were clearly dissatisfied with the present govt. The problem was that under the German Constitution a Chancellor was practically irremovable. Also, CDU leaders had been dispersed during the summer months and had made separate uncoordinated statements. Nevertheless, unless the direction and style of operation of the govt underwent a rapid change, the CDU would surely lose the next Federal elections. He said that he was greatly concerned about the declining health of SPD leaders Erler and Wehner. If they disappeared, the left wing—those who had, among other things, advocated the speakers exchange with the SED which he continued to regard as a serious mistake—would take over. A dangerous situation would arise in Europe if France, after de Gaulle, had a popular front govt and Germany an SPD govt under left-wing leadership. I asked Adenauer what kind of a change of direction he considered necessary. He said “The government must resume the course which I pursued as Chancellor. Coming from me, this may sound vain; but it is not immodest if I consider myself a bit more intelligent than certain others who are very stupid.”

Comment: Adenauer looked pallid on the eve of his departure for a vacation at Caddenabia. However he was alert and in good spirits. I have reported his views on global problems in some detail even though they represent little that is new. I was told today by Kingsbury Smith of Hearst that the Chancellor expressed similar views in an interview with him which he will be reporting. Adenauer’s comments on domestic matters reflect his undiminished disdain for Erhard as Chancellor, also Von Hassel as Def Min. Adenauer has recently been heard recommending Gerstenmaier as Erhard’s successor. It is obvious that he hopes that a combination of CDU leaders can soon be put together which could tackle the problem of Erhard’s succession.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Confidential. Repeated to London and Paris.
2. See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 165.
3. The interview took place on August 2. For Sulzberger’s account, see Age of Mediocrity, pp. 278–282.