Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

163. Letter From the Ambassador to Germany (McGhee) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Bonn, August 25, 1966.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

You will recall our conversation during my recent visit in Washington,² in which I mentioned the possibility of our suggesting quite informally to the Germans a course of action which might serve to better their international standing and, in particular, their relations with the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union. Since my return to Bonn, I have concluded that the present would not be a propitious time to suggest this to the Germans. The Government already feels that a number of things it believes we are doing puts it under inordinate pressure or threatens its interests, and I see little to be gained now by further loading the scale. You will have noted the reference to the Oder-Neisse in the CIA report cited in Bonn 2281.³ We can, however, be thinking about how we would formulate an approach when a more favorable time comes.

There are in my judgment four major issues which create problems for the Germans beyond any corresponding advantages. These are:

A. Their official positon on the Oder-Neisse as the ultimate eastern boundary of Germany;

B. The apparent German desire to increase their influence in NATO nuclear matters;

C. Their rather ambiguous claims to Heimatrecht;

D. Their reluctance to declare the Munich Agreement void ab initio.

In each case the German position is basically a tactical one—i.e., that a concession should be made only when it will provide bargaining power toward the attainment of reunification. In all four cases the Germans really have little hope of realizing any tangible gain, since in each case they seek to bargain something they do not have and which the Bloc states consider a fait accompli. In my judgment there is in fact no bargaining power inherent in the German position on these questions; however, the view is almost universally held in Germany, particularly by political leaders, that they must not “give up something for nothing.” There is a tendency also to fall back on the sterile position of the Potsdam Agreement, to the effect that a determination of the ultimate boundaries of Germany cannot be made except in connection with a peace treaty following reunification.

In my judgment the Germans would not be giving up anything in stating unilaterally that they would, if and when reunification comes about:

A. Accept the Oder-Neisse boundary, with minor modifications, as their eastern frontier;

B. Renounce not only the manufacturing, as they have, but also the national possession of nuclear weapons;

C. State that any exercise of Heimatrecht would be only in full agreement with the governments concerned, and

D. State that the Munich Agreement was void ab initio.

Such an action, accompanied by a repetition of their offer made in their Peace Note of March 25, 1966 to exchange declarations with the Eastern European countries renouncing the use of force and perhaps even an offer to initiate diplomatic relations would, I believe, without any loss to themselves, greatly enhance their image in the world and make possible an era of better relations with the states of Eastern Europe. German failure to clarify these issues in the past has had the effect of sowing distrust in Eastern Europe, as well as in the Soviet Union, as to their ultimate intentions. They are, in pursuing their present policy, really forcing the Eastern European states into a continuing reliance on the Soviet Union to protect them from a “revanchist and militaristic” Germany.

There are no Germans east of the Oder-Neisse line. Germany does not need Lebensraum—it has a deficit in workers. There is no ally of Germany who would back her in obtaining territory beyond the Oder-Neisse line through threats or use of force. Indeed, de Gaulle has already given it up publicly and we have made it clear privately that we could not back the Germans in any extensive demands. A renunciation by Germany would produce an immediate improvement in their relations with Poland, which because of this issue are worse than those with any other Eastern European country.

Germany stands little hope of being a part of a multilaterally-owned nuclear force and, in my judgment, no hope at all of ever obtaining a national force. This is not because, over a period of time and with sufficient expenditure of funds Germany could not do it from a technical standpoint, but because neither the Soviets—or her allies including us, would permit her to do it. By the nature of the problem Germany would face in attempting to acquire a national nuclear capability, her course of action would be fully revealed to the world over the years required for its accomplishment. We could not permit it—i.e., we would withdraw our forces and support for Germany first. The other NATO allies would not tolterate it—i.e., they would probably move to dissociate themselves from Germany in the NATO. The Soviet Union would be quite likely to make such efforts the subject of a preemptive attack.

Heimatrecht is a very vague right, not clearly established under international law. From a practical standpoint it is unlikely that many Germans, all of whom are now well settled, would ever care to return to a hostile communist country. This could in any event not be accomplished except through agreement of the countries concerned—i.e., nobody would support Germany in accomplishing it otherwise. Heimatrecht when associated as it often is by Germans with self-determination is, moreover, patently unacceptable to everyone, since it amounts in essence to creeping aggression. The disadvantages to the Germans of total renunciation of the Munich Pact are more theoretical than real and could be compensated for by corresponding assurances on the part of Czechoslovakia that they would not take any of the actions feared by the Germans against former Sudeten-German residents should they ever re-enter Czechoslovakia.

Without really giving up anything, Germany could through such a declaration drastically improve her posture vis-à-vis the international community. The German “policy of movement” with respect to Eastern Europe would be greatly facilitated as well as her relations with her European neighbors, who still harbor fears and suspicions of a nationalist revival in Germany. The way could be cleared for a non-proliferation agreement and perhaps even for a broader détente or thin-out in Central Europe. The Erhard Government could perhaps overcome criticism within Germany from such an action by pointing out the much greater gains to Germany. We could help by assuring the Chancellor that we would applaud such an action in the strongest terms, and would seek to assure that Great Britain and others would follow suit.

These would be the possible elements of an eventual approach to Schroeder and Carstens. If we pick the right moment, I do not believe we would run any great risks in making such suggestions informally. There will have to be some clearing up of the present malaise, however, before that right moment arrives.⁴

Sincerely,

George C. McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 1 EUR E–GER W. Confidential; Personal.
2. August 19; no record of the meeting was found.
3. Dated August 24. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 FR)
4. In a September 7 letter to McGhee, Rusk wrote: “I agree with you that this is not the time to put pressure on the Germans to make various gestures of reunification if they are not inclined to move on their own.” (Ibid., POL 1 GER E–GER W)