Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

158. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson¹

Washington, July 27, 1966.

Here are some of the points of special interest that emerged from my conversations with Defense Minister Von Hassel in Paris on Monday and Tuesday:²

1. German budget. The German cabinet on Monday apparently decided on a 1967 defense budget of 18.5 billion DM, an amount almost 2 billion below the Ministry’s original estimates of requirements. The austerity of this figure results from the combination of an apparent inability to increase revenues and political pressures to devote more expenditures to social welfare. (This 18.5 billion is totally inadequate to finance the qualitative improvements in the German forces which are required if they are to be relied on to fight alongside us; it follows, too, that the 18.5 billion is totally inadequate to cover the German-US offset for 1967. Germany—which spends about 5 per cent of her GNP on defense as compared with our more than 8.5 per cent—made an almost 50 per cent increase in military expenditures between 1961 and 1963, but has leveled off since then. Taking account of inflation, military expenditures for 1966 will be one-eighth lower than in 1963; and expenditures in 1967 may not be much more.)

2. German-UK offset. The British are trying to get a full offset of their roughly 1 billion DM foreign exchange drain attributable to their forces in Germany. The Germans now cover 300 million, 100 million of which is in non-military purchases. The Germans do not propose to accede to the British request. They are proposing that a UK-German team find ways to cut the fat out of the British deployments (perhaps 10–15,000 men). Among the measures to be considered is basing of UK aircraft in Britain instead of in Germany. The Germans think that by such savings, the British can cut the 1 billion DM drain to perhaps 660 million. The Germans offer to cover half of that remainder—i.e., roughly what they are covering now.

3. German-US offset. The Germans state flatly that they cannot agree to a full US offset for 1967–68. Von Hassel was talking in terms that sounded very much like their proposal to the UK (above)—of an undertaking to offset 50 per cent with best efforts made to buy more than that. It was clear that Von Hassel was under instructions from the Chancellor and that he was expecting the Chancellor, with his small military budget already in concrete, to settle the offset matter with you in September. Until the “French problem” in NATO is over, the Germans will not be ready to propose to us one thing they proposed to the UK—the establishment of a US-German team to see how US forces in Germany can be cut without affecting combat capability. (I made clear that the United States does not want Germany to buy anything from us that they do not need or that they can buy better or cheaper elsewhere, but that it was perfectly clear that Germany needs a good deal of equipment to bring their forces up to proper standards. I also said we would be ready when they are to join in joint efforts to trim our forces in Germany.)

4. “Hardware.” The Germans want to keep on talking about hardware, but specifically suggested, in connection with hardware as an item on the agenda of the “McNamara Committee,” that discussion of that subject come “later.”

5. “McNamara Committee.” The Germans support making permanent the small “McNamara Committee” of Defense Ministers to discuss nuclear planning matters. They want to avoid getting crosswise with their allies with respect to limiting membership on the Group however, and they want to avoid a “constitutional” clash with the French when the North Atlantic Council must act on the proposal. They obviously favor continuation of such a Group.

6. “Unprovoked attack.” Von Hassel reported a conversation with French Defense Minister Messmer which took place during General de Gaulle’s visit to Bonn. According to Messmer, the French would be “with us” in the event of trouble in Berlin. In the event of “escalation of the war in Vietnam,” Messmer thought the Soviets would be deterred by NATO power from attacking in the West; but, if the Soviets did attack in such circumstances, the French would decide at the time whether to participate.

7. French troops in Germany. The Germans believe that the first problem is to find a mission for the French forces in Germany and that this should not be difficult “since five of the six brigades are in reserve status anyway.” Despite the fact that it has been made clear to them that France will not join in the “presumption” that she will be with the Alliance in case of war (see above), the Germans want the French forces to remain in Germany. Von Hassel said it would be “a great shock to both countries if the French troops left.” He concluded that his own view was that the French forces would remain in Germany.

Robert S. McNamara

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 10. Secret. A note on the source text reads: “Fr. Secy of Defense. Recd Pres. ofc 7–27–66, 7 p.m.” A handwritten “L” on the source text indicates that the President saw the memorandum.
2. July 25 and 26. McNamara was in Paris for the Ministerial Meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Working Group. A report on the meeting is in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, Document 189.