147. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Department of State1

1044. Subject: Meeting between GovMayor Brandt and Soviet Ambassador to GDR Abrasimov. Reference: Berlintel 1033 to Dept., 883 to Bonn.2

1.
Spangenberg has given us the following account of Brandt’s conversation with Abrasimov at noon on May 8 in the home of Swedish Consul General Backlund. He spoke from a memorandum of conversation drafted by the Governing Mayor before his departure for Bonn. The discussion lasted two and a half hours.
2.
Abrasimov opened the conversation by asking Brandt about the Congress in Stockholm Brandt had just attended, and subsequently discussed the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union which, he said, had mainly considered internal problems and was “unsensational.” Abrasimov then contrasted the German and Soviet quests for peace. He described German policy as “hostile,” especially as based upon the restoration of the 1937 borders. The FRG peace note, he said, does not serve the cause of peace. Brandt “energetically rebutted” this view and then brought up the subject of German unity.
3.
Abrasimov said there are two German states that must strive to understand each other even though differences in their social systems make the degree of understanding necessarily limited. Brandt replied that there are not only differences in social systems but there are also differing [Page 358] views among the Great Powers (i.e., the West and the Soviets) on the question of German unity.
4.
Abrasimov argued that it must be possible nonetheless for both Germanys to agree upon certain practical questions. He mentioned in this connection the prospects for an exchange of speakers between the SPD and SED, although he did not discuss this subject in detail. Abrasimov stressed “very pointedly” that the GDR is not a Soviet state. He said of himself that he could not dictate policy in East Germany. If he had attempted to do this, his removal would have been sought a long time ago.
5.
Abrasimov described FRG/Soviet relations as unsatisfactory and said that in the field of trade the FRG must either improve its relations with the Soviets or find other trade partners to fill the gap now filled by the Soviets. At the party level, Abrasimov said that relations between the Soviets and the SPD are poor; Soviet relations with Socialist parties in other countries are far better. He regretted that the Communist Party is outlawed in the FRG.
6.
Berlin was the theme of the final portion of this discussion. Abrasimov objected to the presence of Bundestag representatives and other FRG officials in West Berlin. He thanked Brandt warmly for the latter’s remarks in recent biweekly broadcast about the valor of the two Soviet pilots who lost their lives in the Stossensee plane crash. Brandt seized this opportunity to complain about the sonic booms caused by Soviet jets. Abrasimov said these flights would be kept to a minimum.
7.
Abrasimov deplored the poor state of relations between West Berlin and the Soviet Union in the field of trade. Without mentioning Starchinov by name, he asked why it has not been possible for the Soviets to open a small trade office in West Berlin. This office, he said, would deal not only with West Berlin firms but also with firms in the FRG. Brandt made no direct reply. He discussed the common ground on which the German currency and economic system is based as between West Berlin and the FRG, emphasizing that Berlin itself is not an area narrowly controlled in this respect by the protective powers. Brandt said that he would reflect upon how Berlin’s portion of the whole of FRG/Soviet trade might be increased in the future.
8.
Abrasimov said there should be more cultural exchanges between Berlin and the Soviet Union, suggesting that there be scheduled every three months a major Soviet cultural event in Berlin. He quoted each of the Allied Ambassadors as having told him that they had no objection in principle to this. Brandt asked whether it was not easier to increase such exchanges in a setting that is not government-to-government, to which Abrasimov agreed, saying these matters are more easily arranged through private agencies. He suggested that in cultural and sport exchanges, a city-to-city arrangement, such as Moscow to Berlin, [Page 359] would be desirable. Brandt said he would discuss these thoughts with those in Berlin responsible for such matters.
9.
At the close of the conversation, Abrasimov asked whether a meeting such as this could be held again under the same circumstances. Brandt said he could not answer the question, but volunteered the statement that he could not accept an invitation from Abrasimov to come to East Berlin. Brandt then made it clear that he was talking to Abrasimov in the latter’s capacity as a representative of one of the Four Powers responsible for Berlin and not as the Soviet Ambassador to East Germany.
10.
Asked about the atmosphere of the talks, Spangenberg said Brandt had been very pleased. Abrasimov, he felt, was not talking as a diplomat but as a party man. It was possible for both of them to talk openly and in tough terms. Jokes had been exchanged. While this was not an atmosphere of confidence, it was not cool either. The mood was that of two political opponents having a frank talk.
11.
Spangenberg said both participants agreed that it would be desirable to keep their meeting confidential and out of the press. He said that on the Senat side, only Senator Schuetz aside from himself knew of these developments.
12.
Comment: The meeting went about as expected. Abrasimov sought to develop the anticipated themes and he endeavored to move toward a continuing contact with Brandt.
13.
The account given us by Spangenberg leaves the impression of sparring and of feeling out mutual positions. It is hard to see how either Brandt or Abrasimov can expect much from the contact unless it is pursued, either in the same or in some other channel. Brandt’s equivocal reply to Abrasimov’s proposal for another meeting seems to suggest he would not be averse to continuing the contact himself.
14.
It would appear that the next move is up to Brandt, either to approach the Allies regarding a further meeting or to let the matter rest. Spangenberg stated Brandt would elaborate on his personal reactions in a direct talk with the Allies.3 We should then have a clearer idea of how he envisions the future of the relationship with Abrasimov, and hence what problems it may hold for us.
Day
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–USSR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, and Bonn.
  2. Not found.
  3. The Mission reported Brandt’s impressions of the talks in telegram 1089 from Berlin, May 24. (Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W–USSR)