Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

134. Memorandum of Conversation¹

US/MC/7

Paris, December 13, 1965, 8:30 p.m.–12:30 a.m.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE THIRTY-SIXTH MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Paris, France—December 14–16, 1965

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
• Federal Republic of Germany
  • Foreign Minister Schroeder
• United Kingdom
  • Sir Paul Gore-Booth, Permanent Under Secretary
• Republic of France
  • Foreign Minister Couve de Murville

(For guest list showing attendance at conversation see appendix #1)²

SUBJECT

• Quadripartite Dinner Discussion on Problems Relating to Germany including German Reunification

Summary: The two-hour after-dinner discussion on the German question followed orthodox lines. Only one seemingly new element was introduced by the Secretary when he suggested that German policy may mean more for the Soviets than a way of holding on to East Germany—perhaps, in the Soviet view, all of Eastern Europe is at stake. The Secretary suggested—and all present agreed—that the Western Allies should devote more attention to an examination of this and related questions.

Schroeder began the discussion by analyzing what he felt were the two main objectives of Soviet German policy:

1. Denuclearization and isolation of Germany.

2. Destruction of the Federal Republic’s ties with Berlin; an example of this was seen during the April harassment of the Bundestag meetings in Berlin.

Schroeder felt that German policy enjoys top priority in Moscow’s Foreign Policy. He had noticed two contrasting tones of the Soviets; in confidential talks their manner is entirely different than the polemical approach used by Gromyko in his most recent address to the Supreme Soviet.³

In September in Moscow, Carstens received a polite response in the economic area but in political areas the atmosphere was as negative as ever.

The Foreign Minister felt that the Soviet Zone of occupation has improved both its internal and international positions in recent months as evidenced by several significant events:

1. The Zone regime has become a leading trade partner of the USSR, and indeed important in world production;

2. The Ulbricht visit to the UAR⁴ has led to establishment of a UAR Consulate General in East Berlin;

3. The Olympic Committee’s decision to include “GDR” participation;⁵

4. Ulbricht has cleverly exploited the Sino-Soviet split so that both Moscow and Peiping support him.

As a result of these developments we see increased acerbity in the politics of the “GDR”, and we have witnessed the helicopter flights over West Berlin during early summer and the strong national overtones of recent “GDR” propaganda. Reportedly Ulbricht went so far recently as to assert that he—Ulbricht—continued Bismarck’s policies

Foreign Minister Schroeder claimed that a resistance exists in the “GDR”, but that it is not strong and not organized. For public indications of ideological strife in the Zone he would have to cite the Havemann case and the Apel suicide⁶—not all the details of which are yet clear. But it seems certain that Apel resisted exploitation of the Zone by the Soviets through unfair terms of trade.

In Eastern Europe the Soviets put pressure upon all the States to resist German reunification. Czech reluctance to accept a Berlin clause is one result of the pressure. In general, the Soviets are attempting to revive anti-German feeling. Yet Moscow ignores the Federal Republic’s renunciation of ABC weapons and declarations that the FRG does not intend to acquire nuclear arms under national control. In conclusion Mr. Schroeder requested comments on his analysis before inviting a discussion on what might be done if there is agreement concerning that analysis.

Couve de Murville responded with observations from his recent Moscow trip:⁷

1. It is a fact that for the Soviet Union the German problem is not only an essential problem but the essential problem. You only have to go to Moscow to see it.

2. It’s also true that in the USSR there is great anxiety over Germany and a reluctance to change the present situation even after it is admitted—and the Soviets do admit this—that some day the situation must be changed one way or another.

3. The Soviets always stress that their relations with the FRG are not good—this is said with apparent regret—the Soviets simply note the fact and maintain that as long as there is no confidence it is difficult to make any progress. Therefore the situation is just as Dr. Schroeder had analyzed it; Couve wanted to add only that it appeared to him that the Soviets admitted this with a note of regret—as if there were little they might do about it.

Sir Paul Gore-Booth observed: The UK did not notice the motif of regret during Minister Stewart’s visit.⁸ The motives of propaganda were all stereotyped in Moscow. It occurred to the UK that the Soviets might want to sow confusion in the West. The Soviets avoided the China question.

Couve confirmed that the French also noticed Soviet avoidance of the China question.

Gore-Booth: The UK concluded that the Soviet concentration on Germany was a distraction for our benefit.

Generally the UK’s analysis agrees with that of Dr. Schroeder. It agrees that the East Zone has made progress, but the UK can assure Germany that this has had no effect on British policy.

British experiences in Eastern European countries are varied, but the UK tries to encourage these states in any way that might tend to improve relations with the FRG. All of these thoughts seem to lead to the idea that the Federal Republic’s general policy line is correct—and one which the UK can only encourage.

Couve observed that Berlin was never mentioned during his visit to Moscow.

Gore-Booth: This was the UK experience too. They didn’t want to talk about Berlin.

The Secretary: Gromyko did not raise the subject of Berlin in his New York conversations either.⁹ At the very end he made a point as if it were a postscript. He noted that we hadn’t talked about Berlin and that it is quiet there, but he emphasized that Berlin was nevertheless very important. The Secretary gained the impression that something new might be injected—but it never was.

We have the impression that China is a preoccupation with the Soviet Union. Germany is important, but perhaps not the most important foreign policy problem for the Soviets.

The Secretary wished we knew more about Moscow’s relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. The only thing the Arab States can agree about is Israel. Is something similar true of Eastern Europe? Perhaps the presence of Soviet divisions is more important to Moscow’s policy in Eastern Europe today than five years ago. If those divisions were removed what would happen in Eastern Europe? We get an impression from Eastern European diplomats that there is a change but it is not yet clear what the change is. It is curious that there is no interest among the Soviets in settlement of the German problem or in reunification, even though the German problem remains the major outstanding East-West difference. Since 1947 roughly $800 billion have been spent by the United States for security. Perhaps half of this can be attributed to the unsolved German question. The Soviets have been forced to make similar military efforts yet they are unwilling to concede that giving a free choice to 17 million East Germans might be in the interest of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Perhaps more is at stake. Maybe the Soviets believe that the future course of all of Eastern Europe is at stake. We should examine this thesis more closely.

Schroeder: We have the impression that Moscow does not prevent increased trade between Eastern Europe and the FRG because it knows:

1. It is the desire of most of these countries to trade.

2. Development of Eastern Europe helps the USSR in turn. In any event, we know of no case where trade with the West goes much above 20%.

We have no evidence that the Soviets have a real worry that any of the lands of Eastern Europe are about to leave their orbit, and I don’t think this likely. Moscow’s most unpleasant experience has been with Rumania, but that has not exceeded proportions that Moscow can accept.

I think we should consider carefully what our American colleague has said. Joint study of Moscow’s relations with Eastern Europe might lead us to interesting conclusions.

The Secretary: I want to make it quite clear that I was posing questions and not stating conclusions. I was expressing hypotheses which I think merit further investigation.

Schroeder: We seem to be agreed with the analysis of the problem. The question arises of what to do about it. The FRG feels that it is necessary to present the German case to world opinion: that the Germans have a legal and moral right to self-determination and a right to national unity. There is a need to repeat this over and over again. Otherwise the impression is given that the West has accepted the division of Germany as permanent. For this reason we would like the communiqué of this NATO meeting to include the usual remarks on the German question.

We are aware that Germany should do what it can to make reunification attractive to Eastern European countries. We are prepared to make sacrifices in connection with reunification which relate to three general areas:

1. The Eastern borders,

2. The military status of a reunified Germany, and

3. Economic and financial contributions.

But the Federal Republic will make these concessions only in connection with reunification and never without it. In this regard we ask the three Western powers to help us in countering Soviet propaganda charges of militarism and revanchism.

The Church Documents of a recent date include the Evangelical Church memorandum and the statements by the Polish and German Catholic Bishops¹⁰ which have had a strong public impact. We think that these documents are of great importance but are not in the first line of political importance.

With respect to the USSR and Eastern Europe we will continue to improve our economic relations. We think that there also exist good chances for improvement in such things as exchange of students and professors, and in the tourist area.

However, the most difficult question for us is how to behave with respect to the East German regime. Somehow, after restudy, we always seem to come back to our original conclusions. We must reject that regime and we must point out that the USSR and its armed forces prop up that regime. We feel that this policy is correct. We ask your support of it. It is not merely a question of recognition or non-recognition, but a problem of countering the upgrading of that regime. Trade plays a role here and we ask that trade not receive state support. Also we must stick to the four-power principle. We fear that our policy will fail if the Soviets succeed in shifting us from this principle which has been supported by the three powers (together with the FRG).

Further, we must consider what steps can be taken to forestall possible Soviet moves against Berlin. It is a comfort to know that the Berlin question was not raised by the Soviets during the recent visits. But the possible introduction of passes and visas by Zone authorities remains a perplexing possibility which might easily become too hot to handle. It has been discussed in the four-power group, but I think that there still is some disagreement. We would like to bring this matter to a conclusion soon.

The Secretary: It seems to me Minister Schroeder has made some extremely interesting remarks this evening. It seems to me that disarmament, normalization of trade, and such questions are of interest all over Europe. The communications among the Church Leaders also seems to be of some significance. Do you plan to mention them in your speech? [Dr. Schroeder’s NATO plenary speech]¹¹

Schroeder: Yes, I would like to mention the Church Documents, but not in detail.

Couve: I too think it would be good to say something about the Church Documents and I agree with you (the Secretary) that we should follow up on these suggestions.

Mr. Leddy: How will we deal with Germany on the final communiqué?

Schroeder: As we generally do, I presume. (General agreement indicated.)

Gore-Booth: I prefer saying that we discussed problems related to Germany rather than the “German problem” because the latter implies somehow that the Germans themselves are a problem.

The Secretary: As far as we are concerned, we also spoke of the problem of reunification.

The four parties agreed that press communiqués could say that the Quadripartite Group discussed problems relating to Germany including reunification.¹² There was general agreement that the press should be told, if inquiries are made, that the nuclear question was not discussed at the Quadripartite Dinner.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 FR (PA). Confidential. Drafted by Hemenway and approved in S on March 7, 1966. The meeting was held at the German Ambassador’s Residence.
2. Not printed.
3. Extracts of the relevant portions are in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 494–496.
4. February 24–March 2.
5. On October 8, the International Olympic Committee announced that East German athletes would be invited to participate as a separate team.
6. Havemann was fired as a professor at the University of Berlin after publication of an article critical of Communism. Apel, the Chairman of the State Planning Commission, committed suicide after public criticism of his management of the East German economy.
7. Couve visited Moscow October 28–November 2.
8. Stewart visited Moscow November 30–December 3.
9. September 29 and October 1. Memoranda of conversation are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2547.
10. For texts, see Europa Archiv, 1966, vol. 2, pp. 1–19.
11. Brackets in the source text.
12. Not found.