Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

130. Letter From the Ambassador to Germany (McGhee) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Bonn, September 27, 1965.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As I mentioned to you when I saw you in Washington last month² we have, here in the Embassy and in consultation with our Mission in Berlin, been working on a paper analyzing how the United States can best handle the German reunification issue—under the various circumstances which may arise. We assume that the Germans will raise this question with us after the formation of Chancellor Erhard’s new government later in the month—and in the Chancellor’s meeting with the President which will probably take place in November. This paper has now been completed and is enclosed for your information, in the form of a Memorandum on German Reunification. The paper devotes itself to both substance and tactics, of which the latter appears to us be the more important. I hope that it can contribute usefully to the consideration which I know that you personally, and others in the Department, have been giving to this problem.

We have all learned from past experience how very sensitive the reunification issue is. Should it become known that the American Embassy in Bonn has prepared a paper along the lines of the enclosed Memorandum, there would be immediate adverse repercussions in Germany. I am accordingly restricting distribution of the Memorandum to seven copies. In addition to the one enclosed, copies are being sent on a personal Eyes Only basis to the Under Secretary, Tommy Thompson, John Leddy, Walt Rostow, and to Foy Kohler in Moscow. The remaining copy will be retained in the Embassy. I urge that no other copies be made.

Respectfully yours,

George C. McGhee

Attachment³

MEMORANDUM ON GERMAN REUNIFICATION

United States Embassy, Bonn

[Here follow a table of contents and a list of annexes. The annexes were not found.]

Introduction

As was pointed out in Embtel 19 of July 2, 1965,⁴ reunification will remain a basic objective of the Federal Republic. It is believed that its emotional appeal for the German people will in the future be more likely to increase than to decrease. Any German Government will need to devote energetic attention to this subject and can be expected to look to Germany’s Allies, particularly the United States, for support and assistance in this regard. There is, however, no consensus in Germany as to how—if at all—reunification can be achieved. Rather, thinking generally centers on two entirely different approaches to reunification.

A. The first approach, which until now the Federal Government has favored, foresees a new initiative with the Soviets in which substantive proposals (as distinct from procedural proposals or purely demonstrative proposals) for achieving reunification would be put forward. In pushing this idea, however, the Federal Government has been reluctant to define the German position on a number of the critical subjects which would have to be covered in any serious discussions with the Soviets on reunification. For this reason, the Government has been subject to criticism for pursuing an ineffectual policy. The opposition Social Democrats have been among those sharply critical of the Government in this respect. At one point during the election campaign they came out in favor of an initiative with the Soviets. They proposed that this take the form of a peace treaty which, before presentation to the Soviets, would have been the subject of consultation with the Three Western Allies. However, under attack from the CDU the SPD withdrew its support from this proposal. (It will be recalled that Governing Mayor Brandt has in the past publicly favored a Western initiative in the form of a call for a peace conference.)

B. The second general approach to reunification foresees progress mainly in increased contacts between the two parts of Germany. This point of view is usually based on the premise that Soviet agreement to reunification is, within the foreseeable future, extremely doubtful. Therefore, the most promising course of action in bringing the Germans on both sides of the demarcation line into more comparable circumstances and closer together is one of “little steps” and, eventually, hopefully, “larger steps” aimed at increasing intercourse in all fields between East and West Germany. This would not, however, go so far as political recognition of the East German regime. The SPD and the FDP, in their present policies, favor both a substantive initiative with the Soviets and, at the same time, greater direct contact with the East Germans. The CDU does not reject the idea of greater contact with East German residents, but gives the impression of being drawn along in a policy of such “small steps” as the pass agreement with the East Germans, because of public pressure rather than real conviction. As a matter of fact, the Adenauer-Strauss-Guttenberg faction opposes this policy as dangerous and self-defeating.

Looking to the future, the United States will need to be in a position to react to both approaches to German reunification. In so doing, our principal objectives should be the following:

A. We should attempt to satisfy, to the maximum extent possible without jeopardizing other American foreign policy interests, the German desire for forward movement on the German question. The Germans will remain perennially suspicious that their allies are not really interested in the achievement of German reunification; that they, on the contrary, would be willing to accept the status quo in Germany as part of some over-all understanding with the Soviets. We must continually make efforts to counter this German tendency—annoying though it may be—since it could in time lead the Germans toward a nationalist policy, entailing serious dangers for the West.

B. We should continue to keep clearly on the record that it is the Soviets who remain responsible for the division of Germany, and that their uncompromising German policy and their harsh statements about the Federal Republic stem from the Soviet desire to justify to the world their continued enforced division of Germany.

C. We should attempt to make whatever progress may be possible toward lessening the potential danger which the continued division of Germany entails. The tensions thereby created in Central Europe, where there exists the only direct Soviet-US confrontation, constitute a serious threat to world peace.

The present paper is an effort to suggest how the United States can seek to achieve these objectives, under conditions likely to prevail during the next few years which will see Germany under a CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. It includes a review of past US, German and Soviet positions on reunification, a suggestion as to how we might deal with the German authorities on the question of a new substantive initiative and certain ideas on an alternate procedure should a substantive initiative not prove feasible or desirable. In addition, annexes are attached outlining what the United States might be able to accept as part of a substantive initiative and describing the logical sequence of events under a reunification plan should an initiative meet with success.

[Here follows the body of the paper.]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 32–4 GER. Secret.
2. According to Rusk’s Appointment Book, the meeting took place at 10 a.m. on September 1. (Johnson Library) No record of the discussion was found.
3. Secret. No indication of drafting officer is on the source text.
4. Document 124.