106. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Western Three Declaration on Germany
PARTICIPANTS
- Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein, German Embassy
- Mr. Berndt von Staden, Counselor, German Embassy
- Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, S/AL
- Mr. Stuart H. McIntyre, GER
Ambassador Knappstein called on Ambassador Thompson under instructions to make a compromise proposal regarding the Western Three declaration on Germany. The Germans were making this suggestion, Ambassador Knappstein noted, in an effort to save the Western Three-Power declaration on Germany. The Germans were coming to us before going to the French with the proposal. The FRG was also describing its proposal to its embassies in Paris and London but they will not mention it to the French and British until it has been discussed with the United States and our reaction is obtained.
Ambassador Knappstein said the Germans suggest the following re-draft of the second sentence of the declaration:
“The Governments of the Republic of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America in conjunction with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany have recently undertaken a further examination of the German problem and of the prospects for a resumption of discussions on this subject with the Government of the Soviet Union. They have taken this action by virtue of the obligations and responsibilities concerning Germany, including Berlin and access thereto, devolving [Page 259] upon them without change since the end of the Second World War—obligations and responsibilities which the Three Governments share with the Government of the Soviet Union and which have been reaffirmed by the heads of government of all the four powers in Geneva on July 23, 1955, in a directive aiming at the solution of the German question by the reunification of Germany.”
Ambassador Knappstein said that if the US found difficulty with this suggestion there was another one he could make, although it was not an official proposal. This would be to delete the second sentence of the draft declaration, first paragraph, and insert the following sentence at the end of the declaration:
“The Three Governments reemphasize the obligations and responsibilities concerning Germany including Berlin and access thereto devolving upon them without change since the end of the Second World War—obligations and responsibilities which they share with the Government of the Soviet Union and which were reaffirmed by the heads of government of all the Four Powers in Geneva on July 23, 1955 in a directive aiming at the solution of the German question by the reunification of Germany.”
Ambassador Thompson noted that even if sentences such as those suggested by the FRG were included in the declaration the fundamental difficulty with the French draft nevertheless remained, i.e., its emphasis upon the solution of the German problem as primarily a matter for the Europeans. He observed that the 1955 declaration was 10 years old; also, even though the Soviets agreed to it at one time, for many years they have attacked the declaration.
Ambassador Knappstein suggested personally that one additional idea might be to say “of all European peoples as well as the other peoples concerned” at the end of paragraph three in place of the words “of Europe”. He noted, however, that this was probably unacceptable to the French.
Ambassador Thompson expressed appreciation that the Germans had asked us about their compromise proposal before approaching the French. He said, however, that he did not think that revising paragraph (1) was helpful. We have offered three compromises which are reasonable and should be acceptable to the French. Ambassador Knappstein agreed with Ambassador Thompson that the French concept regarding responsibility for the solution of the German problem in the future must not be accepted. Ambassador Thompson thought that the French are now in an impossible position. Ambassador Thompson said he could not in good conscience recommend acceptance of de Gaulle’s dictat. Ambassador Thompson thought that if the sentence suggested by the Germans were placed in the first paragraph it would be impossible for the US to accept. Even if it went at the end of the declaration it would be doubtful.
Ambassador Thompson thought there was a very real danger in putting the German compromise proposal to the French now for it would take off them pressure for real movement. Ambassador Thompson said it was better to hold to the compromises we have already proposed.
Ambassador Knappstein stated that he personally wondered what would happen if no Three Power declaration were agreed. He referred to the conversation of the Secretary with Brandt,2 noting that the Secretary had indicated that if there were no agreed declaration the US might issue a unilateral statement. Knappstein regretted the fact that Brandt had talked publicly following his visit with the Secretary. Ambassador Thompson thought there were two possibilities: (1) that we could make a [Page 260] joint statement with the British or (2) a unilateral statement, possibly in a speech which might be made at a high level in the United States Government on or about May 7. It would obviously be easier on the French if we issued a unilateral statement rather than a joint statement with the British. Our preference would probably be for a unilateral statement.
Ambassador Knappstein thought that if a break occurs on the negotiation for a declaration there will be a severe reaction against France within the FRG. He thought personally that the French may wish, despite the dangers for them, to avoid having a declaration at all.
Ambassador Thompson agreed to discuss with the Secretary the German compromise proposal. (Comment: Following discussion with the Secretary, Ambassador Thompson telephoned Ambassador Knappstein to inform him that the German proposal was not acceptable.)
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–4 GER. Confidential. Drafted by McIntyre.↩
- See Document 101.↩