Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

62. Notes of Meetings¹

Washington, January 19, 1965.

[Here follows discussion of a swearing-in ceremony and telephone conversations about irradiated food and personal matters.]

At 2 p.m. I attended the Meeting of Principals in Secretary Rusk’s Office in the Department of State. Others present at the meeting included Rusk (Chairman), Ball, McNamara, Bundy, Llewellyn Thompson, McCone, Foster, and Fisher. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the venting of the January 15th Soviet underground test. McCone described the evidence upon which the conclusion was based that venting had occurred. The acoustic signals were somewhat anomalous, which is consistent with the venting nature of the event, but makes the determination of the energy vented into the atmosphere a little indeterminate. Substantial debris was picked up over Japan, which together with the other evidence makes it clear that it was a Soviet test that had vented. It was decided that there should be a press release, accompanied by a background briefing for key press people. McNamara, Foster, and I had draft press releases available, and these were used as the basis for drafting the press release (attached),² which was agreed to by the group.

I argued for the inclusion of the statement that this was not a violation of the limited test ban treaty, but the others disagreed with this point of view. McCone was particularly strong in his feeling that this was, in fact, a test ban violation, while the others felt that it should not be so regarded, but they didn’t feel it would be wise to so state in the press release. There seemed to be general agreement that the venting was accidental. There was some discussion of the U.S. Kiwi-TNT test, in which McCone and I explained that this was definitely not a weapons test but a planned excursion of a nuclear reactor.³

At 3:15 p.m. I attended the Meeting with the President in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Others present at the meeting included President Johnson, McNamara, Ball, Foster, McCone and Bundy. Ball began the meeting by saying that its purpose was to discuss the venting of the Soviet nuclear underground test that took place on January 15th. He and McCone described the evidence for this.

The detection of radioactive debris over Japan, at about the predicted time, made it quite clear that it was a Soviet nuclear test that had vented. Ball suggested that, in view of the fact that the Japanese would probably detect the radioactive debris soon and would announce this fact, it seemed highly desirable for the U.S. to make an announcement immediately. The proposed press release that had been composed by the Principals in their meeting during the previous hour was placed before the President. He read it and said he thought it was generally all right, but perhaps a little obscure with its somewhat technical language. Bundy explained the need for the particular phraseology used and that much of it constituted words of art understood by the interested press people. The President then agreed to the wording of the release and authorized its issuance without change. It was agreed that it would be issued for 6 p.m. release, and that there would be a background briefing of the press at the State Department at which Ball, Fisher and a representative of the AEC (to be designated by me) would participate. (Kavanagh was chosen to play this role.)⁴

It was also requested that Rusk inform Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate [Foreign] Relations Committee; I would inform key members of the Armed Services Committee of the Soviet venting and the impending press release. The President then went on to complain about the leaks to the newspapers that had occurred within the last few days. He was particularly direct and vociferous in his complaints to Ball, McNamara and McCone, as the leaks had involved their departments. He reiterated that the leaks to newspapers must be stopped.

At 4 p.m. I talked with Holifield, Pastore, Hickenlooper (at Secretary Rusk’s request) and Mrs. Eileen Case in Hosmer’s office, and advised that we have detected debris from the Russian test which, to us, means that it vented. I said that the U.S. is going to announce this in a rather low key. We are reasonably sure the Japanese have detected this, and we wish to announce first.

[Here follows discussion of personal matters and inaugural events.]

1. Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 10, pp. 73 and 75. No classification marking.
2. Not printed. AEC press release, January 19; ibid., p. 74. It was also read to news correspondents by a Department of State spokesman on January 25. (Department of State Bulletin, February 8, 1965, p. 187)
3. Anticipating the Soviets’ complaint about this U.S. test held on January 12, Seaborg noted on January 15: “It appears that they may try to cover a venting by accusing the U.S. of violating the Test Ban Treaty in the Kiwi-TNT (reactor excursion test) held at the Nevada Test Site a few days ago.” (Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 10, p. 56) Concerning this Soviet complaint and the U.S. response, see Documents 65 and 67.
4. Dr. George M. Kavanagh, Assistant General Manager for Reactors, AEC.