Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

60. Minutes of Discussion¹

Washington, January 7-8, 1965.

COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

1. Briefings by the Principals (January 7, 10 a.m.-5:45 p.m.)

Presentations and responses to questions on the part of Chairman Seaborg, General Wheeler, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Rusk and ACDA Director Foster took place in Executive Session on January 7. Minutes of their remarks are set forth as attachments to this memorandum.²

2. General Review (January 8, 9 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.)

Mr. Gilpatric stated his preference for a world with a limited number of nuclear powers, finding it implausible that additional proliferation could be compartmentalized, quarantined, or regionalized and comparing the consequences for the world of the Sarajevo incident. He found it all the more unlikely that a nuclear conflict involving 1.5 billion Chinese, Indians and Japanese could not affect our own security. Furthermore, the United States is already committed to Asian defense, both through treaty and through the President’s October 18 message.³ We cannot avoid fulfilling these commitments and we have the power—more usable today than ever before—to do so. The additional price, for example, $5 billion for an ABM, is not beyond our means, and Mr. Gilpatric would wish to recommend to the President that he make good on the course he’s set for himself.

Mr. Webster said that he felt a rearguard action to keep proliferation to the minimum is to some extent inevitable although the characterization is perhaps oversimplified. He questioned whether we should be prepared to pay the ultimate price to stop proliferation—for example, a nuclear umbrella to India which might be too much temptation for Indian adventures; he would not give the Indians the ultimate military guarantees. On the other hand, he favored the taking of all steps reasonably necessary to slow proliferation, to approach the problem on a case-by-case basis. He felt he was nearer to Secretary McNamara’s “Model A” world than to “Model B,”⁴ but not so close as Mr. McNamara.

Mr. McCloy focused on the form of the guarantees that might be necessary, feeling that thorough analysis is needed. He said that it is not the answer alone to say that we have tremendous military power, but that we must instead acknowledge the political limitations on the use of that power. We have been convincing on our guarantees of Berlin, but the character of our determination will be diluted if we have 20 such commitments and our fundamental image of capability to defend the free world might be impaired. He is not convinced that a guarantee is the price we should pay; as to India, for example, we should try first to get an agreement to stop the spread of nuclear weapons without offering an umbrella. Mr. Dulles concurred.

Mr. McCloy went on to emphasize that it is “fantastic” to assume that the problem of European security is solvable by the “other side” alone, as suggested in NSAM 322. He feared that our position in the Alliance is rapidly deteriorating and that we risk both losing the Alliance and non-proliferation as well. We are going to have to confront De Gaulle’s belief that a return to nationalism in the Twentieth Century is appropriate; nationalism isn’t adequate for conventional weapons and is not adequate for nuclear weapons. Mr. McCloy thinks that the United States is drifting in a situation where proliferation in Europe is more serious than in Asia or the Middle East. He questioned the view that we owe the Germans nothing, emphasizing that such an approach opened the door to German insecurity in the 1920s.

Mr. Watson said that the ideal is the “Model A” world although he was puzzled by how we were to get it going without participation by the French. Soviet cooperation, he felt, would be desirable, at the price of overcoming their historical fears of Germany. Mr. Gilpatric suggested that perhaps at some time we may have to give up the “Holy Grail” and move to a “Model B” world. Mr. Watson emphasized that he was concerned with the need for a long-range plan for the future of the Germans. At the same time he said that it is a terribly dangerous course to repudiate France. He felt that some horse-trading would be necessary to soften the blow to the French of making Germany the dominant power in Europe. He said it was hard for him to see the practicality of alienating both the French and the Russians in order to achieve an Allied Nuclear Force.

Mr. McCloy added that we did the same before on both the Common Market and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and he felt that the Russians will adjust once again, even though they hate Western unity. France’s equivocal position, Mr. McCloy said, was readily stiffened by De Gaulle because our approach to the MLF has been so maladroit. Mr. McCloy emphasized that a solid Western Community was far more important than De Gaulle and is the essential basis for both the long-range prospects of disarmament and a modus vivendi, even affecting China.

General Gruenther indicated that his views had changed in the course of the study and that a “Model A” world is not impossible, stating that he feels we have to go forward to achieve it whatever the cost. He felt that a principal problem would be the selling of increased American commitments on India to the American public.

Mr. Dulles believed that we should begin with Course II as outlined in the Committee’s planning and move to Course III as we find targets of opportunity.⁵ We have to be sure that when we move to more adventurous positions we will be successful.

Dr. Kistiakowsky felt that for our own lifetime we might prefer to live in a “Model B” world, but his thoughts about his grandchildren have changed his mind and commit him strongly to seek the “Model A.” To term such action rearguard, he believes, is a concession of defeat. We must wage a campaign to keep proliferation at a minimum and be prepared to lose individual battles, but not the overall war. First, we should be prepared to impose pressures and present inducements to others. He felt the non-European world is at least as important as Europe in the light of growth in population and technological innovations. He is convinced that guarantees are essential to security in this area but that they should not be given promiscuously. He also thought that our own example will be essential and that we should press measures of arms limitation and increasing understanding with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Dean indicated that he, like General Gruenther, had changed his views somewhat to support “Model A” if the United States will pay the necessary costs. To succeed, he said, we must involve the Soviet Union. In this context, he thought it wise that we weigh reunification as an alternative to the MLF.

Dr. York came out squarely for “Model A.” Guarantees, he believes, are possible, and in the short run at least, United States lives need not be at stake in India to support a guarantee, although we must also be able to withdraw from guarantees, if necessary. “With nervousness about the long run, I am for ‘Model A’ as a goal for the short run.”

Dr. Perkins emphasized that proliferation is not the totality of United States policy and that the subject should not be expanded until it covers all of our interests and those of our allies. He also emphasized the need to relate our short-run actions to long-range objectives. First, he felt we should emphasize our conventional military option and seek to make it convincing. In regard to peaceful uses of atomic energy, he felt our restraints should be relatively mild because such restraints are not likely to prove especially significant in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. In addition, he had some distress about NSAM 322 and its exclusively regional basis. He is concerned that we are seeking to get out of a difficult situation rather than to work out an appropriate alternative. In the Far East, he felt that a strict treaty with India is not necessary but that we should consider a regional alternative, such as NATO in Europe, and to this end, start conversations with the Indians, the Japanese and the Filipinos to work out regional arrangements on a series of national agreements. Internationally, he felt we should strive for the non-proliferation and comprehensive test ban treaty, whether we are likely to get them or not. We should beef up the IAEA to make it the inspectorial system around the world. In terms of long-range objectives, he urged:

a. A beginning of considerations about United States-USSR “sharing of nuclear power progressively,” which he defined as two sharings between allies of the respective super-powers. (Dr. York interjected that perhaps we should seek a United Nations Security Council “that really runs the world.”)

b. With regard to the French, Dr. Perkins feels we are too optimistic to think that our policies will change after De Gaulle and that we should consider now what kind of a French role we expect, what kind of relationship with the French we should desire, and what kind of Atlantic Community we can have after De Gaulle’s passing.

c. The Chinese are the biggest problem of all because of their size, intransigence and isolation which, together, make the rest of our problems seem academic. He emphasized that it should be the highest order of business to achieve a study of our future policies on China as a follow-on to the activities of this Committee.

d. In regard to Africa and Latin America, he felt we should quickly push for denuclearization in order to achieve a 5-25 year breathing space.

Mr. Gilpatric, in summation, pointed to the problems of defining appropriate guarantees on a selective basis. Dr. York stressed that such guarantees should be extremely limited, and Mr. Gilpatric emphasized that we could give them only so long as the protected country remains non-nuclear.

There followed a review by members of the staff of problems of special significance to them.

Mr. Keeny stressed that he believed the net security advantage for the United States fell in “Model A,” which course we could change to “Model B” if “Model A” fails. Dr. Rathjens and Mr. Johnson emphasized the need for cooperation with the Soviet Union in future efforts to stop proliferation. Mr. Rivkin pointed to the overall security position of the Soviets in the face of possible Chinese and German nuclear weapons capability, urging that the United States be prepared to negotiate directly with the Soviets on their long-range security situation, and suggesting that we consider denuclearized, guaranteed German re-unification as an early alternative to the ANF. Mr. Garthoff expressed reservations about the consequences of Course III, some of which he felt could be either bad or disastrous. He indicated that if we give up the ANF to achieve non-proliferation, we avoid getting the British out of deterrence. He warned, with regard to dealing with the Soviets, that we might be exchanging good relations with our allies for an uncertain detente. He believed that Soviet participation is not essential to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Any proposal to the Soviets for halting strategic delivery vehicle deployment should not be allowed to affect Polaris. In summary, he preferred Course II, “with liberal borrowing from Course III and perhaps with Course I and Course IV.”

Professor Fisher emphasized the need for continuing studies. Existing policy, he said, is based on getting along with our allies, regardless of the consequences. The problem of guarantees, he thinks, has been over-emphasized, and little more is required than has been given already. He desires a policy to make nuclear weapons appear bad and the undertaking of progressive policies to eliminate United States reliance on nuclear weapons. Reunification of Germany, he said, should be clearly considered as an alternative to the MLF since it is the only policy which appears to resolve all our needs. He felt that the Committee should recommend the study of orderly controls on uranium exports and that it also consider the organization of the vigorous mechanism within the government necessary to stop proliferation.

Dr. Kistiakowsky noted that arguments in favor of Plowshare are based on an unsymmetrical assumption about technology in which Plowshare improves and conventional excavating technology stays the same. There was general agreement, in conclusion, that our hopes to stop proliferation are based on two basic “ifs”: Soviet cooperation and future Chinese behavior.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Minutes of Meetings, Box 9. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Rivkin on January 19. The minutes cover the third meeting of the Gilpatric Committee, which met in the Old Executive Office Building from January 7 at 10 a.m. to January 8 at 5:45 p.m.
2. Minutes of each of these briefings are ibid. For a memorandum of Secretary Rusk’s briefing, see Document 59. For Seaborg’s account of his briefing, see footnote 7 thereto.
3. For the text of President Johnson’s October 18, 1964, message, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, Book II, pp. 1377-1380.
4. In his briefing of the Gilpatric Committee on January 7 (see footnote 2 above), McNamara developed two models. In “Model A” the United States would push for a world in which there were no additional nuclear weapons nations; in “Model B” the United States would acquiesce in a world in which there would be a limited amount of further nuclear proliferation.

5. Reference is to the undated and unsigned planning paper for the Gilpatric Committee, “Problems Concerning Alternative Course of Action” (see footnote 6, Document 56), which developed four possible courses, as follows:

   • “i. Course I. Avoid costs and risks of trying to stop proliferation; attempt to establish regional stability based upon new balances of power, in the hope that the U.S. can avoid dangerous external involvements; assist proliferation where useful in creating such stability (e.g., India and Japan as counter-balances to China).
   • “ii. Course II. Attempt to slow proliferation everywhere while at the same time preserving other goals and avoiding major risks. Use the extra time to learn to live with the problem.
   • “iii. Course III. Accept substantial costs and risks in exchange for a materially increased probability of halting or greatly retarding proliferation.
   • “iv. Course IV. All-out efforts to stop proliferation; most or all other policies subordinated; acceptance of large costs now to avoid greater costs in the future.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Chron File, Box 5)