Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

48. Informal Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities¹

Washington, September 25, 1964, 10 a.m.

The fourth meeting of the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities met, under Ambassador Thompson’s chairmanship, at 10:00 a.m., on September 25, 1964. A list of those attending is appended.²

Chairman Seaborg expatiated on existing bilateral and multilateral safeguards, and the possibilities and problems in extending them more widely.³ In answer to a question, he noted that US policy is consistent in not permitting reactor sales without safeguards. Attention was given to the problem of discrimination by the application of safeguards over transfers to non-nuclear powers, while nuclear powers are not obliged to apply such safeguards to their own operations. Insofar as the objective is to curb further proliferation, such a distinction is wholly justifiable; on the other hand, the sensibilities of non-nuclear countries are adversely affected by this distinction.

The question was raised whether the Soviets would acquiesce in safeguards on Soviet transfers to other countries, particularly to other “socialist” countries. It was agreed that the Soviets might agree to such safeguards over transfers to non-Bloc countries, but would probably not agree to safeguards on transfers to Bloc countries. They have shown themselves averse to any application within the USSR itself. In response to a question, Chairman Seaborg stated that he did not believe the Soviets would be concerned over technological intelligence with respect to any reactors they have been willing to supply to other countries. The Soviets have acquiesced to the IAEA safeguards program, but have objected to having the cost of inspections be borne by the IAEA.

The question was raised whether safeguards on transfers of reactors and fissionable materials is adequate to prevent proliferation. Ambassador Thompson noted the recent remark by Dr. Kistiakowsky to the effect that a total test ban is necessary for this purpose. Chairman Seaborg agreed, but noted the value of also extending safeguards on transfers.

It was observed that the US has been able to persuade countries such as Israel and India, particularly in the latter case only with considerable pressure, to accept IAEA safeguards on our transferred materials and reactors. India will not, however, accept safeguards on its own planned reactor. Our Ambassador in Tel Aviv has reported that Israel is ready to accept any controls acceptable to the UAR, so long as there is adequate inspection. It was remarked that the Swedes appear to have a misconception on the intrusiveness of safeguards inspection.

Ambassador Thompson noted that the IAEA did not appear to be the appropriate body for inspection of nuclear free zones. Chairman Seaborg agreed that at least for the present the IAEA was not suitable. Dr. Scoville noted that the IAEA could inspect reactors in such zones, and this was generally agreed. The discussion drew attention to the problems posed for the US in seeking effective inspection for such zones, assuming there were no restrictions on transit, while opposing any inspection involving transit.

The ACDA proposal for including provisions for IAEA safeguards in the draft non-proliferation agreement was discussed.⁴ The ACDA proposal would include provisions both for applying safeguards on transfers, and on the indigenous programs on non-nuclear states. While the discussion was not conclusive, Ambassador Thompson noted that this question might be an appropriate one for determination by the Principals.

In discussion of the problems posed by the separate Euratom safeguard arrangements, it was noted that many consider such arrangements as at best Western self inspection. Moreover, its safeguards apply only to transactions of the member governments conducted under the specific auspices of Euratom. The Soviets have denounced Euratom and prevented its recognition by the IAEA.

The discussion concluded with two recommendations on which there appeared to be a tentative consensus, apart from the divided judgment on the advisability of including provisions for IAEA or similar safeguards in a non-proliferation agreement. The first recommendation was to consult with and urge the Western Suppliers Group to adopt a policy requiring IAEA safeguards on equipment transfers. The desirability of admitting Germany to the Group was also generally agreed upon. It was noted that the French have been offering reactor sales without safeguards, and do not consider themselves bound by decisions of the Suppliers Group. The second recommendation was to encourage Japan to submit its entire nuclear program to IAEA safeguards.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Committee on Nuclear Weapons. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Garthoff on September 30. The source text was transmitted under cover of a September 30 memorandum from Thompson to the members of the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities.
2. Not printed.
3. Seaborg’s brief account of this meeting was as follows: “We discussed the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the application of safeguards and inspection in connection with the peaceful nuclear activities of new nuclear countries. I spoke strongly for a significant role for the IAEA and described the problems of getting the USSR to go along. I said that much progress in this line has been made in the last year or so.” (Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 9, p. 190)
4. See Annex A, Document 44.