Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

46. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, August 25, 1964.

SUBJECT

• The ACDA Memorandum on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

I have reviewed the ACDA paper on non-proliferation² to be discussed at the Principals’ meeting scheduled for August 27,³ and consulted with the interested bureaus in the Department. With the exception of a divergent view held by Len Meeker, which I understand he will submit to you separately,⁴ the views in this memorandum have the concurrence of the other bureaus.⁵

The ACDA draft position paper marks a substantial step forward, in my view, in placing greater emphasis than heretofore on recommending a case-by-case consideration of the key situations which could provide an undesirable trigger to proliferation. Communist China represents a special problem and is being dealt with separately. With respect to Germany, we have the MLF. Current efforts to deal with the Israel-UAR situation offer our best hope for that area. This paper notes, I believe correctly, the need to give high priority to the Indian case. Our concrete programs for the MLF and to deal with the Israel-UAR arms race were developed by careful consideration of local pressures and problems, and we believe additional case-by-case studies as now recommended by ACDA should be undertaken. Bill Foster has been in touch with me with the suggestion that I chair a group to consider these various regional case problems, and arrangements for this are going forward.

In several other respects, the ACDA paper also contributes to advancing our tactical handling of the problem of preventing proliferation, in particular by suggesting a letter (though not the one ACDA has drafted) instead of a minute to express to the Soviets our interpretation of the relation of the MLF to non-proliferation, and to suggest (but not insist upon) specifying IAEA safeguards in a non-proliferation agreement with the USSR. In view of Soviet opposition to reliance on IAEA safeguards, it would not be desirable to make this a required element of our position.

At the same time, I believe that the ACDA paper raises three major problems: (1) decision not to insist on Chinese Communist participation as a precondition to a non-proliferation agreement, (2) decision now to place sharp constraints and conditions on the MLF, and so to inform the Soviet leaders, and (3) advocacy of an attempt to use the recent OAU resolution on non-proliferation as a vehicle to open a new campaign for a world-wide agreement. I, and the other interested officers in the Department, have grave reservations on the conclusions of the ACDA discussion, and oppose several recommendations made in the paper.

1. Should we decide now to accept an agreement without Communist China?

I believe that if we are able to agree upon a satisfactory non-proliferation agreement, we should probably accept it even without adherence of Communist China. I see no way to induce or compel Chinese commitment to forego acquisition of what they regard as an essential symbol, as well as instrument, of great power status. However, I strongly question the advisability of making that decision at this time. Even if, as ACDA proposes, we would not at once disclose such a position to the Soviets, I am much inclined to believe it would become known to our Allies, some of whom would be greatly alarmed at our giving up this card while pressing them to accept such an agreement. Similarly, India at least would probably be disinclined to adhere to such an agreement without Chinese commitment, and premature Indian realization of our position accepting an agreement without China could adversely affect our efforts to restrain India from initiating its own nuclear weapons program.

Accordingly, as a clarification and alternative to the ACDA draft, we would propose adopting at this time the following US position:

(a) If the Soviet Union should prove willing to accept a non-proliferation agreement on terms acceptable to ourselves and our Allies, we should, at that time and in the light of the circumstances then prevailing, consider the question of whether we should enter into such an agreement without the participation of Communist China.

(b) If, at the time the US and the Soviet Union reach agreement, other countries should hesitate to adhere to the agreement without the participation of Communist China or other particular countries, we should consider the usefulness of their issuing declarations of intent to adhere at such time as the adherence of other necessary parties may take place.

2. Should we offer the Soviet Union, in connection with a non-proliferation agreement, a commitment that we will not allow the MLF control formula to evolve in a way that would increase the number of nuclear decision-making centers?

It is highly unlikely that the US would or should give up a decisive voice in the control of the MLF unless this step involved abandonment of at least one of the existing European national deterrent forces and thereby had the effect of not increasing (or possibly of reducing) the number of “powers” controlling the use of nuclear weapons. But freezing our position now and offering a formal commitment to the Soviet Union on this score would damage important US interests without increasing the likelihood of early Soviet acceptance of a non-proliferation agreement.

The question of the “review clause” of the MLF Charter is one of the most sensitive issues confronting participants in the MLF, including the US. To make this issue the subject of negotiations with the Soviet Union, as ACDA suggests, would present severe substantive difficulties reaching beyond the MLF and affecting our basic position in Europe, and the timing of ACDA’s proposal could not be worse. Taking both substance and timing into account, adoption of the ACDA proposal would have the following adverse effects:

(a) It would lead to a deepening crisis of confidence in our relations with West Germany (the more so in view of the aide mémoire left by Ambassador Knappstein with me on August 5, which expressed concern about the handling of the non-proliferation question at the Geneva Conference and which forecast difficulties in the forthcoming General Assembly).⁶

(b) It would create a first-rate opportunity (which would not be lost) for the Gaullists in Germany as well as France to step up criticism of US policy in general. They would argue that the US was selling out European interests in dealing with the Soviet Union over the heads of the Europeans; that the US had, in effect, disowned assurances which had been given by both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson about possible evolution in MLF control as Europe moves toward unity; and that Germany should turn away from the MLF and cooperate with a force “that is really at Europe’s disposition”—the force de frappe. All of this would weaken Erhard in his effort to fight off external and domestic pressures to abandon an “Atlanticist” outlook, in favor of narrow Franco-German collaboration.

(c) While disturbing our relations with West Germany, the ACDA proposal would, evidently, not satisfy the British. As you know, the ACDA proposal is patterned after a suggestion initially put forward by the UK Delegation to the Geneva Conference and subsequently, in effect, disowned by the Foreign Office after implications for continuation of the British national deterrent were realized. To advance the language now suggested by ACDA would catapult the question of MLF control and its relation to the British national deterrent into the British electoral campaign, by making it appear that the US contemplated that the MLF would eventually absorb the British force. (This may be a desirable objective from our standpoint, but the way to achieve it is not by making it a partisan issue in the British election.)

(d) From the standpoint of the MLF control issue itself, the ACDA proposal would be counterproductive. It would be strongly resented by such “Europeanists” as Jean Monnet and his Action Committee who, while not pressing for abandonment of the US veto, set great store on not precluding this possibility—if only to make it clear that their acceptance of joint US-European control is not the result of US pressures. The net result would be a revival of European pressures for abandonment of the US veto since the recent decline in these pressures (manifest in statements by Von Hassel, Monnet, and others) was partly due to a belief by the Europeans that they would be able to consider the issue on its merits, instead of having the answer dictated to them by the US.

(e) Adoption of the ACDA proposal might divert and disrupt the MLF drafting exercise in Paris at a time when we are trying to bring this exercise—one of the few constructive ventures we now have going in Europe—to a successful conclusion by the end of the year so that the governments concerned can then reach the necessary decisions in a final negotiation.

(f) Finally, while we can probably agree to a withdrawal clause in a non-proliferation agreement along the lines suggested, it would be undesirable to give the Soviets now a club to wield over the MLF prior to its ratification.

While incurring the liabilities noted above, the ACDA proposal would not be likely to achieve its objective of hastening Soviet acceptance of a non-proliferation agreement. Ambassador Kohler’s assessment (which I share, and which INR also shares) is that, as long as the MLF is in the formative stage, the Soviet Union will reject any non-proliferation agreement that does not bar the MLF. Past experience with the Soviet Union supports this conclusion, and the price of again confirming this experience by putting forward the ACDA proposal is prohibitively high for the reasons that have been presented.

As an alternative to the ACDA proposal, we recommend the following:

(a) As specific MLF arrangements emerge from the Paris discussions, we recommend further talks between you and Ambassador Dobrynin to clear up any Soviet misunderstandings of these arrangements. This would be in line with your previous assurance to Dobrynin that many Soviet concerns would be met when details respecting the MLF became available.

(b) Continuing assurances should be given the Soviet Union that we will not permit the MLF to fall into the hands of any single country or of any grouping in which a single European country was predominant.

(c) Later in the year, when the time comes for European governments to adhere to MLF, we can consider how this adherence should be related to non-proliferation. Tentatively, we are inclined to believe the best approach would be the issuance of appropriate non-acquisition/non-dissemination statements by MLF participants at that time, but this is a matter that we can consider and discuss with other MLF participants between now and then, and not unilaterally decide nor at this time.

3. Should we take the initiative in promoting support of the OAU (Cairo) resolution on non-proliferation?⁷

ACDA proposes that we should endeavor to develop “the widest possible political consensus favorable to a non-proliferation agreement” by mounting an initiative on the basis offered by relevant sections of the OAU (Cairo) resolution on non-proliferation. In our view, there is today already substantial support for a non-proliferation agreement among those countries which have no possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons, and to the extent that world opinion can pose a barrier to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by countries that can obtain them, that obstacle already exists. Accordingly, we doubt that there is much to be gained by a further major initiative, particularly one which would be resented by our Allies (as ACDA’s earlier proposal concerning unilateral non-proliferation declarations was found to be unacceptable both to the Germans and Italians).

Moreover, we have some difficulty in believing that the OAU resolution would prove to be a very sturdy vehicle for this purpose. Notwithstanding the fact that the OAU resolution is based in part on the Irish Resolution (which we supported),⁸ the UAR representative at the Geneva Conference has already sought to precipitate debate concerning the relationship of the MLF to non-proliferation and advocated holding-up the MLF pending agreement. Moreover, as ACDA recognizes, the OAU resolution, taken as a whole, includes some provisions that are either not acceptable to us (an implied ban on transit of nuclear weapons) or at least undesirable (an international conference on non-proliferation). It would, therefore, be undesirable for the US to “encourage other states to associate themselves with the OAU resolution.” Finally, we recognize that the OAU resolution was a “holding action” by the African states instead of agreeing on a nuclear-free zone, and any efforts to influence them (such as ACDA suggests) would not only probably be ineffective but very likely also counterproductive.

While we do not, therefore, support the present ACDA proposal, we recognize that other countries may well take the initiative. OAU members may well press their proposal in the General Assembly; the Soviet Union will almost certainly inject attacks on the MLF into that forum; and, all in all, non-proliferation is likely to be a hot topic. Therefore, we believe that we should proceed now with an assessment of those tactics which would best protect our interests. In this context, further consideration could be given to the handling of the OAU resolution and to preparatory steps, in this or other connections, which it might be desirable for us to undertake in advance of the opening of the GA. Accordingly, we recommend that IO, together with EUR, S/MF, AF, and ACDA, be requested to prepare recommendations concerning our tactical approach.

4. Accession to a non-proliferation agreement.

Finally, I am disturbed about the suggested arrangements for adherence to the new draft non-proliferation agreement which envisage a single depository government and state that it would be open for accession to “all governments.” I believe some way must be found to deal with the problem of East German adherence, particularly if we are to have the support of the Federal Republic.

1. Source: Department of State,S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Garthoff on August 24. The source text forms Tab C-1 of a briefing book prepared for Secretary Rusk for the meeting of the Committee of Principals on August 27.
2. Document 44.
3. The August 27 meeting was postponed without scheduling a new date. (Memorandum for the Files by John J. de Martino (S/S-S), undated; Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964)
4. Meeker explained his views in a memorandum to Secretary Rusk, August 25, which is attached as Tab C-2 to the briefing book cited in footnote 1 above.
5. At the end of the source text are concurrences initialed by Richard Davis (EUR), Henry Owen (S/P), Jeffrey C. Kitchen (G/PM), Howard Furnas (S/MF), David Popper (RPM), and Joseph Sisco (IO).
6. The German aide-mémoire, August 5, expressed “great concern” about the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee discussions, which “are increasingly used by the Soviets to attack the policies followed by the Federal Republic and the creation of the MLF.” The Germans felt the discussions were being “exploited by the Soviets as a welcome means to discredit us in the eyes of the world and especially in those of the uncommitted countries represented at Geneva.” It further asked the U.S. Delegate in Geneva to avoid the subject of nonproliferation if possible and to consult with the Federal Republic of Germany in anticipation of future attacks that the Soviets would launch against the MLF in the United Nations. In a memorandum of conversation between Llewellyn Thompson and Ambassador Knappstein, August 5, attached to the aide-mémoire, Thompson said that he did not expect further discussion of nonproliferation at the current session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and gave assurances that the United States would continue to respond to Soviet attacks on the Federal Republic and the MLF and would consult with his government on the nonproliferation issue in the U.N. General Assembly. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18)
7. See footnote 1, Document 44.
8. See footnote 4, Document 44.