Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

33. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Scoville) to President Johnson¹

Washington, June 12, 1964.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Position on a cutoff of fissionable materials production and transfer to peaceful uses

Enclosed (at Tab A) is the position paper, “Cutoff of Fissionable Material Production and Transfer to Peaceful Uses as Separable Measures,” dated June 4, 1964, together with an annex “Inspection of a Fissionable Material Cutoff” of the same date.² The purpose of this memorandum is to request your approval for use of this position paper as guidance for the United States Disarmament Delegation in Geneva, and for use of the Annex as a working paper.

In accordance with the position approved by President Kennedy in November 1962,³ the United States has discussed these proposals in Geneva; you will also recall that the cutoff proposal was included in your January 21 message to the Geneva Conference. Thus, the enclosed position paper does not involve new proposals, rather the paper contains elaboration of our existing proposals, particularly with regard to verification. The working paper which the position paper authorizes the Delegation to table at the Conference would constitute the first detailed United States public statement to be made on inspection of the cutoff since the measure was initially suggested by the United States in 1955.

The position paper has been developed through extensive interagency consultation and has been approved by the Department of State. In addition, the position paper and annex now presented for approval were redrafted in light of Secretary of Defense McNamara’s letter of June 3, 1964, expressing his own views and transmitting those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, enclosed at Tab B. I am enclosing as Tab C a letter of June 9, 1964 from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Solbert which states that the drafts are now acceptable to the Department of Defense on certain conditions which are acceptable to ACDA.⁴

Mr. Solbert’s letter indicates that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in general agreement with the inspection provisions, with the exception of two matters: they desire overflights and some monitoring of atomic explosions for peaceful purposes. Secretary McNamara has indicated that the question of overflights need not be decided at this time, and therefore a policy of conscious ambiguity as incorporated in the paper is appropriate on this matter. As for the matter of monitoring atomic explosions for peaceful purposes, Secretary McNamara made it clear that he believes this is a subject more appropriately discussed in the context of the test ban.

The JCS have also stated that: “Until the IAEA safeguards organization and procedures are strengthened and the concept of IAEA inspection of a US/USSR cutoff agreement can be evaluated, adversary resident inspection of declared facilities is required as one of the safeguards against Soviet cheating.” As indicated by Section I of the verification annex, this requirement is recognized in the cutoff paper, and we are not, at this time, firmly committed to an IAEA role.

The Joint Chiefs also believe that the relative advantages and disadvantages of a combination cutoff and transfer proposal have not been thoroughly analyzed. Secretary McNamara has asked the Joint Chiefs to conduct such an analysis, but has noted that the paper is consistent with the position approved by President Kennedy in November 1962. The Department of Defense, through Mr. Solbert, has asked that we not authorize discussions now of transfer of over 60,000 kilograms for the United States and of a US/USSR ratio greater than 2. The Chiefs’ study on this subject should be available some time next month. At that time the Secretary will forward his views on any possible increase in our transfer proposal. This is acceptable to ACDA.

The AEC has also concurred in this position paper with a few clarifying comments. On the basis of discussions of these comments with the AEC staff we are in agreement with them. (Tab D)⁵

Mr. McCone has concurred in this position with the exception of a point relative to declarations. (Tab E)⁶ All agencies concur with this point and it will be taken care of by subsequent instructions to the delegation.

Recommendation

That you approve the use of the enclosed position paper as guidance for the United States Delegation in Geneva.

Herbert Scoville, Jr.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Vol. 1, Box 10. Secret.
2. Not printed, but see footnotes 2 and 3, Document 32.
3. In a memorandum to President Kennedy, November 20, 1962, Foster made recommendations regarding U.S. positions at the resumption of the Geneva disarmament talks, and President Kennedy approved them on November 21, 1962. See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. VII, Document 246.
4. Neither Tab B nor C is printed; see footnote 4, Document 32.
5. Letter from Seaborg to Fisher, June 12; not printed.
6. Reference is to McCone’s letter to Foster, June 10, in which he wrote in part that “there should be another declaration in Annex A (Section IVA, page 2) on the intended uses of allowed production. Without this, it is doubtful that unilateral intelligence could provide the necessary assurances that declared production requirements were reasonable.”