299. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1
Mr. President:
I gather from Sec. Rusk that both you and he are now cool to the possibility of a Summit on missiles; and I would guess that Moscow is also cool.
The reasons are ample:
- —time is short;
- —we could not go far beyond the exchange of positions and papers;
- —we would have to brief in Rogers and Laird;
- —we would have NATO consultation problems
Every normal argument is for leaving it to Nixon. And that may be the correct course.
But it may also be a decision we shall regret more than any other in the years ahead.2
Nuclear agreements are always marginal and tough. If we do not hold the meeting, the new administration may let the NPT and missiles slip in priority. Time will pass. Men and situations will change. And mankind may move down the wrong fork in the road for what will, with hindsight, look like relatively trivial reasons.
Therefore, I suggest that the President and Secretary of State make one more assessment of NPT and missile talk prospects in the Nixon administration, before abandoning the concept finally.3
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Strategic Missile Talks, Box 11. Top Secret; Literally Eyes Only. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that it was received at 1:40 p.m.↩
- The President has circled the words “we shall regret more” and drawn an arrow to the margin where he wrote, “I agree.”↩
- The President has also circled much of this sentence and drawn a line down to the same “I agree” referenced above.↩