Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

293. Summary Notes of the 594th Meeting of the National Security Council¹

Washington, November 25, 1968, noon–1:20 p.m.

[Here follows discussion of monetary issues, Vietnam, and current problems before the United Nations.]

[Ambassador Wiggins:] d. Disarmament—The issue now is the continuation of the conference of non-nuclear powers.² Our position is to oppose a permanent body to deal with this issue. As to the talks on strategic arms limitations, the Soviets have made mention of these talks but we have been non-responsive.

The President: What should we do about conducting talks on strategic arms limitation? We have the Czech situation, a new Administration coming in and there is uncertainty as to the possibility of achieving anything in such talks.

Ambassador Wiggins: We should proceed with the talks. There is no problem about conducting a parallel policy—attacking the Russians for their invasion of Czechoslovakia each morning and each afternoon talking about strategic arms limitations.

The President: The President-elect has slowed down Senate ratification of the non-proliferation treaty. Can we accomplish anything in strategic arms talks if we do not have the NPT ratified?

Ambassador Wiggins: We can accomplish something because the Russians are eager to undertake the arms talks. The Russians are embarrassed by criticism of the Czech invasion. They want to undertake arms talks in order to draw attention away from the Czech issue. However, we should not propose a special Senate session to ratify the non-proliferation treaty.

The President: Ratification to the NPT has a bearing on the strategic arms talks. The Congressional leaders will be coming here this evening to discuss whether or not to hold a special session.³ The Germans have been softened up by recent actions in the monetary crisis but we have no leverage on them to ratify the NPT because we have not yet ratified. The same situation is involved with Israel. We have given them the Phantom airplanes but this may not be useful in getting them to accept the NPT unless we have already ratified. In India and Japan, those opposing the NPT can argue that their countries should not act on the treaty before we do.

Delaying ratification until the new Senate arrives may mean that the ratification of the NPT is in doubt. The composition of the Senate will be different. Senators Clark and Morse will be out and Goldwater will be in. Senator Russell is in doubt about the treaty and his doubts may grow. Unless we act in December, we may run into trouble.

Ambassador Wiggins: It is embarrassing in the United Nations to be able to say only that we think we will ratify the treaty. It would be wonderful if the treaty were ratified.

The President: Asked for a paper summarizing the attitudes in the UN as reported by Ambassador Wiggins.⁴ Bob Murphy has been told that we believe we ought to go ahead with the NPT now.⁵ It is true the Senators didn’t want to come back for a special session. The Czech invasion blew up earlier plans for the arms talks. We should get started even if we handle the talks so as not to bind a successor. It is our hope that Mr. Nixon will agree to our going ahead and we have offered to have Bob Murphy as an observer on the delegation.

Secretary Fowler:⁶ The NATO meeting at Brussels changed the thinking of Europeans. The European situation is different after the NATO meeting as regards their doubt about bilateral or US-USSR arms talks.

Secretary Clifford: It is clear that NATO members do not want to return to the cold war. Their concern was that a NATO arms buildup might upset the movement toward detente. The NATO meeting was delayed almost to the point where the Soviet invasion could not be fully exploited in an effort to get them to increase their defense contribution. Most of the Soviet divisions are now out of Czechoslovakia and the threat to NATO members is, in their minds, less than it was a few weeks ago. However, NATO members would welcome US-USSR arms talks.

The President: State Department officials had told him the arms talks would cause trouble with NATO members. Secretary Rusk believed that talks would trouble our allies. President-elect Nixon said we should delay the talks because of the Czech invasion. A paper was requested giving all the reasons why the talks should or should not be held which he could use in a conversation with Senator Dirksen.⁷

Secretary Clifford: The Germans and British want us to go ahead with the arms talk. They are prepared to have us take the calculated risk that things will quiet down in Czechoslovakia. The rest of the NATO members want us to go ahead but they do not want us to ask them whether we should go ahead.

The President: Bob Murphy has been told that a meeting with the Russians might persuade the Soviets to pressure Egypt on the Middle East problem and Hanoi on the Vietnam problem.

Secretary Clifford: As to whether a special session on the NPT should be called, we must make a very careful nose count before deciding. There is real concern that the Senate might refuse to ratify the treaty. Senators would resent a special session whereas to the arms talks, such talks would help advance in the NPT here and abroad.

The President: We should tell the new Administration the facts of life and then they will have to take responsibility.

[Here follows brief discussion of other U.N. issues.]

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 5, Tab 76, Box 2. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bromley Smith.
2. See Documents 284 and 286.
3. No record of this conversation has been found. However, in a memorandum to President Johnson, November 25 at 11 p.m., Rostow proposed talking points for a message to President-elect Nixon. Among other things, Rostow’s draft message indicated President Johnson had decided to “leave the NPT to the opening days of the next session of Congress in January, at the earliest. (Both Dirksen and Mansfield think this would be wiser than calling a special session.)” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 108, Box 43R)
4. Not further identified.
5. On November 15, President Johnson announced that President-elect Nixon had designated Robert D. Murphy, former Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to serve as his liaison with the White House and as observer at the Department of State. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, p. 1126.
6. Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury.
7. Not further identified.