290. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster)1
Dear Bill:
Events in Czechoslovakia seemed to have overtaken any urgency for the ENDC speech proposed in your memorandum of August 16, 19682 and thus, the need for my immediate reply. I believe, however, that you would be interested in our general views on the subject of an agreement for a cutoff of production of fissionable material for use in weapons.
From the standpoint of AEC’s responsibilities, we are principally concerned with the effect that a cutoff would have on the ability of the AEC to meet possible weapon production requirements. To that end, we plan to make a study of our ability to meet foreseeable requirements for fissionable material and tritium under conditions of a cutoff, and will be happy to make the results of that study available to the agencies represented on the Committee of Principals.
Changes in US requirements for fissionable material and tritium for weapons, in projected demands for fissionable material for non-weapons use, and in AEC’s production operations have occurred since the Committee of Principals last reviewed the US position on a cutoff, several years ago. We believe that another review by the Committee of Principals would be very useful in terms of over-all perspective concerning the desirability of a cutoff.
We are also concerned about the present adequacy of the inspection procedures which were outlined in 1964 (ENDC/134)3 to apply to nuclear-weapon states under a cutoff agreement. In particular, demands for uranium enriching services to provide fuel for nuclear power reactors have expanded at a much greater rate than foreseen in 1964, and this raises a question as to the suitability of the monitoring procedures provided for in ENDC/134. Progress in the development of the technology of uranium enrichment by gas centrifuge has also been substantial. The procedures for monitoring operating uranium enrichment plants were based on the premise that such plants would continue operation at low production rates to meet demands for enriched uranium for non-weapons [Page 731] use, and that those demands would be small relative to existing stocks of fissionable material.ENDC/134 recognized that the monitoring procedures will have to be reviewed “as peaceful uses grow and involve substantially larger quantities of fissionable material.” We believe that it would be desirable to consider whether the monitoring procedures outlined in ENDC/134 are still appropriate in the changed circumstances. Accordingly, we intend to study this question and will make the results of our study available to the agencies represented on the Committee of Principals.
In order that our studies may be most useful, we would appreciate your providing us with the specific language of the cutoff proposal you would like to have considered for possible use at the ENDC.
With respect to the existing alternate proposal of plant-by-plant shutdowns, we believe that US actions since 1964 require that such a proposal be reformulated. We now have completely shut down two production reactors and have placed five others in standby. The reactors in standby are available for our use, given adequate lead time, for the production of plutonium or tritium for use in weapons or, alternatively, for production of materials for non-weapons use. Furthermore, some of the reactors still in operation are being used entirely for the production of materials for uses other than weapons. Accordingly, we believe that if and when any plant-by-plant offer is restated, consideration should be given to phrasing it in such a manner that it comprehends the following alternative actions: (1) shutting down permanently, under verification, of an operating reactor; (2) placing in standby under verification (for possible subsequent verified operation for permitted uses) of a currently operating reactor; (3) placing under verification a reactor already shut down or in standby, which had previously been a source of fissionable material for use in weapons; or (4) placing a currently operating reactor under verification to assure that the material being produced is only for permitted uses.
Cordially,
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83, Master Book, No. 2 of 3, July-September 1968. Secret. The letter is also reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 17, pp. 332-333.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 276.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 251.↩