288. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Clifford to Secretary of State Rusk1
ACDA-3548
Washington, undated.
SUBJECT
- Soviet Memorandum on Strategic Arms Limitations
The Soviet memorandum2 is, in general substance, consistent with the US proposal which has been developed for presentation to the USSR. The memorandum sets forth certain “general objectives” and also the “basic principles” which would be utilized in seeking to reach these objectives. It is contemplated that these objectives and principles would be set forth in a communique or joint statement following an initial meeting. In our view, any such agreed statement should embody the following changes:
- (1)
- The first proposed general objective, at the top of page 2, is “to achieve and maintain a stable US-Soviet strategic deterrence.” The word “achieve” may be intended to suggest that some adjustment of the present nuclear balance is required to bring about numerical equality in some respects. We should take the position that effective deterrence now exists and that the proper objective is to “maintain a stable US-Soviet strategic deterrence.”
- (2)
- The first two “basic principles,” at the bottom of page 2 and the top of page 3, phrase differently the subject matter of the proposed arms limitation agreement. The first of these refers to “offensive and defensive weapons systems” and thus would include manned bombers and missile systems designed to defend against manned bombers. The subsequent paragraph refers to the limitation and reduction of “offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and anti-ballistic missile systems.” This would appear to cover manned bombers, but not bomber defenses. Our proposal does not include limitations either on aircraft or on anti-aircraft systems. In view of the fact that the two paragraphs cover essentially the same subject matter, we should propose dropping the second and leaving the first with its general language about “offensive and defensive weapons systems.” This would leave us free in the course of negotiations to determine the advisability of including or excluding bombers and bomber defenses.
- (3)
- The third basic principle, contained in the second paragraph on page 3, talks of assuring “equal security” for both sides. Here again, the [Page 728] intent may be to provide for an adjustment in the existing nuclear balance to achieve numerical equality in one or more areas. US and USSR forces are not symmetrical at the present time and our security needs differ in some respects. We should point out that the word “equal” is tautological as a qualifier of “security” and should be deleted.
- (4)
- The third paragraph on page 3 does not clearly convey the thought that the two sides should study means for preventing the development of situations which pose the risk of escalation to nuclear war. The word “minimize” might be substituted for the words “rule out” in line 3 of paragraph 3. The word “possible” might be added at the beginning of line 5 of paragraph 3.
- (5)
- It is our understanding that the last two paragraphs of the memorandum contemplate that there will be an initial high-level meeting at which agreement will be reached on the “general objectives” and “basic principles” which will then be recorded in a communique or joint statement. Thereafter, special delegations will meet to develop a final agreement, guided by these objectives and principles. The memorandum thus apparently does not foreclose the possibility of a formal treaty although it does not specify the form that a final agreement is to take.
Clark M. Clifford
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 3548. Top Secret.↩
- Document 287.↩