242. Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals1
PARTICIPANTS
- See Attached List2
REFERENCE
- Report of the Deputies Meeting on Arms Control on the Seabed, May 27, 19683
Summary of Action
The ACDA Proposal4 was remanded to the Deputies with instructions to prepare a statement reflecting a U.S. position in time for the June 17 meeting of the UN Ad Hoc Committee. The intelligence community was requested to review its position on U.S. unilateral verification capabilities. Mr. Meeker was to be requested to meet with R.Adm. William Hearn (U.S.N. JAG, Ret.) and reach agreement on the inner and outer limits of that portion of the seabed adjacent to the coast of each signatory state within which the prohibition will not apply.
Discussion
Secretary Rusk asked Mr. Foster to summarize the Report of the Deputies.
Mr. Foster commented on the four principal points made in the Deputies Report of May 27.
Secretary Rusk queried whether there was not a rough analogy in this situation to the Outer Space Treaty5 negotiations.
Mr. Helms said it was roughly the same.
Mr. Nitze stated there was a problem. Under the Outer Space Treaty, the Soviets could orbit everything but the nuclear warhead. Under the ACDA proposal, the Soviets could deploy the weapon system on the seabed, to be armed with nuclear weapons at a time of their choosing—without (until the moment of arming) there being a violation of the treaty. They could aim for a first strike capability.
Mr. Foster said we would know if the Soviets made a substantial deployment—we can keep track of the changes in their strategic position.
[Page 609]Mr. Helms said Secretary Rusk’s statement remains accurate: the ACDA proposal involves a rough analogy to the Outer Space Treaty.
Mr. Nitze said that the seabed proposal would face a difficult time in the Senate. The Senate was much concerned with the Soviet FOBS development which followed on ratification of the Outer Space Treaty. He added that he had problems with each one of the four conclusions in the Deputies’ Report. As to the first which stated that the Deputies were in general agreement on the interpretation of what would be permitted and what would be prohibited, Mr. Nitze disagreed saying that the Soviets could, without treaty violation, deploy the weapons system minus warheads.
With respect to the second conclusion to the effect that the ACDA proposal, as amended, would not adversely prejudice future U.S. legal positions concerning the law of the sea,6 R.Adm. Hearn doesn’t share Mr. Meeker’s views. Adm. Hearn believes that substantial questions are involved such as the 12-mile territorial sea. The definition of the coast in the draft treaty text annexed to the proposal is tautological and does not take into account the USSR views on their so-called “internal seas.”
Secretary Rusk said such a definition probably was prejudicial to Soviet views on territorial seas but not to the U.S. Use of the 12-mile exclusion zone raises a presumption that we are getting involved in the territorial sea, but we can make clear that this proposal has nothing to do with the law of the territorial sea. Perhaps we could accept some other outer limit such as 25 miles.
Adm. Taylor asked if the 100 fathom isobath was practicable as the outer limits.
Dr. Wenk said that isobath would have a tendency to be confused with the 200 meter isobath defining the outer limits of the continental shelf which, in some cases, is found at a distance of 156 miles from the coast. He believes that any line in terms of distance was less harmful than one in terms of depth.
Secretary Rusk asked Mr. Nitze if JAG’s views would be met if we separated completely the outer limits of the exclusionary zone in the ACDA proposal from the law of the territorial seas?
Mr. Nitze replied that he wasn’t sure.
Mr. Foster noted that it would solve a psychological problem. The considerations involved in the proposal differ from those involved in the law of the sea.
Secretary Rusk said he saw no disadvantage in the ACDA proposal in an outer limit of the coastal zone which is clearly not related to the law [Page 610] of the sea. He suggested that Mr. Meeker and Adm. Hearn meet to resolve any differences.
Mr. Nitze said he also had difficulties with the third paragraph in the Deputies’ Report relating to the absence of military advantages and to the presence of economic savings and political benefits in the ACDA proposal. He could not see any economic savings since we may never wish a seabed deployment at all. We are talking of possibilities which may occur some 10 to 20 years in the future in the light of a technology much more advanced than it is today. We could be interested in alternatives to land based or submarine launched missiles. The seabed could offer the most economical alternative—unless we are to assume that we should not want such a deployment.
Mr. Foster said the basic economic savings would be to avoid any expense by precluding an arms race on the seabed.
Secretary Rusk asked if the Antarctic7 situation did not provide an analogy.
Mr. Nitze said that was not necessarily so.
Mr. Foster stated it was U.S. policy to eliminate nuclear weapons in the entire world. First in Antarctica, then testing in the atmosphere, next deployment in Outer Space and now on the seabed. We can’t eliminate such weapons in one day but the seabed represents an additional environment. When one considers the astronomical estimates of deployment costs reflected in the JCS staff paper,8 one is astonished. A movement in this direction would conform to our overall arms control policy.
Mr. Nitze replied that the same principle could be applied to submarines even though it was more expensive to deploy missiles on land where it costs more than submarine systems to get the same degree of assured destructive capability. He found the logic of the situation wanting.
Dr. Seaborg said we would have to assume the seabed had as much potential as submarines to make such an argument.
Secretary Rusk added that if we decided in favor of such deployment, enormous defense budgets for this purpose would be inevitable.
Dr. Tape said that the economic savings conclusion in the Deputies’ Report was based on the assumption that we would retain submarines, and that no other system appeared more useful.
Mr. Nitze replied that a mobile force was less costly and would not involve giving up anything.
[Page 611]Dr. Tape said that any missile silo (Rocksite) program would be prohibitively expensive, so why do it.
Secretary Rusk said it was his personal view that it was a military disadvantage to even have invented missiles.
Mr. Nitze added that thermonuclear weapons were terrible.
Gen. Wheeler stated that the same opinions had been expressed some 400 years ago with regard to gunpowder.
Dr. Seaborg said that the same disadvantages were cited years ago against the Limited Test Ban Treaty.9 Obviously other reasons had been found to more than compensate for the disadvantages.
Mr. Marks said that the argument applied to every new weapons system, and that this renunciation of a military option was a cheap price to pay for lessening of tension.
Secretary Rusk queried whether the LTBT had resulted in a reduction of expenditures for testing.
Dr. Seaborg replied that underground testing was extremely expensive.
Mr. Nitze replied that any advantage in ACDA’s proposal would be political, but that he had not seen much analysis of political gains. The proposal, if agreed, would be unverifiable, however.
Dr. Hornig asked whether we would stand for the deployment of such a seabased weapon system, without warheads?
Mr. Foster said we’d denounce the treaty.
Gen. Wheeler said he also had thought we would denounce the Outer Space Treaty under a similar situation, but now had serious doubts that we would denounce either treaty under such conditions.
Dr. Wenk gave his views on the economic savings and political benefits. The first related to the arms control measure which involved trade offs. The second involved international cooperation and collaboration in the sea—through the UN and other agencies. He believed that the present set of U.S. proposals on seabed resources could not proceed without an arms control measure. The political benefits were of an immediate nature which had to be weighed against the hypothetical long term military contingencies. The U.S. would be in a far weaker position on its overall long term seabed policy if it took a negativistic point of view towards arms limitations. The ACDA proposal represents almost the least we can do.
Mr. Nitze replied that the ACDA proposal, if adopted, may not be acceptable to other nations and we’ll be pressured to go further.
[Page 612]Mr. Foster said he didn’t think the proposal would be unacceptable to other nations. The Soviet “demilitarization” proposal would knock out SOSUS. ACDA’s proposal is realistic. We wouldn’t negotiate a treaty at the U.N. but rather in the ENDC. We would state a general arms control principle at the U.N. to accomplish the U.S. policy of limiting nuclear weapons.
Secretary Rusk said this proposal would take care of 98% of the apparent objectives in the Soviet Arms control proposals.
Dr. Wenk added he did not believe the Soviets were serious about their “demilitarization” proposal, but they would capitalize enormously on the political level if the U.S. were to do nothing in this field.
Gen. Wheeler said he joined Mr. Nitze in the latter’s stated views. He pointed out that if the Soviets were to deploy large numbers of weapons on the ocean floor, we could detect a massive underwater undertaking but nothing more. The JCS disagreed with the Deputies’ judgment on U.S. verification capabilities as reflected in their report. He added that he did not believe that the Soviets would most likely not opt for seabed deployment. The U.S. had not seen that FOBS were in the net U.S. advantage, but the Soviets had concluded it was to their advantage.
Secretary Rusk asked if we had any information whether the Soviets were deploying that kind of system (FOBS).
Mr. Helms said the Soviets appeared to be flight testing FOBS.
Dr. Hornig said it was not clear whether the Soviets were developing FOBS or ballistic missiles with depressed trajectories and deboost capabilities.
Secretary Rusk asked whether we had any indications that the Soviets were contemplating a seabed nuclear weapon system.
Adm. Taylor said that we had no indications and that it did not appear that the Soviets require a system of this type. The U.S. verification capabilities are based on a combination of sensors. We have to consider that the magnitude of the task of emplacement would be detectable. Once the emplacement was located, underwater verification should be adequate for U.S. to know what the Soviets are doing.
Dr. Wenk added that the last paragraph of the Deputies’ Report on the adequacy of U.S. verification capabilities must be read with its operating phrase “in conjunction with” (“the current and projected strategic balance, the limited relative advantage to the Soviet Union of clandestine deployments of this kind on the seabed, and the political penalties attached to the detection of such deployments”). The entire thought does not support Gen. Wheeler’s judgment. Moreover, the Soviets are retarded in deep sea technology, and for the Soviets to develop such technology would be visible to the intelligence community in the Ramp;D stage. The Soviet interest in purchasing the Star III, for example, supports [Page 613] this view since the technology represented in the Star III as constructed is 8 or 10 years behind the current state of technology.
Adm. Taylor added that the basic question is the direction of Soviet oceanographic interest—the evidence points to increasing Soviet capabilities for fisheries resources.
Secretary Rusk said that perhaps we could attempt to cooperate with the Soviets in exploiting and exploring the deep sea resources.
Adm. Taylor thought it was a good idea, adding that we could then check on their technology.
Secretary Rusk noted that without large expenditures it would be a long time before deep sea capabilities would come into being.
Dr. Wenk said that most of the existing U.S. deep submergence vehicles were built by aerospace industries.
Secretary Rusk asked Mr. Nitze the reason for his interest in reserving the seabed for possible future nuclear weapons deployment. In view of the Antarctica, LTBT and the Outer Space treaties, an agreed restraint in this new environment would appear very real.
Mr. Nitze said that the reason for DOD’s support of the LTBT was to avoid further contamination of the atmosphere.
Gen. Wheeler added that JCS support for the LTBT almost did not come to pass, and that the U.S. was paying a penalty for ratifying the treaty in the constraints the U.S. had accepted. The U.S. is performing underground tests at a much greater expense and delay than if the tests were conducted in the atmosphere. As for the Antarctica Treaty, no one wanted to fight over the Antarctic. It is easier to verify compliance with the Outer Space Treaty than under this proposed treaty.
Secretary Rusk asked if DOD was concerned for the immediate future or for the naval officer of year 2000 who is going to be penalized for this decision. Would a duration clause make a difference?
Gen. Wheeler said it seemed that we were giving up possible future strategic capabilities in return for a small political gain. Further, this might be only the first step toward a strategic straight jacket, particularly in view of U.S. verification capabilities.
Mr. Foster said we must consider constraint in nuclear weapons. Was the U.S. sincere in seeking arms limitations on nuclear weapons? This proposal is a thoroughly consistent follow-up to Antarctica, LTBT, and Outer Space Treaties. It is a logical next step, and not a minor political advantage.
Secretary Rusk said the U.S. better start finding some acceptable constraints. He wondered where we would come out if we continued the arms race in offensive and defensive missiles. As for the possibility of preprogrammed computerized missiles, there would be no decisions left to make and it would make the human condition appalling beyond description. [Page 614] There exists a real danger in having nuclear weapon systems: they may be beyond the control of human intelligence.
Dr. Seaborg said he had no strong feelings on the ACDA proposal. He could appreciate the problems of Gen. Wheeler and Mr. Nitze. He could also see the political advantages. If we failed to give up an option, we could be doing ourselves a great deal of harm. We must make progress and show that we are taking steps to control the arms race. The NPT is in the U.S. interests. There does exist a dilemma with respect to verification of the seabed proposal. Perhaps this problem should be recognized for what it is and we all agree that it is overweighed by the political advantages. Congressional approval will be difficult to obtain. The proposal has not been presented as well as would be required to avoid Congressional difficulties.
Gen. Wheeler said that Congress had recently queried him three times on whether FOBS constituted a violation of the Outer Space Treaty. There still exists grave doubt on this point in Congress.
Secretary Rusk said that there doesn’t exist that much difference in verification capabilities under the Outer Space Treaty and the ACDA proposal. It is very difficult to determine if a particular object in orbit is carrying a nuclear weapon.
Adm. Taylor said he disagreed with the JCS on U.S. verification capabilities. He thought the estimative judgment in the Deputies’ Report was supportable but was as strong a judgment as could be made.
Secretary Rusk said the U.S. was faced with a problem of what to tell the Soviets and others in June and July.
Mr. Foster said we could announce at the June 17 meeting our belief that restraints on the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in the seabed environment are possible, and hopefully discuss the matter in the ENDC in July or August. If we do nothing we face difficult political problems.
- Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Arms Control on the Seabed (2), Box 20. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, although Sidney Graybeal (ACDA) and C. Normand Poirier (ACDA) are listed as reporting officers on the attached list of participants. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State’s Conference Room.↩
- Not printed.↩
- See Document 241.↩
- See Document 233.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 238.↩
- See footnote 6, Document 238.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 238.↩
- Presumably a reference to Document 236 in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff commented extensively on the ACDA proposal.↩
- See Document 3.↩