Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

239. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 17, 1968, 1–3:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Nonproliferation Treaty

PARTICIPANTS

• For the United States:
  • The Secretary
  • G—Ambassador Bohlen
  • EUR—John M. Leddy
• For the Soviet Union:
  • Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov
  • Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
  • Min. Couns. Yuri N. Tcherniakov

About two-thirds of the 2-hour luncheon was devoted to the NPT.

US-Soviet Cooperation

Both the Secretary and Kuznetsov expressed their appreciation for the close cooperation which had taken place at the UN between the Soviet and American delegations on the handling of the NPT. The Secretary and Kuznetsov agreed that this close collaboration should continue; that the two governments should stand firm against any changes, certainly for the time being; and that if, at the very end, and if both agree, there were minor changes in the text of the Treaty which would not affect basic substance, and if by these changes it would be possible to get significantly wider adherence to the Treaty, the two governments would then consider whether these changes could be accepted.

Kuznetsov emphasized that he was under instructions to agree to no changes at present and stressed the problem of opening a Pandora’s box if alterations were to be considered at this stage.

The Secretary and Kuznetsov agreed that the two countries could be more flexible in dealing with the proposed GA resolution endorsing the NPT than with the text of the NPT itself; but that any changes in the text of the GA resolution must also be acceptable to both the US and the USSR.

Significance of the Latin American and African Vote

Kuznetsov said that before coming to Washington he had had a talk with Robles, the UN Delegate of Mexico, which was the leader of the Latin American group. He stressed the importance of bringing around the Latin American vote and urged that the US do everything it could to bring the Latin Americans into line. The outlook was not discouraging, but US help was needed. The Secretary said that we would do everything that we could on an urgent basis. According to Kuznetsov, Robles had said that the Mexicans would sign the NPT even if there were no changes in the text, but Robles urged changes in order to bring around the rest of the group. The Secretary observed that Robles was probably more Mexican than the Mexicans. He pointed out that Carrillo Flores, the Mexican Foreign Secretary, was personally strongly in favor of the Treaty.

Kuznetsov said that the Mexican proposal² to include in the NPT Treaty—or possibly in the GA resolution—a reference to the Treaty of Tlatelolco,³ would cause serious difficulties for the Soviets. Such a reference in Soviet eyes would bind them to the principles of the Treaty of Tlatelolco which they are still considering and about which they have reservations on two main points:

(1) On the principle of permitting peaceful explosion by non-nuclear weapon states—(Art. 18) and (2) on the huge area covered by the treaty, which embraces half the Atlantic and half the Pacific.⁴

Turning to Brazil, the Secretary told Kuznetsov that the US was not in agreement with the Brazilians on their proposed amendment regarding peaceful nuclear explosive devices (Pineds).⁵ He said that the Brazilian Foreign Minister had told him that the Brazilians would not press their amendment on this subject or urge the other Latin Americans to support it. He thought the Brazilians would probably not sign the NPT now but might come along later. He observed that the Brazilians, like a number of other countries, were attempting to use the NPT in order to get bilateral bargaining advantages from the US on such questions as fuel supply, peaceful uses, the S.W. Africa issue, etc. Kuznetsov said he hoped we would make good use of our bargaining power to get adherence to the NPT.

Reference was made to the fact that Mexican Foreign Secretary Carrillo Flores was now visiting Moscow. It was suggested that the Soviets could raise the NPT with him during his visit, while the US would approach the Mexicans in Washington or Mexico City.

Kuznetsov said that the Africans were being troublesome. The African opposition bloc was led by Ghana, Tanzania and Kenya. Their tactic is to promote a resolution which would postpone consideration of the NPT until the 23rd GA. Kuznetsov had had a talk with the UN representative of Kenya within the last few days and had ascertained that an important element in the African position was the attitude of South Africa on the NPT. If the South Africans could be brought to support the NPT unequivocally, this could be very important in swinging the entire African vote. At this point the Secretary showed Kuznetsov a telegram which the Department had received this morning from our Mission in South Africa, explaining some of the South African preoccupations and recommending that a US technical expert be sent to Pretoria in order to clarify these problems. The Secretary said that the US would take steps to do this immediately in an effort to help the situation.

The Secretary asked whether the Soviets felt that the negative Tanzanian attitude was influenced by the Chinese. Kuznetsov said that the Soviets were quite certain of it. The Tanzanians had said at the UN that the NPT was nonsense and what really mattered was disarmament. Their whole idea is to postpone the NPT with the hope it will be killed. In response to Kuznetsov’s question as to whether the US could do something with Tanzania, the Secretary replied that our relations were only fair, but we would do what we could.

The Secretary asked whether Kuznetsov felt that the Africans were attempting to use the NPT as a means of pressing their views on S.W. Africa. Kuznetsov confirmed that they were and referred to a recent Asian-African meeting at which a decision was reached that there would be no action on NPT until the S.W. African problem was solved. The Secretary said that this created real difficulties.

Ambassador Bohlen asked Kuznetsov what he felt was the attitude of the francophone Africans. Kuznetsov said “not good”; that according to a recent talk he had with Bernard (French Ambassador to the UN) the French would be neutral on NPT although it really favors the Treaty. Mr. Bohlen recalled that De Gaulle had said a few years ago that he did not believe in treaties which have no real powers of enforcement.

Concluding this aspect of the discussion Kuznetsov once again emphasized the importance of the Latin American vote and the importance of US efforts with the Latin American countries to obtain favorable results.

FRG Activities at the UN

Kuznetsov said that the FRG observer at the UN (Von Braun) had recently distributed a press release (which he said had been prepared over a year ago, but with new thoughts introduced) designed to bring uncertainty and doubt about the NPT. The Soviets were wondering whether they should not speak out against this action. From the Soviet view, the FRG is trying to sow seeds of doubt. Meanwhile, while the FRG has two people at the UN the GDR can’t get visas from the US to be present at the UN, and the Soviets think that they should.

The Secretary said that, speaking very frankly, he would like to offer the Soviets some advice. There was an internal problem in the FRG on the NPT. Some were hostile to it, but others, including Kiesinger and Brandt, were prepared to move. Birrenbach was troubled; Strauss was not in favor. The Secretary thought that the FRG would sign the NPT, but he advised the Soviets not to make an issue about the FRG observer’s statement; this would only complicate an already serious problem both for the FRG and for the US and would make more difficult FRG support for the Treaty. In any event, he said, the question of a GDR observer at the UN raised a difficult problem in itself.

(Mr. Bohlen briefly mentioned the recent GDR interference with the travel of West German citizens over the autobahns to Berlin. Kuznetsov quickly said this was an entirely different question and had nothing to do with the NPT. Mr. Bohlen said he had raised the matter only because Kuznetsov had mentioned the question of visas for GDR observers at the UN.)

The Secretary said one of the reasons for the internal opposition in the FRG to the NPT was the thought of making a commitment to the Soviet Union for nothing in return. The US would like to keep the NPT quite separate from all extraneous matters and he again urged that the Soviets take no action regarding the FRG statement at the UN. He added that the members of NATO were strongly interested in assurances of FRG adherence to the NPT for reasons which would be understood.

US-Soviet Talks on Nuclear Weapons

Kuznetsov acknowledged that if the United States and the Soviet Union could agree to start bilateral talks on limiting strategic nuclear weapons this would be helpful at the UN on the NPT. However he could only say that Moscow was still considering the US proposal that talks begin.

Security Assurances

Responding to the Secretary, Kuznetsov said that there is considerable dissatisfaction at the UN over security assurances. There was the problem of when to put the draft resolution to the Security Council. The membership problem was not encouraging and it would not be easy to find 9 members in support of it. He had tried to find out what the French attitude would be. The French delegate had told him that he would not be active, but had no answer on the final French position. Probably they would abstain. India would probably also abstain. Ethiopia and Pakistan were doubtful.

The Secretary thought that Japan and India face the most serious problem in connection with security assurances. He said that he personally was 1000% against India becoming a nuclear-weapon state; but that if he were the Foreign Minister of India he would certainly understand the difficulties confronting India in view of the Chinese threat.

Kuznetsov said the Japanese were very active in the GA and have prepared a draft statement. Japanese reservations relate to the questions of security assurances, peaceful uses and disarmament.

The Secretary said his personal view was that Japan would sign; Kuznetsov thought that they and others would nevertheless try to postpone.

Responding to the Secretary, Kuznetsov said that he had no definite answer from the Romanians. The Romanians were not active in the UN. His best guess was that the Romanians would not vote in favor of the GA resolution endorsing the NPT, but would abstain.

The Secretary emphasized two points in connection with security assurances and the position of the US:

1. The US is not prepared to enter into any additional commitments of alliance in order to give security assurances relating to the NPT. We have enough allies as it is and the Senate will not approve any additions.

2. The US is not ready to entertain the prospect of a possible war with the Soviet Union in order to get the NPT.

Therefore, the Security Council approach which we had agreed upon with the USSR is the only approach possible for the US.

The Secretary added that there are few people who truly understand the real meaning of nuclear war—perhaps not more than 25 or 30 in the US. Kuznetsov said that the Soviet Union understood it very well. The NPT had been under the highest consideration in the USSR which had concluded that the NPT negotiations were of the highest importance and the only way to stop proliferation. He returned to the importance of solidarity between the US and Soviet Union in not making any material changes in the Treaty except as outlined above.

Procedures for Signing NPT

The Secretary said that the US has not made up its mind on the procedure for signing the NPT. This would have to be discussed with the President. The US had no strong objections to signing the Treaty at the ENDC in Geneva. But if this procedure were adopted two problems would arise. If signature of the Treaty were open to all on this occasion, then the question of the non-recognized (implicitly the GDR) would arise. If signing were limited to members of the ENDC, there is the question of how many members we could get to sign. Perhaps it would be less complicated to use the formula followed in connection with the Outer Space Treaty, i.e., to sign in the capitals of the 3 depository powers. Kuznetsov said that the Soviets favored signing in Geneva in order to maximize public attention to the importance of the treaty. This would be analogous to the procedure followed for the Test Ban Treaty (which was signed at one place, in Moscow). He said that if problems should arise about non-recognized states (presumably referring to GDR) in a Geneva ceremony, he thought that this could be taken care of.

The Secretary then made a personal suggestion, which he asked the Soviet side not to report, that perhaps there could be an initialing of the text in Geneva with formal signatures taking place in the capitals of the 3 depository powers. He said that he would talk over this whole question with the President.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Leddy (EUR) and approved for distribution by J.P. Walsh (S/S) on May 20. The source text is labeled “Part I of V.” The conversation took place in the Secretary’s dining room.
2. For a detailed account of Mexico’s position on the non-proliferation treaty and its relationship to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, see Garcia Robles’ statement to the First Committee of the General Assembly, May 16, printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 345-357.
3. See footnote 2, Document 226.
4. On May 20, First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov delivered a statement to the First Committee of the General Assembly on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. At this time, he expressed, in broad terms, the reservations held by the Soviets about the Mexican proposal. See Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 368-378.
5. Brazil was one of several ENDC members which urged that peaceful nuclear explosions should be exempt from prohibition under Articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty because Article 18 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (see footnote 2, Document 226) specifically permitted the signatories to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under international inspection, either with their own resources or in cooperation with third parties. See the statement by Brazil’s Foreign Minister de Magalhaes Pinto to the First Committee of the General Assembly, May 3, regarding Brazil’s proposed amendments to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 278-283.