Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

202. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)¹

Washington, August 28, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Arms Control Considerations of a U.S. Anti-Ballistic Missile Deployment Decision (U)

On several occasions over recent years the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has made clear that a U.S. decision to deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense system would have serious consequences for U.S. arms control objectives. In a speech to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference [Committee] on August 16, 1966,² the U.S. pointed out how we believe that ABM deployment would exacerbate the strategic arms race. This effect was also made clear in Secretary McNamara’s statement to Congress on January 23, 1967,³ and was a basis for President Johnson’s suggestion to Premier Kosygin that U.S.-U.S.S.R. discussions should be held in order to control this race.⁴ Even though the ABM deployment were limited, we still believe it would pose serious risks to our arms control objectives, in the first instance the non-proliferation treaty.

The ultimate decision with respect to deployment of an ABM system will, of course, be made in the light of the total range of considerations affecting U.S. security, including the Chinese Communist build-up and the Soviet failure to date to agree to the initiation of discussions on controlling the strategic arms race. If these considerations were to lead to an early U.S. decision to initiate deployment of an ABM system notwithstanding the adverse effects of such a decision on U.S. arms control objectives, I believe it would be essential that certain actions be undertaken by the U.S. Government in order to minimize insofar as possible these adverse effects. In particular, every effort must be made to avoid such a U.S. decision from preventing the maximum acceptance of and continued adherence to a non-proliferation treaty by non-nuclear-weapons countries.

With this objective in mind, I am forwarding herewith for your consideration a paper suggesting various actions which might be taken by the U.S. Government in the event of a U.S. decision to deploy ABMs. I and my representatives will be glad to discuss this with you and your staffs at your earliest convenience.

Adrian S. Fisher

Enclosure⁵

August 25, 1967.

CONTINGENCY PAPER ON THE ARMS CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS OF A U.S. ABM DEPLOYMENT DECISION

If a U.S. decision were to be made to deploy an ABM system along the lines of the “I-67 Program” (an area defense system with hard-point defense of some Minuteman complexes), then extremely important arms control considerations would have to be taken into account prior to the announcement of any such decision. Such a deployment would probably be based upon and justified by the emerging Chinese ICBM capabilities and the continued Soviet offensive missile buildup; the area defense component would provide protection against Chinese ICBM’s and possible accidental launches, and the hard-point defense of Minuteman would decrease the vulnerability of this component of our assured destruction capability by raising the “cost” to the Soviets should they attempt a counterforce first strike.

Such a U.S. ABM deployment decision at this time could have adverse effects on at least four important U.S. arms control objectives:

1. Preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons by obtaining maximum acceptance of and continued adherence to a Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT);

2. Controlling the offensive and defensive strategic arms race between the U.S. and the USSR;

3. Assuring the continued adherence to existing arms control agreements; specifically, the “Limited Test Ban” (LTB) treaty; and

4 Maintaining continued U.S. Government support of stated U.S. policy positions on important arms control proposals; specifically, the cutoff in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes (“Cutoff”) and the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB).

The potentially adverse consequences of a U.S. ABM deployment decision on the foregoing arms control objectives could be minimized by the following recommended specific actions:

1. Private discussion with the USSR prior to announcing our ABM deployment decision emphasizing:

a. The emerging Chinese ICBM threat as a primary basis for our decision;

b. The “limited” nature of the planned deployment and our intentions to keep it “limited”;

c. The hard-point defense of Minuteman as a partial response to continued Soviet offensive missile buildups, and as posing no threat to the USSR per se;

d. The increasing importance of achieving meaningful private discussions between our two nations on ways of controlling the strategic arms race in order to prevent any misunderstanding as to the nature of any deployment and to avoid further escalation of the strategic arms race;

e. The importance and urgency of showing some progress in other arms control areas, such as meaningful discussion on controlling the strategic arms race, in order to secure the widest possible acceptance of and adherence to the NPT; and

f. The increasing pressures of many of our respective allies for their own offensive and defensive strategic systems and associated nuclear warheads if they observe a continued strategic arms buildup by the USSR and the U.S.

2. Private discussions with NATO prior to announcing our ABM deployment decision,⁶ emphasizing the first four points under “1” above as well as:

a. The emerging Chinese missile threat is not directed towards Europe;

b. There are no hardened strategic missile deterrent forces in Europe suitable for hard-point ABM defenses (FYI, future French solid IRBM silo deployments are not a part of U.S. NATO strategic missile deterrent);

c. ABM defenses of overall urban populations against present and future Soviet offensive missile capabilities are not feasible at this time for either Europe or the U.S.;

d. Some U.S. defense against the emerging Chinese ICBM threat can provide the U.S. more flexibility in its actions in support of its allies and friends around the world;

e. The fact that the Soviets were the first to initiate ABM deployment and the very limited nature of our ABM deployment need not cause a new spiral in the U.S.-USSR strategic arms race; and

f. Such an ABM deployment decision should not decrease in any way importance and desirability of an equitable NPT to other nations.

3. Private discussions with Japan prior to announcing our ABM deployment decision emphasizing:

a. The continued deterrent value of the overwhelming strategic superiority that the U.S. will possess for the foreseeable future over the Communist Chinese, and the continued utility of this strategic deterrent in protecting the vital interests of Japan;

b. Our ABM deployment in face of an emerging Chinese offensive missile capability is supplemental to our strategic deterrent forces and is designed to decrease U.S. vulnerabilities to possible Chinese threats of attack and thereby enhance the credibility of our commitments to Japan and other friendly nations (we do not consider China to be an irrational adversary);

c. The U.S. is firmly committed to achieving an equitable NPT and does not consider that a U.S. ABM deployment decision should in any way decrease the desirability of an NPT to other nations. In fact, for the reason indicated in “b” above, the need for nuclear weapons by nations friendly to the U.S. will be reduced as will the utility of nuclear weapons to nations which may be enemies of the U.S.; and

d. Our willingness to continue to hold detailed discussions with Japan on the overall ballistic missile defense problems—technical, military, economic, and political.

4. India will also require timely consultations, particularly in light of the growing Chinese threat and current NPT negotiations. Shortly after the announcement of our ABM deployment decision, a high-level discussion with Indian representatives should take place emphasizing the same first three points made with Japan (see “3 a, b, and c” above) and the points to be made public under paragraph “5” below. With India one should also emphasize that the U.S. ABM deployment decision is one of the least provocative U.S. responses to the continuing Soviet offensive missile buildup and the emerging Chinese missile capabilities.

5. At the time that the U.S. ABM deployment decision is made public, the following points should be clearly stated and emphasized by senior U.S. officials:

a. While the U.S. has demonstrated its reluctance to initiate ABM deployment, this was the only prudent decision in face of an emerging Chinese ICBM capability and our need to protect our Minuteman force against the continued buildups in Soviet offensive missile capabilities;

b. The limited scope and purposes of the planned ABM deployment emphatically stating that such deployment need not trigger a new strategic arms race between the U.S. and the USSR, and that the U.S. still desires meaningful discussions with the USSR on ways for controlling the overall strategic arms race involving both offensive and defensive weapons systems;

c. The U.S. continues to consider the achievement of an equitable NPT as a priority goal;

d. The U.S. ABM deployment decision in no way interferes with or detracts from stated U.S. positions involving important U.S. arms control objectives; and

e. The planned ABM deployment will not require any nuclear tests which are inconsistent with the present LTB.

6. Specific talking papers on the arms control considerations of our ABM deployment should be prepared for use by our ambassadors and other senior officials in various private and public forums shortly after our ABM deployment decision is made public.

Early consultations within the U.S. Government on the above-proposed course of actions should be held and specific actions agreed to in order that necessary staff-level preparations may be completed on a timely basis.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967. Secret; Noforn.
2. Statement by ACDA Deputy Director Fisher; see Documents on Disarmament, 1966, pp. 562-567.
3. Presumably a reference to McNamara’s military posture statement given to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Department of Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, January 25; for text, see ibid., 1967, pp. 5-24.
4. See Document 178.
5. Secret; Noforn.
6. Note: The U.S. must be prepared to discuss the issues involved in ABM deployment at the Disarmament Experts’ Meeting in Paris, September 12-15, 1967, and at the Ankara NPG Meeting, September 28 and 29, 1967. [Footnote in the source text.]