Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

199. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, June 24, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Safeguards Article for Non-Proliferation Treaty

This is a follow-up on our telephone conversation of yesterday evening. For your background I am attaching a copy of the U.S. Draft Article III and the Soviet Draft Article III which we have exchanged to date.

As you can see, the primary differences are that the Soviet draft merely provides for the acceptance of IAEA safeguards and, by having no time schedule for their application, presumably provides that they should be immediate, while the U.S. Draft holds open the possibility that negotiations between the IAEA and the authorities of another international safeguards system (e.g. Euratom) should come to a mutually satisfactory arrangement under which the IAEA verifies the effectiveness of the other system.

The Euratom countries, and in particular Germany, have a variety of interests in preserving the Euratom system. The first is the very simple one of keeping Euratom going and their feeling that they could not do so if they attempted to put Euratom facilities under the IAEA safeguards over the objection of one Euratom member, that is, France. If Euratom safeguards were to disappear, then an element of discrimination would be injected into the Community in that France would be the only Euratom country without safeguards on its peaceful activities.

The problem is complicated by the common ownership of nuclear fuels and the presence on the territories of four members of facilities which are owned and operated by Euratom and, hence, immune from the jurisdiction of the state on whose territories they are located.

Another concern is, of course, based on the feeling of Euratom members that the economic and political objectives which they hope to obtain through Euratom will be jeopardized if they do not negotiate with the IAEA on a group basis so far as matters within the competence of Euratom are concerned.

One possible way of handling this concern has been suggested by a variety of sources, including an informal suggestion by a Soviet delegation officer in Geneva. It would provide for negotiation of “bilateral or multilateral” agreements with the IAEA. This concept is similar to that of the safeguards provision of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (LA-NFZ).² It would permit individual or collective negotiations, and thus permit Euratom countries to deal as a group with the IAEA to safeguard their common interests. If you would like new draft treaty language along these lines before your discussions with the Soviets at Glassboro tomorrow or any other time, I will be available on an on-call basis.

You will recall that, in your letter to Willy Brandt,³ you indicate we would not depart from the NATO agreed Article III language without further consultation. Minister von Lilienfeld made a demarche yesterday stressing the importance of adhering to this understanding.

You also may wish to discuss with the Soviets the possibility of facilitating the handling of the Euratom point by having both the U.S. and the Soviets make an offer to put at least some of their peaceful activities under safeguards. This would, to all intents and purposes, eliminate the Euratom arguments. We believe that the Soviets have a number of facilities (e.g. power and research reactors) devoted solely to peaceful purposes which they could offer to be safeguarded by the IAEA without affecting their military programs. A talking paper on this subject is attached.

Adrian S. Fisher

Attachment 1⁴

April 25, 1967.

U.S. DRAFT TREATY

ARTICLE III

For the purpose of providing assurance that source or special fissionable material covered by this Article is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices:

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to have international safeguards meeting the requirements of this Article on all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory or under its jurisdiction. In cooperating with any non-nuclear-weapon State with respect to peaceful nuclear activities within the territory or under the jurisdiction of such State, each State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to provide

(a) source or special fissionable material unless the material shall be subject to such safeguards; or

(b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material unless the special fissionable material shall be subject to such safeguards;

2. After the original entry into force of this Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty which has activities subject to any international safeguards system other than that of the International Atomic Energy Agency undertakes to facilitate verification by that Agency of the effectiveness of the international safeguards system applied to such activities;

3. To meet the requirements of this Article, international safeguards (a) shall be either those of the IAEA or such other international safeguards generally consistent therewith as are accepted by the IAEA under verification procedures mutually agreed by the authorities of the IAEA and the authorities of the other international safeguards system concerned, and (b) shall be applied as soon as practicable but no later than three years from the date of the original entry into force of this Treaty;

4. Agreement on the implementation of IAEA verification of another international safeguards system, as provided for in this Article, shall be reached as soon as practicable but no later than three years from the date of the original entry into force of this Treaty; and

5. The international safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technical development of the Parties having them.⁵

Attachment 2⁶

May 20, 1967.

SOVIET DRAFT TEXT

ARTICLE III

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to accept the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency on all its peaceful nuclear activities. Each State Party to this Treaty further undertakes not to provide source or fissionable material, or specialized equipment or non-nuclear material for the processing or use of source or fissionable material or for the production of fissionable material for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear-weapon State, unless such material and equipment are subject to such safeguards.

Attachment 3⁶

TALKING POINTS ON SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS

1. US considers that, to overcome charges of discrimination in safeguards article requiring mandatory safeguards and to gain acceptance of such article, it may well prove necessary for nuclear-weapon signatories to offer to accept IAEA safeguards on at least some of their peaceful nuclear facilities. Such an offer would apply only after entry into force of an NPT with the desired safeguards article. The justification for exclusion of any facilities from offer would be on military or security grounds and not for any commercial reasons.

2. Accordingly, US is prepared to make such an offer in order to facilitate acceptance of a safeguards article which requires mandatory safeguards and which is mutually acceptable to the US and the Soviets. We have indication that UK prepared to join us in offer.

3. While US and UK offer may be sufficient to gain widespread agreement on acceptable safeguards article, such agreement may also require some degree of Soviet acceptance of IAEA safeguards. US hopes that USSR would be able to offer to place at least some of its peaceful facilities under IAEA safeguards, and accompany US and UK in a joint or parallel offer at the appropriate point in the negotiations. However, US for its part would be prepared to make offer without Soviets and without UK.

4. Properly presented, such a US-UK-Soviet offer should not only greatly facilitate acceptance of safeguards article, but could go far toward meeting non-nuclear-weapon states’ demands for balanced obligations.

5. If Soviets are interested, we are agreeable to coordinating timing and manner of presenting offers for maximum beneficial effect.

Background-Noforn

1. Recent cables indicate Soviet knowledge of possible US offer to accept IAEA safeguards on peaceful nuclear facilities and Soviet thoughts on making similar offer.

2. The approximate numbers of Soviet peaceful nuclear facilities which could be placed under IAEA safeguards are nine power reactors and twenty-three research reactors (including reactors estimated to be operational by 1968). The above totals exclude reactors designed for military use or for dual plutonium/power production, maritime reactors employing Soviet submarine reactor technology, and reactors located in or very near sensitive installations.

3. The Soviets could probably afford to have IAEA safeguards applied to all, or at least most, of the thirty-three reactors listed above without significantly impairing their plutonium supply for weapons purposes. The amount of plutonium produced in these reactors is estimated to be only a small percentage of the plutonium the U.S.S.R. produces and will produce for weapons purposes.

4. The Soviets have peaceful uses for significant amounts of plutonium. For example, at present a single Soviet research reactor uses a quantity of plutonium in its core which is almost equivalent to the total estimated annual amount of plutonium presently produced in all peaceful reactors. Also, they will need a large quantity (1000 kg) of plutonium for peaceful purposes in the early 1970’s for the plutonium core of their BN-350 fast breeder reactor, presently under construction.

5. The Soviets have held closely the location and technology of fuel fabrication and fuel reprocessing plants, and we do not expect any such plants to be part of any offer to accept IAEA safeguards. Most probably all such plants are mixed military/peaceful facilities to some extent, but undoubtedly have primary emphasis on their military aspect.

6. The following tabulation, listed for purposes of comparison with the U.S.S.R. peaceful program, includes approximate totals of peaceful U.S. and U.K. nuclear facilities which could be offered for IAEA safeguarding. The totals include facilities estimated to be operational by 1968.

U.S.: Power Reactors—19 (plus 2 reactors already under IAEA safeguards)

Research Reactors—over 100 (plus 2 reactors already under IAEA safeguards)

Fuel Reprocessing Plant—1

Fuel Fabrication Plants—10 (while fabricating peaceful uses fuel)

U.K.: Power Reactors—17 (plus 2 reactors already under IAEA safeguards)

Research reactors—20

(Included in power reactor listings are experimental power reactors and power demonstration reactors.)

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967. Secret.
2. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco) was signed in Mexico City on February 14, 1967, and entered into force April 22, 1968. The United States is not a party to this Treaty. For the English language text of the Treaty, see 22 UST 762. For specific reference to Article 13, the safeguards provision, see ibid., 772.
3. Not found.
4. Secret.
5. The substance of most of the remainder of this paragraph as it appeared in the April 25 draft we gave the Soviets has been incorporated in Article V of the draft Treaty prepared by the Co-Chairmen on June 7. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. Secret.
6. Secret.