Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

163. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

Washington, October 31, 1966, 7:52 p.m.

76255. For the President and Secretary. Following are instructions which we are proposing to send USUN re non-aligned resolution on non-proliferation,² in particular that part dealing with non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.

Begin Text. 1. US Del should vote affirmatively for non-aligned NP res.

2. Operative para 3 which “invites the nuclear weapon powers to give an assurance that they will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states” provides opportunity for US Govt state public position regarding use of nuclear weapons which of particular timeliness in view possible developments in NPT negotiations.

3. We believe that pressure to gain security assurances through proposals to limit use of nuclear weapons, such as Kosygin proposal for clause in NPT,³ has been growing and is likely increase considerably as impression grows that conclusion of NPT is becoming imminent. Accordingly, we wish take this opportunity to state conditions, as formulated by United States, under which United States would limit use of nuclear weapons. Since operative para 3 of NP res “invites the nuclear weapon powers to give an assurance,”⁴ we believe US Govt can properly respond with unilateral assurance formulated in fashion acceptable to US Govt. Having made public statement, we would then impress upon others as necessary that we do not intend agree to assurances provision in NPT.

4. In explaining affirmative vote of the US, you should state that the US fully understands the security concerns of non-nuclear weapon states which undertake not to obtain their own nuclear weapons. You should state that the US has previously recognized this concern, quoting from President Johnson’s statement of October 18, 1964, that non-nuclear weapon states “can be sure that, if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it.”⁵ You should then point out that it is particularly appropriate for the UN, which was founded for purpose of maintaining international peace and security, to consider question of security for non-nuclear states, and to do so at time when there appears to be increasing opportunity to conclude a non-proliferation treaty. You should express conviction of the US that a non-proliferation treaty will advance the security of all states, nuclear and non-nuclear. You should then state on behalf of the US Govt that the US, taking into account all of these considerations and in view of the invitation contained in operative para 3 of the resolution, declares its intention to refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state that is party to a general non-proliferation treaty and that is not engaged in an act of aggression supported by a nuclear weapon state. Finally, you should reaffirm US dedication to purposes and principles of UN Charter and state conviction that both NPT and policy just enunciated by US will strengthen UN.

5. In advance of making above statement, you should explain to US allies and others, in your discretion, US thinking behind decision to make statement. In addition to drawing on considerations in para 3, you should stress following:

a. US Govt wishes create most favorable climate for maximum adherence to possible non-proliferation treaty.

b. US Govt believes UN is proper forum for consideration question security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states and does not intend agree to incorporating assurances clause in text of non-proliferation treaty.

c. Qualification that non-nuclear weapon state must not be engaged in act of aggression supported by nuclear weapon state is essential for US. If questioned about desirability of using words or concepts inherently vague, i.e., “aggression” and “supported by nuclear weapon state,” you may explain that the US would make its own determinations, should this ever be necessary, and that this is situation which exists under present circumstances.

d. No implications should be drawn re US policies in Vietnam. End Text.

Joint Chiefs “express their opposition to the Kosygin proposal or any variation thereof. Their opposition was based on the reason that such a non-use assurance could provide an impetus toward total prohibition of nuclear weapons and that the total impact could alter the current military balance to the detriment of the US.” They also said that a vote for the resolution would “offset the deterrent effect of US nuclear power and free the non-nuclear states for aggression without fear of nuclear reprisals.”

Secretary of Defense and ACDA support affirmative vote indicated in above instructions, as do I.

Believe NP resolution in question will be adopted overwhelmingly. All other parts of resolution are free of problems for US. Adoption of this resolution permits US to declare in its own terms the conditions under which it willing to refrain from using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries. Such a declaration should encourage accession to NPT. Moreover, of more immediate importance, it would give US grounds for resisting proposals for other disadvantageous limitations on use of nuclear weapons. Extent of limitation on US nuclear deterrent resulting from terms of proposed resolution plus declaration would not be significant: Restriction would not apply in the event of any war in Europe in which Soviets gave their support; for declaration to apply to North Korea and North Vietnam they would have to become parties to NPT and would have to keep ChiComs and Soviets from giving them support in any hostilities; and perhaps most important, question of whether an aggression has taken place and whether a nuclear weapon state is providing support would be subject to US determination.

I would propose to send the instructions if necessary at the appropriate time if you do not indicate non-concurrence. It now appears, however, very unlikely that vote will come this week.

Katzenbach

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18 UN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Alan F. Neidle (ACDA/IR) and Lawrence D. Weiler (ACDA/DD); cleared by Fisher (ACDA), McNamara (DOD) (in substance), McNaughton (DOD/ISA), and Sherrod McCall (S/S); and approved by Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach. The President and Secretary Rusk were in Seoul October 31-November 2 to meet with Korean President Park Chung Hee.
2. Reference is to a draft resolution submitted by 32 Latin American, Asian, and African countries in the U.N. General Assembly’s First Committee on October 27. (U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.371)
3. See footnote 3, Document 122.
4. The sponsors of the draft resolution submitted a revised draft in the First Committee on November 9, which among other things replaced paragraph 3 with a new paragraph 4, urging the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to consider the proposal that the nuclear-weapon powers give assurance that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states without nuclear weapons on their territories. (U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.368/Rev.1 and Add.1-6)
5. President Johnson made this statement in a radio and television broadcast. For text see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book II, pp. 1377-1380.