Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

146. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, September 2, 1966, 1 p.m.

Mr. President:

In the light of my memorandum to you of August 12, 1966,² I have talked with Bob McNamara at length about the non-proliferation treaty.

He agrees that the heart of the matter is this: so long as we are committed to NATO we cannot, should not, will not give up our veto over the firing of nuclear weapons in that theater.

The issue arises in connection with the “European clause”: it never arose with the MLF, where the retention of our veto was universally accepted.

There have been several U.S. statements in the past which implied that if the Europeans fully united we would not rule out the possibility of their having an independent right to fire nuclear weapons from a presumably integrated European nuclear force. Behind these statements were three judgments:

• —It was wise to encourage the movement towards European unity, and unity would be encouraged by “not ruling out” the possibility of a European force with a right to fire as independent as that now enjoyed by U.K. and France;
• —If and when the Europeans ever got to a position of true integration and seriously contemplated the problem, they would, in fact, not ask for the surrender of the U.S. veto, because they would lose more in the dilution of the U.S. commitment this would bring about than they would gain by this act of “independence;”
• —If and when the Europeans ever got to a position of true integration, and there was a European executive equivalent to the President of the United States, a rational arrangement could be worked out with that executive consistent with the requirements of the alliance.

The non-proliferation treaty forces us to face this issue sooner than we might otherwise have to face it; because the European clause in the treaty makes a reality out of a quite distant but important contingency.

If we are now to probe Gromyko and the Russians deeply as to the possibility of a non-proliferation treaty, Bob McNamara’s and my judgment is that the probe should take place on this question: Would the Russians sign a treaty if we were to guarantee that we would not surrender under any future circumstances, and whatever the form of nuclear organization in the West, our veto over the firing of nuclear weapons?

As I said in my memo, this is the one issue on which the Russians might have a legitimate interest in the nuclear organization of the West, and it is an issue where Russian and U.S. interests converge with those of Europe, if the Europeans think the matter through.

If Secretary Rusk should find that Gromyko was willing to accept a non-proliferation treaty based on this principle, we would, however, then face an interesting problem of persuading the Europeans to accept this proposition. I believe the job could be done because, at bottom, what the Europeans are really groping for—although they are not very clear about it—is not an independent right to fire, but an insurance policy against the possibility that at some future time some American administration might pick up its nuclear weapons and its troops and go home. The British and French national nuclear capabilities and a future possible European nuclear force is a kind of insurance that, if we should ever move in this way, Western Europe would not be left naked of nuclear capacity.

But so long as we remain a fully committed ally of Europe, Europeans can, I believe, be made to see:

• —that it is ridiculous for them to think of firing their nuclear weapons without ours; and
• —that the threat to use a small nuclear force in Europe to engage us in a nuclear war to which we were not committed could only lead to the U.S. pulling back and dissociating itself from European defense.

No American President is going to place in the hands of the Europeans—or anyone else—the right to determine when we are engaged in a nuclear war.

The outcome of such sober and careful discussion with the Europeans would, I believe, be an understanding that so long as they wanted our total commitment, including a nuclear commitment, to the defense of Europe, a European nuclear force could relate to ours only on the same basis as the two-key system now works: namely, that affirmative action both by Europe and the U.S. would be necessary for the firing of nuclear weapons in defense of Europe.

Therefore, we suggest that:

1. Secretary Rusk focus on this question of the continued U.S. veto in his talks with Gromyko;

2. If it emerges that this is the critical issue with Moscow, we then tell Gromyko that we must talk with our allies and then come back to him.

I am raising this with you at Bob McNamara’s request. He feels that you, Secretary Rusk, and he ought to talk about this before the conversation with Gromyko is undertaken in New York. For some reason he did not feel free to raise it directly with Secretary Rusk, as I suggested he might. It is possible that Secretary Rusk would have views which differed from Bob’s and mine in this matter; and he may have alternative formulae to suggest to try out on Gromyko.

This matter is so fundamental that you may wish to budget for a small and quite leisurely meeting with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara in which we could hear Secretary Rusk’s views about how to probe Gromyko; Bob McNamara would have a chance to express his; and you would have a chance to give Secretary Rusk guidance for his talks on this subject with Gromyko.

To recall my own approach to this question of the U.S. veto, I am attaching my memorandum of August 12.

Walt

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Non-Proliferation, Box 11. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that the memorandum was received at 1:52 p.m. the same day. The source text bears the following choices for approval: “Set up a special meeting, Put on Tuesday lunch agenda, Leave it to Secretary Rusk, and See me.” The choice “Put on Tuesday lunch agenda” is checked. No record of the Tuesday lunch discussion has been found.
2. The memorandum under reference sets forth Rostow’s conclusions from his thoughts on nonproliferation and arms control which he elaborated in an attached memorandum of the same date to the President. (Ibid., Bator Papers, Non-Proliferation, August 1, 1966-September 27, 1966, Box 30)