Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

131. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, May 25, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Key ENDC Developments and Recommendations

1. Non-Proliferation. My final report to you from Geneva (Disto 2210)² describes a possible shift in the Soviet position. As you know, both in public and private, the Soviets have previously taken a tough and extreme line against any FRG “access” to nuclear weapons, including “political access,” such as the Special Committee. Their public attacks on our non-proliferation treaty have continued to be extreme. However, in private conversations at Geneva, both Soviet and Bloc representatives have now shown awareness of the need to accommodate any non-proliferation treaty to the reality of continued nuclear consultations and, by implication at least, to the reality of present nuclear arrangements in NATO.

From comments by Soviet and Czech staffs and Polish representatives, it appears they do not really expect any formal burial of NATO hardware proposals, which they say they consider “dead” anyway. They seem to want some assurance, presumably in the treaty, that continuing NATO arrangements, including improved consultative machinery, will not serve as a front for future hardware arrangements and that participants in any consultative group will not acquire power of decision regarding actual employment of nuclear weapons (as distinct from participation in questions of strategy, deployment, etc.).

We have no way of knowing whether the Soviets and Bloc representatives are genuinely, though cautiously, seeking serious negotiations. As a result of increased tensions over Viet Nam, this may not be the case. Nevertheless, I believe we should consider whether there are ways we can test Soviet willingness to move to more reasonable positions. With this in mind, I recommended in cable 2210 from Geneva that we give serious thought to the possibility of a general non-proliferation formula which neither expressly permits nor prohibits a NATO “hardware” option. We do not believe the Soviets could utilize a withdrawal clause in such a treaty to interfere seriously in the affairs of NATO because withdrawal as such would not give them any practical basis for taking action against our interests, i.e., they will presumably not wish to disseminate in any event. Our allies would, of course, have to be consulted.

In practical effect, this amounts to a recommendation that we take a serious look at the current price of getting a non-proliferation treaty. I shall want to discuss this further with you.

I cannot help but believe that a non-proliferation treaty would have fundamental value beyond the field of non-proliferation. On the one hand, there would be unquestioned political value to us in achieving a major arms control agreement with the Soviets in view of the state of Sino-Soviet relations. On the other hand, it would be particularly unfortunate if the U.S. becomes isolated on arms control issues at a time when, because of the repercussions of the Viet Nam situation, the U.S. badly needs to demonstrate its desire to seriously negotiate measures contributing to international stability and curbing the nuclear arms race.

2. Soviet Willingness to Cooperate in Test Ban Verification. In Geneva, the Soviets requested a Co-Chairman’s meeting in order to inform us of their willingness to participate in the exchange of national seismic data. Exchanges would be on a “voluntary” basis and analysis of data would be done by national institutions rather than by an international center. The Soviets professed an interest in bringing U.S. and Soviet viewpoints closer together to enhance long-range prospects for agreement. I replied that we welcomed their interest in data exchanges but this could not be a substitute for necessary on-site inspections. The Soviets did make clear that their interest in exchanging seismic data was not contingent on the U.S. dropping its demand for on-sites.

Although the Soviets may be attempting to undercut our position on on-sites, it is also a possible indication that, in the arms control field, they are willing to work towards agreement, despite Viet Nam. We should not under-estimate the significance of the Soviet move. The Soviets know that international exchange of data is basically directed at improving the capability of other countries to determine what is happening inside the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union is, in fact, willing to exchange data toward this end, it will be a most important step.

3. SNDV Freeze and Reductions. On instructions,3 I formally asked the Soviet Co-Chairman whether his government would be interested in the possibility of a freeze on the manufacture of SNDVs if this could be accompanied by reductions. I read to him a list of issues which we proposed for discussion in the event they were interested. A week later, the Soviets indicated their recognition that we had made a serious proposal and requested a paper setting forth the issues to be discussed. We provided the paper,³ but have not yet received their response.

William C. Foster

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Memoranda Files, FRC 77 A 52, Memos to the Secretary of State, 1966. Secret. An unsigned handwritten note on the source text reads as follows: “Sir: We are informed by Ben Read that Mr. Foster mentioned this memo to you last evening. Copies have been sent by S/S to Messrs. Ball, U.A. Johnson, and Thompson.”
2. At this point the source text bears the following handwritten note: “(below at clip; Sec saw),” referring to telegram Disto 2210 from Geneva; not found.
3. Not further identified.