Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

108. Message From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson¹

Moscow, undated.

TRANSLATION OF MESSAGE HANDED ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN

January 11, 1966, 6 p.m.

Dear Mr. President.

We have decided to address this communication to you in order to set forth our views on a question, the urgency of which is recognized by everybody. This question is the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which has been discussed for a long time on a bilateral basis and at international conferences, but the solution of which has not progressed so far.

The Soviet Government, as you undoubtedly know, attaches great significance to the program of preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons. We believe that if the dissemination of these terrible weapons of mass destruction is not blocked and these weapons continue to spread more and more throughout the world, that would inevitably lead to the growth of the threat of war and would immeasurably increase the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. Having in mind the importance of this problem the Soviet Government submitted it for consideration by the twentieth session of the UN General Assembly, by introducing a draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We are aware of the official position of your Government on this question. We have taken note of the statement of the U.S. Government, transmitted on December 8, 1965, through Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, that it is interested in reaching an agreement on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and that “the objective (of such an agreement) should be that nuclear weapons really not be disseminated.”² We also note that the U.S. Government agreed that such a treaty, as set forth in the General Assembly resolution of November 19, 1965, adopted at its twentieth session, “should be void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form.”³

If one proceeds from these statements it would not seem to be very difficult to work out a mutually acceptable text of a non-proliferation treaty. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The American draft treaty and even more steps actually taken by the U.S.A. indicate that the Governments of our countries by no means give the same content to the very notion of “non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.”

The Soviet Government has in mind such a treaty which would really exclude the possibility of any dissemination of nuclear weapons whatever which would make it impossible for non-nuclear powers to acquire access to these weapons in any form, directly or indirectly.

As for the Government of the U.S.A., our understanding is that while declaring its readiness to reach an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it has in mind an agreement which would provide a significant exception to the principle of non-proliferation by permitting the implementation of plans, now under discussion within the framework of NATO, for providing access to nuclear weapons to the non-nuclear member states of this military alliance, including West Germany. It is precisely this that is the main difference between the positions of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Government has frequently drawn the attention of the U.S. Government to the fact that statements on striving to prevent dissemination of nuclear weapons are in no way compatible with actions actually leading to the spread of such weapons. We have invariably emphasized, since we have most weighty reasons for doing so, that what is especially dangerous is a policy of satisfying step by step the nuclear claims of the Bonn Government, creating thereby conditions which make it easier for the West German revanchists to get access to nuclear weapons.

Indeed, it is a fact that the U.S.A. on an evergrowing scale provides the FRG and the other NATO allies with atomic information. It is a fact that the U.S.A. trains military personnel of those countries in the methods of using nuclear weapons. It is a fact that the U.S.A. provides some of its allies, including the FRG with the very weapons which are capable of carrying nuclear shells, although it declares at the same time that the nuclear warheads for such weapons remain under the control of the U.S. Moreover, as it was recently reported in the Western press, American nuclear warheads are now not only assigned to the armed forces of several non-nuclear member-states of NATO and deployed on their territories but in some cases West German planes and missiles manned by West German military personnel are even equipped with these nuclear warheads.

There are going on in NATO and at bilateral meetings of representatives of Western powers active discussions of various plans, the essence of which, no matter what might be said, is only one thing: how and to what extent to satisfy the growing nuclear demands of West Germany. A new concession to West Germany which creates obstacles on the road to the solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was the proposal providing for the FRG’s participation in decisions on the question of nuclear strategy in NATO within the framework of the so-called “McNamara committee.”⁴

And today the Bonn Government is now putting forward new claims and is getting ready to demand even more tomorrow. The final goal pursued by the West German Government is obvious, although it tries meanwhile to camouflage it, is the possession of nuclear weapons.

Frequent attempts have been made to convince us that West Germany allegedly has no such goals and its access to nuclear weapons is not involved. But what is left of these assurances if the Defense Minister of the FRG von Hassel openly states that West Germany will not be satisfied until it possesses atomic weapons, and other Bonn leaders now publicly say that the FRG will not sign a non-proliferation agreement if it blocks the creation of a NATO nuclear force.

Thus, the FRG Government in effect challenges the whole world, the United Nations, which called for earliest conclusion of a treaty to prevent dissemination of nuclear weapons. And how can one evaluate statements by the head of the West German Government that during his recent visit to the U.S.A. he received not only a promise to provide West Germany with “appropriate participation in nuclear defense”⁵ of NATO, but also agreement that the settlement of NATO nuclear problems would be given priority over the question of the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty?

These statements by leaders of the FRG Government were not refuted by the American side although their meaning is at variance with the position of the U.S. Government as it was stated to us in the communication of December 8 and earlier statements made to us by official representatives of the U.S.A. Moreover, the Western press has carried a report that the United States indeed gives priority to NATO nuclear plans in the belief that the non-proliferation agreement can wait, since even if these plans should be resolved, the Soviet Union allegedly would not abandon its position on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In connection with such baseless speculations we deem it necessary to emphasize once again that no matter what intentions the United States and other Western powers may have in connection with those plans now under discussion in NATO, the Soviet Union will never agree that West Germany should acquire access to nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever. No matter how one evaluates the FRG’s policy,—we know that your assessment of this policy differs from ours,—one thing is clear: the access of West Germany to nuclear weapons would create a direct threat to European states and would cause a new, sharp aggravation of the whole international situation.

The Soviet Government has already unequivocally stated that if the FRG got access to nuclear weapons either through a multilateral or an Atlantic nuclear force, on the basis of creating some “atomic committee” or in any other form, the Soviet Union would be forced to take all measures which it, along with its allies and friends, would consider necessary for securing peace in Europe. This is a question of the vital interests of the Soviet Union, and we not only have the right but believe it to be our duty—this stems from the Potsdam agreements as well—to prevent West Germany from becoming the source of a new war.

Now, Mr. President, the moment has come, when it is necessary to make a definite choice: either we shall firmly adhere to the position of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons without any deviations from this position or the situation will inevitably lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It is said that this whole question is still under consideration by your Government and that final decision has not yet been made. We would like to believe that this is so. Knowing that the decisive word on this rests with you, we hope that you will personally devote the most searching attention to this question.

The problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is so important that it is necessary once again to weigh with utmost responsibility all possible consequences of the decision to be made. It would be a mistake in this matter to try to derive some unilateral advantages. A non-proliferation agreement must meet in equal measure the interests of all countries and all peoples.

For its part, the Soviet Government, consistently standing for the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons, is ready to begin businesslike negotiations to prepare such a non-proliferation treaty. Taking into account the considerations put forward by the American side in the statement of December 8, we propose that during the forthcoming session of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, along with the discussions of the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Committee itself, representatives of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. carry on a bilateral exchange of views in order to expedite the working out of an appropriate draft treaty.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin, Box 8. Secret. A January 12 memorandum from Benjamin H. Read to McGeorge Bundy states that this message seemed to renew the “pen-pal” correspondence.
2. Document 104.
3. Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX), adopted November 19, 1965. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1965, p. 73)
4. Secretary of Defense McNamara suggested the establishment of a select committee of four or five members reportedly including France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany to study ways of extending nuclear weapons planning and consultation at the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting in Paris May 31-June 1, 1965. A Special Committee of the Defense Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany met at Paris, November 27, 1965, for this purpose. It set up three working groups concerned with communications, data exchange, and nuclear planning under the guidance of a steering committee consisting of the Permanent Representatives of the participating countries. See Department of State Bulletin, June 21, 1965, p. 993, and December 13, 1965, p. 939.
5. The phrase “appropriate participation in nuclear defense” is in the Joint Statement issued December 21, 1965, following discussions between Chancellor Erhard and President Johnson. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 1165-1167)