Enclosure A
STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN, JCS ON FY 1970 DEFENSE
BUDGET
Introduction
Mr. President, recognizing the financial constraints under which the
FY 70 budget is being developed, the
JCS decided against addressing
individual issues as has been the custom in the past. Instead, we
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propose to discuss the general
posture of our armed forces with emphasis on the impact of FY 70 budget decisions on present and future
military capabilities. I will provide a brief assessment and each
Service Chief will provide illustrative examples highlighting his key
areas of concerns.
The JCS are fully aware of the wide
variety of demands on our nation’s resources and the hard decisions
which must be taken in allocating these resources. The war in Southeast
Asia, coupled with the dangerous situation in Northeast Asia, and the
unstable and uncertain environments in the Middle East and Europe,
challenge our capability for adequate and timely response to other
contingencies which might arise.
First, The Threat—
The Soviet threat continues to expand in size and improve in quality.
There is no indication that it is leveling off nor is there any sign of
self-imposed limitations based upon achievement of a particular force
capability. We expect an increase in Soviet land and sea-based missiles,
an increased deployment of anti-ballistic missiles, an improvement in
air defense, and an overall improvement of their general purpose
forces.
Regarding Strategic Forces—
Despite US progress in certain areas, rapid increases in USSR capabilities have eroded our once
clearly superior strategic position.
The Soviet missile force is growing in size. Our strategic force is
undergoing qualitative improvements, such as Poseidon and Minuteman III,
which will increase our force effectiveness; however, it is programmed
to remain static in numbers. While our bomber force is being reduced,
the loss in numbers is partially offset by the introduction of a
short-range attack missile and a new decoy missile. Our capability to
defend the continental US against the bomber threat will be reduced by
force reductions programmed for FY 70.
The lack of an effective ballistic missile defense is also cause for
concern, although the planned Sentinel deployment represents a
significant first step in this direction.
In the General Purpose Forces Area—
The JCS are concerned with the decreased
readiness of our general purpose forces and their capability to respond
to possible worldwide contingencies. Our fighting forces in Vietnam are
the best equipped and supported in history; however, the higher
priorities given Southeast Asia, together with manpower and funding
limitations, have resulted in constraints on personnel and materiel in
other areas of the world. The
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resulting personnel turbulence, curtailment of training, and diversions
of logistic assets to meet unprogrammed requirements magnify the
deficiencies in our current military posture.
In this regard, the plan for the improvement and modernization of the
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces is receiving priority attention and
support. The JCS note, however, that it
will require diversions of service equipment programmed and procured for
US forces. An uncompensated diversion of materiel from US forces will
have an adverse effect upon the readiness of general purpose forces not
directly committed to the conflict in Southeast Asia.
In Summary—
The JCS consider that US strategic force
levels, when compared with the growing Soviet strategic capabilities,
represent a declining trend in the US strategic position vis-à-vis the
USSR. Additionally, we believe that
the existing conventional capability of our general purpose forces
provides only a limited choice of options at the present time outside
Southeast Asia. It does not provide the capability to reinforce NATO adequately in a timely manner, nor of
simultaneously providing a response to other than minor contingencies
elsewhere.
Risks associated with the capabilities of our programmed forces can be
reduced by short-term actions such as: (1) improving the readiness of
deployed forces, (2) modernizing current forces, (3) retaining forces
scheduled for phase down, and (4) providing adequate logistic
support.
Deferral of such actions is generating an accumulation of unfunded
requirements which reduce current force capabilities and will have an
adverse impact on force capabilities in the future.
In amplification of these judgments, and to provide further insight into
these matters, each Service Chief is prepared to discuss his areas of
concern, with illustrative examples.
